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Preface
What is the essence of the martial arts? What is their place within or their 
 relationship to culture and society? This book, Deconstructing Martial Arts, 
analyses issues and debates that arise in scholarly, practitioner and popular 
 cultural discussions and treatments of martial arts, and it argues that martial 
arts are dynamic and variable constructs whose meanings and values shift, 
mutate and transform depending on the context. Martial arts serve multiple 
functions and can be valued and devalued in numerous ways. Furthermore, it 
argues that the act of deconstructing martial arts can be a valuable approach both 
in the scholarly study of martial arts in culture and society and in  expanding 
wider understandings of what and why martial arts are. Placing martial arts in 
relation to key questions and concerns of media and cultural studies around 
identity, value, imagination and embodiment, Deconstructing Martial Arts 
seeks to show that the approach known as deconstruction is a uniquely insight-
ful method of cultural analysis. To do so, the book deconstructs key aspects of 
martial arts to reveal the ways that their construction always involves political, 
ideological and mythological dimensions.
Using deconstruction as a method of analysis, Deconstructing Martial Arts 
contributes both to academic debates and practitioner understandings of 
 martial arts as cultural practices. The Introduction demonstrates that martial 
arts are variable social constructs and sets out the key concerns of the  emergent 
field of martial arts studies. The work then interrogates the question of whether 
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martial arts might be regarded as ‘trivial’, as some perspectives and values 
might suspect (Chapter One). After deconstructing and recasting this debate, 
Chapter Two explores the problem of definition. Can we define martial arts? 
Do we need to? The chapter argues that, contrary to many impulses in the 
study of martial arts, what is required is rigorous theory and analysis before 
definition in martial arts studies. This is because, as Chapter Three clarifies, 
martial arts are constituted via all manner of supplements, including media 
supplements.
Chapter Four takes this insight into the realm of a key emergent field of study, 
‘embodiment’, in order to problematize certain understandings of embodiment. 
In a field of practice saturated with – indeed, constituted by – media images, 
how can embodiment be approached without reference to media, culture, 
 language and signification? But, it asks, once you follow this line of approach, 
what happens to embodiment? Chapter Five connects the reconfigured notion 
of embodiment with the idea of martial arts as hybrid, heterogeneous and 
 eclectic discursive constructs, and brings this back into conversation with a 
well-worn theme, namely the proposition that the Western discourse of  Eastern 
martial arts may be ‘orientalist’. The chapter studies the core place of Taoism in 
such discourses but complicates the charge of orientalism by emphasising the 
incompletion and fragmentariness of all discourses. This displaces the discussion 
into the realm of incompletion and the inevitability of invention.
Chapter Six takes this focus further by interrogating ‘martial arts mind-sets’, 
which are typically imagined as ranging from supposed Zen-like serenity to 
something more akin to violent psychosis. This chapter moves from familiar 
contemporary connections that are made between Eastern martial arts and 
‘mindfulness’ and proposes instead a possible relation to ‘madness’. Given a 
 certain ‘undecidability’ here, the final chapter (Chapter Seven) enquires into the 
wider cultural and discursive status of martial arts by way of a key  deconstructive 
approach: The exploration of supplementary, minor and  marginal spaces. In this 
case, screen dialogue about martial arts in non-martial arts films is  examined, 
in order to glean unexpected insights into their wider cultural currency. Finally, 
in the face of such supplementarity, eclecticism, hybridity and undecidability, 
the Conclusion asks not where martial arts studies should draw the line around 
its object(s) of attention, but why line-drawing and boundary-marking is held 
to be so essential, not only in martial arts studies but also very frequently in all 
academic work and indeed all discourse.
The book is designed to be read from beginning to end, but its chapters could 
in fact be approached in any order. Furthermore, readers may wish to know 
that in its focus and orientation the book also falls into two distinct sections or 
halves. The Introduction, Chapters One and Two and the Conclusion are  heavily 
invested in academic, theoretical and disciplinary questions of the emergence 
of the field, its orientations, questions of definition, theory, and so on. Chapters 
Three to Seven, on the other hand, explore more obviously ‘cultural’ questions 
and may therefore feel more accessible, especially to newer readers of either 
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my own work, deconstruction, martial arts studies, or cultural theory more 
generally. However, the approach and orientation of all chapters is united by 
one thing: The analytical practice of deconstruction, deployed  specifically for 
deconstructing martial arts.

INTRODUCTION
(De)Constructing Martial Arts (Studies)
Deconstructing What?
First things first. What are martial arts? What do we mean when we say ‘martial 
arts’? These two questions can be regarded as either very similar to each other 
or very different. Simplifying in the extreme, we might propose that, although 
there is a spectrum of possible answers, there are two main positions on 
these matters. On the one hand, there is a kind of strict or rigorously literalist 
 position, which holds that only certain kinds of things can properly be regarded 
as martial arts, and that to fit the bill they must meet certain criteria, such as 
having been designed for or used on the battlefield, or being some (implicitly 
bodily) part of the ‘arts of war’. On the other hand, there is an ostensibly more 
relaxed, ‘loose’ or open-ended position, which might either be called cultural, 
‘discursive’, or (pejoratively) ‘relativist’. This holds that, because all of the terms 
and concepts that we use are variable conventional constructs, a category like 
‘martial arts’ only ever refers to whatever people think and say are ‘martial arts’. 
Both the category and the practices are heavily cultural and contextual.
There are strong criticisms of both positions. The literalist position tends 
to exclude a great many practices that are widely recognised as martial arts. 
 Literalist positions may not accept that judo, taijiquan (aka tai chi or taiji), 
aikido or even MMA, for instance, should be regarded as martial arts, for a 
range of reasons (all boiling down to the idea that they were not developed 
 specifically with the battlefield in mind). So, they would be excluded from 
 attention, even though many other people, in line with conventional usage, 
would be happy to apply the term ‘martial arts’ to them. In other words, strict or 
rigorous  literalist positions impose rigid criteria that exclude practices deemed 
to be ‘too far’ away from being martial arts ‘proper’ – such as practices that may 
focus on health cultivation, esoteric matters, or even practices with ‘too much’ 
of a focus on sport or personal development. In being fixated on war or battle, 
How to cite this book chapter: 
Bowman, P. 2019. Deconstructing Martial Arts. Pp. 1–17. Cardiff: Cardiff University 
Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.18573/book1.a. License: CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0
2 Deconstructing Martial Arts
a literalist position might even exclude the range of practices that make up the 
brutal world of full contact combat sports, such as MMA. Accordingly, one 
criticism of literalist positions is that in their quest for rigour and precision they 
can effectively become self-blinding or myopic positions which, in their putative 
insistence on ‘reality’, somewhat ironically end up refusing to accept what many 
(or most) others take to be reality – at least the lived reality of what people think 
of and do ‘as’ martial arts in a given culture or society at a given time.
Meanwhile, a culturalist or discursive position can be subject to the criticism 
that it is too ‘relativist’ or too open or flexible to be meaningful. In his important 
discussion of the problem of establishing a ‘concept’ of martial arts, Benjamin 
N. Judkins examines a range of scholarly approaches to martial arts and pro-
poses that, when it comes to ‘discursive’ understandings of martial arts, ‘self-
identification is a poor metric to judge what activities qualify as a martial art, 
or how we as researchers should structure our comparative case studies’. To his 
mind, ‘this has always been a potential weakness of the sociological approach’; 
so, he asks, ‘lacking a universally agreed upon definition, how should we move 
forward?’ (Judkins 2016a, 9)
Judkins himself moves forward by pointing out that definition is not really 
the question. The question is really one of why we are studying this possible 
object or field called ‘martial arts’ in the first place. In his discussion, Jud-
kins deconstructs the ways in which different kinds of attempts to define or 
even demarcate the category of martial arts tend to fall down or unravel. For 
instance, he notes that it is not possible to separate off ‘military’ from ‘civilian’ 
combat training or practices, as the likes of Donn Draeger once attempted to 
do. No cultural or social category is hermetically sealed. Each is always, effec-
tively or potentially, connected to and even infused with elements of others. 
Military and civilian realms may seem to be poles apart, and, in many respects, 
they often can be. But, as the history of the development of martial arts in the 
US shows us, the growth of civilian and police ‘martial arts’ practice was often 
indebted to and driven by returning servicemen (Krug 2001). The US is the 
big example, but other Western countries have similar narratives. The civilian/
military distinction is even murkier in Asian countries, where martial arts nar-
ratives are replete with tales of civilian pioneers entering military life and vice 
versa (see for example Gillis 2008 for a fascinating set of stories).
In his next move, following Peter Lorge’s influential discussion of martial arts 
in China, Judkins points out that even prominent Chinese military generals 
have (in)famously dismissed the martial utility of unarmed combat training 
(Judkins 2016a, 7–8; cf. Lorge 2012, 3–4). This may seem ironic. However, the 
real irony is that many of these ‘dismissive’ generals nonetheless continued to 
advocate the importance of unarmed combat training for their soldiers despite 
their conviction that unarmed combat training was not directly useful in war. 
This is because the importance of such ‘useless’ training derived from the sense 
that combat training builds character, resilience and spirit.
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All of this complicates things further. Indeed, it could be said to make the 
whole literalist position fall to pieces – not least because of the possibility 
that things as ‘non-martial’ as intense aerobic exercise, on the one hand, or 
 meditation, on the other, might be of more ‘combat value’ than literal combat 
training itself.
Many modern martial artists will recognise this idea. In technical (and 
polite) Chinese terms, this is the distinction between ‘gong’ and ‘fa’, or the deep 
skill, energy, force and sensitivity required (gong) to make what are otherwise 
merely the external semblance (fa) of techniques ‘work’ (Nulty 2017). In more 
general terms, how many times have martial arts practitioners looked at the 
demonstration of a technique and said or thought something like ‘that would 
never work, at least not if you did it like that’? The sense is that what is more 
important in combat is an intensity and single-minded determination of pur-
pose (spirit). How many of us have ever suspected, as I have, that in a danger-
ous situation it would be preferable to have an ultra-competitive ice-hockey, 
rugby or American football player on one’s side than a serene old tenth dan 
who can do amazing technical things but has never had a real fight? This is not 
simply a prejudice based on doubting someone’s ability. It is an intuition that 
someone who is used to intense physical competition will be more able to deal 
with non-compliant opponents and to handle what Miller calls the ‘chemical 
dump’ that explodes in our bodies in situations of extreme stress (Miller 2008; 
Miller and Eisler 2011).
Certain forms of (‘non-martial’) intense exercise popular today involve deal-
ing with equivalent if not identical physical and psychological stresses, training 
with as much ‘spirit’ as possible and taking the body to the limits of exhaus-
tion in different ways. Because of their physiological and often psychological 
similarity to what happens to a person in a physical conflict or confrontation, 
these intense exercise programmes are sometimes wholeheartedly embraced, 
advocated by, or included in military and/or ‘reality-based’ martial arts such 
as krav maga for precisely this ‘combat-like’ reason. On the flipside, as is more 
well-known (or more widely believed), ultra-slow movement or static medita-
tion practices emphasize and ‘train’ qualities like relaxed precision and calm 
detachment, and they have long been associated with the generation of both 
budō ‘fighting spirit’ and – ‘paradoxically’ – the cultivation of a peaceful out-
look (Benesch 2016; see also Reid and Croucher 1984).
As a long-time reader of the work of the deconstructive philosopher Jacques 
Derrida, what shines out from all of this is the extent to which practices (if 
not ideas) of ‘the martial’ or ‘martial art’ seem constantly to be supplemented 
by non-martial – or not literally martial – elements (Derrida 1976; see also 
Bowman 2008). In Derrida’s work, the notion of the supplement is deployed to 
demonstrate the ways that things we tend to want to consign to the category 
of the secondary, the add-on, the non-essential, the extra, and so on, are actu-
ally in a very real sense ‘primary’ (Bennington and Derrida 2008). Or else, put 
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differently, there is no ‘primary’, no ‘essence’, no ‘pure’, despite our desire for 
this to be so. Rather, there are only ever supplementary ingredients, practices 
or procedures. The idea of the ‘essence’ is itself an effect – a kind of illusion, or 
even delusion (Derrida 1998).
Of course, this is not to say that the ‘essence effect’ is somehow fake. Imagine 
your ideal martial arts class. Practitioners may think of a martial arts train-
ing session which starts or ends with some kind of meditation, then breath 
training, then physical exercises for strength or flexibility, then maybe forms 
training, then applications, then ever freer sparring, maybe also weapons, until 
they may have felt that they were ‘really’ doing ‘real fighting’. We might come 
away from such sessions feeling that we really have experienced the essence of 
martial arts training. And maybe we did experience something profound. But 
the point is that the experience of what we think of as one thing is always a sub-
jective experience of multiple supplementary elements being brought together 
in a certain way.
This is so even if we think that it is only ‘one thing’ that we are doing. 
Whether we are doing standing qigong training or some kind of real-world 
combat  scenario training, we are never simply doing ‘one thing’. Each of these 
 supposedly unitary activities is made up of myriad supplementary  components, 
each of which could be ever further dissected and divided up into ever more 
 differentiated elements. But, because we have a sense of ourselves as unitary, and 
because we have to use shared languages, we are always inclined (or required) 
to simplify things so that heterogeneity and multiplicity are given one name 
and imagined as having one essence.
This might help explain why practitioners of certain martial arts styles feel 
most strongly (often negatively, or critically) not about different styles but 
about practitioners of ‘the same’ style – what they regard as ‘their style’ – who 
practice differently and ‘therefore’, they believe, wrongly. Different practitioners 
with different approaches to training in different schools and clubs of the ‘same 
style’ can easily regard each other’s approaches as ‘wrong’ because each will 
feel that the essence of the style cannot be conveyed other than via the correct 
practices – their practices.
At issue is the inevitable emergence of difference within putative or  nominal 
sameness (Derrida 1988). Styles and systems cannot but change, from teacher 
to teacher, and even over time under the same teacher; because styles and 
 systems are not fixed essences but rather constructs. They are constructed 
through constantly changing practices and combinations of elements. They are 
constructs, not essences. Linguistic terms and imaginations work in many ways 
to try to persuade us that this or that martial art is always one thing. But, to put 
it bluntly, it is never one thing.
Hence, it is heartening that more and more scholars today are prepared 
to move away from making direct ontological or essentialist (what I earlier 
called ‘literalist’) statements about what this or that martial art ‘is’ or indeed 
what martial arts ‘are’. The very category ‘martial art’ or ‘martial arts’ is first 
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and  foremost a contemporary construct. It has a history. It is only within the 
last few decades that the notion of ‘martial art’ has become an intelligible term 
that is widely understood as the kind of thing we all tend to think it means 
( Farrer and Whalen-Bridge 2011; Judkins 2014a). What non-specialists tend to 
think the term ‘martial arts’ means frequently involves some vague evocation 
of punching and kicking, coming from Asia, and – surprisingly frequently, still, 
half a century after their heyday – being exemplified by figures like Bruce Lee 
or Jackie Chan, whose very names have become shorthand for ‘martial arts’ (or 
‘kung fu’).
Contemporary martial arts studies scholars have attempted to  negotiate 
the variably and changeably constructed character of the practices, as well 
as the terms and categories we have available for conceptualising them, in 
 various ways (Tan 2004; Bennett 2015; Judkins and Nielson 2015; Moenig 
2015). In an  opposite but effectively identical approach (that may be regarded 
as  controversial because of its barefaced straightforwardness), the historian 
Peter Lorge elected to study the place of unarmed and armed combat train-
ing  practices via the historical texts about them throughout Chinese history 
without excessively problematizing the term ‘martial arts’ at all. Lorge preferred 
to  proceed in terms of a sense of the obviousness of the object to be analysed 
(Lorge 2012).
Following what is ‘obviously’ part of the thing under analysis is a valid route – 
although the question immediately arises: Where do you draw the line? In 
studying this or that martial art, must we also study strength training, dietary 
practices, micro- and macro-ideologies, religious beliefs, and so on? What 
about the kinds of literature or television programmes that practitioners watch, 
or experienced in their formative years? As Derrida argued, context may be 
everything, and will always be incredibly important to understanding specific 
things, but when it comes to a context, how do you draw a line between what is 
inside and what is outside of a context? (Derrida 1988)
Indeed, a sense of the ‘obviousness’ of the object is the very thing that opens the 
door to all of the problems already discussed, and that Judkins has  insightfully 
dissected (Judkins 2016a). For once you scratch the surface of what’s ‘obviously 
in’ and ‘obviously out’ of our purview, everything becomes grey – and what 
Derrida would call ‘undecidable’. That is (to recall our earlier discussion of what 
is most useful), it may for instance be undecidable what is more important in 
krav maga training – how to handle a knife or how to keep going in the face 
of all terrors and adversities in a combat situation. The famously experienced 
author and self-defence instructor Rory Miller takes it even further. He states 
that, were you to be slapped in the face by a stranger, if you are the kind of 
 person who would instantly feel outrage, anger and aggression, then he has 
little to nothing to teach you. You have already ‘got it’ – the key to self-defence – 
a kind of righteous rage, and a capacity to retaliate ferociously (Miller 2008). 
If, however, you are someone who would freeze or feel fear, shock, confusion, 
even embarrassment, then perhaps he may never be able to teach you anything 
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worthwhile. You may never ‘get it’. You may always be incapacitated by fear, 
and you may always freeze. If this is true, then the question becomes one of 
whether therefore any pedagogy and hence any category akin to ‘martial arts’ is 
 worthwhile on any ‘literal’ level.
This line of thinking opens out onto the possibility that there may be a ‘myth 
of pedagogy’ (Rancière 1991) that runs far deeper and wider than the  familiar 
stories many martial artists know about instructors teaching absolute  rubbish 
to hapless students who believe they are learning effective techniques or 
 profound truths. If Miller’s observation has any value, then perhaps the matters 
of  teaching and learning in martial arts need to be rethought (Bowman 2016b). 
For the implication would seem to be that many people could never effectively 
‘learn’ the most important aspect of self-defence – the aspect that might be 
called the ability to become a kind of berserker.
This is to evoke one of the most popular of myths that circulates among 
 competitive fighters: That ‘fighters are born, not made’. This is the idea that 
good fighters have an innate fighting spirit, and that unless you have this 
you cannot succeed as a fighter. Of course, a wide range of different kinds of 
 evidence contradicts this enduring myth. The importance, and the palpable 
and measurable effects, of training strongly suggest that fighters are made, not 
born (Loïc Wacquant 2004, 2005, 2009).
Nonetheless, it is easy to get caught in an oscillation between accepting 
Miller’s statement (and maybe also the myth of the natural born fighter), on 
the one hand, and believing in the more observable development of novices 
into experts, on the other. It is not uncommon to see uncoordinated, timid, 
non-aggressive and incompetent people entering the club on day one and their 
undergoing a complete physical and psychological transformation over time. 
(It may have happened to you. I think it may have happened to me, possibly, 
and more than once, at least partially.) Those who adhere to a ‘natural born 
fighter’ myth could argue that the person who entered on day one nonetheless 
had a ‘spark’ or ‘hidden essence’ that was cultivated. Others may retort that one 
does not need a spark or an essence, that all that is required is the desire, an 
effective teacher, and ‘the means of correct training’ (Foucault 1977).
But is this really the be-all and end-all of martial arts? Some readers will have 
noticed that this discussion has so far been presupposing one specific kind of 
outcome (effective self-defence skill) and conflating that with another (‘being 
a fighter’, either in the sense of fighting ‘on the street’ or doing competitive 
 combat sports well). There is often a lot of conceptual drift and conflation in 
these waters. Despite its obviousness and familiarity, the range of meanings of 
‘martial arts’ is not set in stone, and connotations frequently leach and bleed 
into each other. Certainly, not everyone enters a training hall or club for  reasons 
of ‘self-defence’, ‘competition’ or ‘fighting’. People may not even know their rea-
sons. They may have more or less than one ‘reason’. There may be  multiple vague 
attractions. It may just be ‘something to do’, perhaps to avoid something else. If 
there are reasons, these may oscillate between different possible outcomes, or 
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merge and mutate. Reasons may change over time, emerging, receding, moving 
into and out of existence.
Scott Park Phillips offers an excellent overview of many of the most common 
reasons why people send their children to martial arts classes:
The most common reason people give for putting their children in 
 martial arts classes is so that they will learn how to act with moral self-
discipline. The list of qualities that the average parent wants their kid 
to learn in martial arts classes includes leadership, protecting the weak, 
legal and moral self-defense, overcoming challenges, persistence in the 
face of adversity, seeing the big picture, self-discipline,  self-improvement, 
self-motivation, cooperation, teamwork, body confidence and  awareness, 
love of exercise, learning from failures, and the ability to concentrate and 
focus. This is a lot of expectations to have! Why, if the main purpose of 
martial arts was fighting, would this ever have come about? The answer 
is simple: martial arts were always about more than fighting. (Phillips 
2016, 29)
As he notes at the end of this list of common assumptions, this is a hell of a lot of 
reasons to train – or, more specifically, a hell of a lot of hopes and  expectations 
(to project) about the outcomes of sending children to martial arts classes. And, 
as Phillips’ final claim makes clear, this is because the term ‘martial arts’ is in 
many contemporary ways a misnomer: Martial arts are not about learning how 
to win a literal war – they are always about other things.
Does this mean that the term ‘martial arts’ today often functions as a kind 
of marketing tool to ‘sell’ exercise and self-development to children? There 
could certainly be some truth in this. After all, it can sometimes be easier to 
 persuade children to find value in and do something by making cool-sounding 
associations: Big tough gorillas eat fruit; sharks eat fish and/or eating fish will 
make you clever; meat will give you big muscles; lions drink water; karate will 
make you tough; and so on. There is certainly some value in exploring this 
kind of intentional or accidental ‘misrecognition’ of one’s own activities and 
investments. The psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan theorised misrecognition as 
inevitable and fundamental to the formation of identity and the workings of 
the symbolic order; later thinkers incorporated this idea into various theories 
of ideology (Althusser 1971; Silverman 1983; Lacan 2001). Indeed, throughout 
his provocative study, Phillips argues that martial arts – Chinese martial arts 
in particular – have for an extremely long time been misrecognised as 
 principally or primarily martial when they are in fact much more a matter of art. 
Phillips’ specific argument is that Chinese martial arts are at root the  modern 
 descendants or residues of ancient Chinese theatrical traditions ( Phillips 2016).
Phillips’ overall argument about ‘possible origins’ may be controversial, 
but his contention that martial arts are always about more and other than 
fighting is helpful. Sixt Wetzler has proposed that the most common range of 
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 reasons for attending martial arts classes include the following: ‘Preparation 
for  violent conflict’, ‘play’, ‘competition’, ‘performance’, ‘transcendent goals’, 
and ‘health care’ (Wetzler 2015, 26). To this we might add the parental or 
vicariously  projected categories set out by Phillips; and then the categories 
applicable to children made to take martial arts classes. These would include 
‘having been sent to classes as a child by parents’ or ‘having been made to do 
it at school until it just became “something that I do”’ and on, to the whole 
range of ex post facto rationalisations that could be invented and sincerely 
believed at any moment.
The point is that, in addition to the good reasons and good categories 
 proposed by Wetzler, one should also remember the often less than good 
 reasons and often less than good categories that also organise the ‘decision’ (or 
obligation, or automatism) to ‘do’ martial arts. Reasons given for martial art 
training can either be ex post facto rationalisations with no bearing on what-
ever true story there might be, or they may arise long into a period of training. 
In other words, one problem with Wetzler’s proposed categories is that they are 
individualistic, rationalistic and ‘Cartesian’ – as if we are all Descartes and we 
wake up one day and say, ‘I think [I am interested in transcendent goals and 
healthcare] therefore I am [going to go to practice kung fu, not krav maga]’. 
But the world does not work anything like as simply as that. Often, reasons are 
imposed, or generated, or simulated.
A friend once told me about something that would often happen in the kung 
fu class she attended. The instructor (or sifu) would at points sit the whole class 
down and proceed to give them a lecture on the philosophy that underpinned 
the art. When she told me this, I was horrified to hear about such a practice 
in a martial arts lesson. She said she certainly found it very frustrating and 
 boring. We both agreed that surely not many people take martial arts classes 
for  lectures, and that martial arts philosophy lectures did not really strike us as 
being an appropriate or valid part of martial arts classes as such.
Of course, the idea that at least some martial arts ‘are philosophical’ is 
 widespread. Certainly, I am not saying that ‘philosophy’ is not present in 
 martial arts, or in martial arts classes. Nor is it to say that martial arts – or 
indeed martial art classes – cannot or should not be philosophized. But all of 
these are very different things. To say that something ‘is’ philosophical begs the 
question of what we think we mean by that. Are we saying we can philosophize 
it – or about it? Or are we saying that it is itself an example of a philosophical 
thing? These are very different propositions. We might philosophize (about) 
anything, maybe everything. But is that the same as saying that everything is 
philosophical? (I explore this more fully in Chapter Six.)
What does philosophy even mean? Derrida spent a lot of time pondering 
matters such as this. To his mind, the conundrum of what is inside and what is 
outside philosophy was the core problem of philosophy itself. Inevitably, lots of 
philosophers (and non-philosophers) disagreed with him. Indeed, despite any 
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evidence to the contrary, many philosophers still refuse to recognise Derrida 
as a philosopher.
Interestingly, as with ‘martial arts’, the questions of what philosophy is and 
what it is to do philosophy do not seem to have necessary or ineluctable answers 
either. People do different things and call it philosophy, and they disagree 
with what other people do under the title philosophy. This is the same as what 
 happens in and around martial arts. At best, ‘philosophy’ (or ‘martial arts’) is 
one term for many possible activities. But the form and content, start and end, 
and inside and outside of activities that may or may not be called martial arts 
are interminably and incessantly up for disagreement and dispute. Some see 
judo as a martial art; others insist that it is really ‘only’ a sport. Some see taiji 
as a martial art; others argue that it is at best a kind of calisthenics, maybe even 
closer to a religion than to combat.
In and around the academic world, there are long-running battles around 
defining ‘martial arts’. As mentioned, some have built up lists of criteria to be 
met before they will accept that this or that activity could be dignified with 
the term ‘martial art’. Others have argued quite persuasively (and often using 
the criteria that the self-appointed gatekeepers of propriety have themselves 
 proposed) that activities as unexpected as Star Wars-inspired Lightsaber 
 combat, and indeed even certain forms of computer gaming, fulfil all of the 
criteria to be regarded as martial arts (Judkins 2016a; Goto-Jones 2016).
But, with no unequivocal definition or delimitation of martial arts, not to 
mention any agreement on pedagogy, motivations, outcomes or philosophy, 
where do we go? The obvious place to go in such a situation is the university. 
Universities are normally regarded as the places where disagreements and the 
attempt to find answers are welcomed and housed. However, one question 
has long recurred: Can martial arts ever be taken seriously and studied in the 
 university as a legitimate subject, field or object of attention? (Bowman 2015a)
Constructing Martial Arts Studies
Whether martial arts can become a serious object of academic attention has 
long been a familiar question, especially to people whose interests straddle the 
worlds of martial arts and academia. Undoubtedly, for many who asked, it was 
widely assumed that the answer would always be no. No, martial arts cannot, 
could not, will not and would not be taken seriously within the university. And 
yet, research into this question actually returns a different answer. Digging 
deeper reveals that studies of martial arts have long appeared in all kinds of 
academic contexts and publications. Indeed, studies of martial arts can and 
do take place in all kinds of academic fields. Studies of martial arts have long 
appeared in fields as diverse as anthropology, film studies, law, management, 
philosophy, psychology, sociology, sports science, history, medicine, and more.
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Nonetheless, the question of whether martial arts can become a serious field 
of academic study in its own right is a very different matter (Bowman 2015a). 
The question of establishing a field is a very different thing to choosing a case 
study within a pre-existing field. It is eminently easy to imagine academic 
 studies of just about anything: Farting, fidgeting, nose-picking, nail-biting – 
you name it – could all be objects of study in any number of disciplines. Such 
studies could appear in almost any field, from anthropology to psychology to 
film to philosophy to history and beyond. However, it is quite another matter 
to propose that such a topic could or should mutate from being a specific object 
of study within a discipline, and morph into a disciplinary field in its own right.
Is there a call for fart studies, fidgetology, rhinopraxicology, or suchlike? 
There need to be pressing reasons for the development of a discrete new 
field – reasons based on answering some demand, filling a lack, redressing 
some kind of inadequacy or limitation. Answering a demand or responding 
to a lack has led to the emergence of many ‘suffix-studies’ subjects in recent 
decades:  Cultural studies, media studies, gender studies, Afro-American and 
other  ethnic identity studies, film studies, sports studies, management  studies, 
 postcolonial studies, and so on. The rationale for the development of a new sub-
ject always involves answering a need or a demand, by redressing a perceived 
lack or limitation in the present configuration of the disciplines. Researchers 
may find that a specific topic that they regard as important has inadequate 
space to develop within current disciplinary spaces, or that current approaches 
to it are inadequate or even stifling. Or a topic may simply be entirely absent, 
unrepresented, overlooked; and the development of ways to study it may not fit 
into any established disciplinary space.
All of the above-mentioned ‘suffix-studies’ subjects emerged in recent dec-
ades to fill a perceived gap. The driving forces for their development came 
from both inside and outside the university. Such fields endure, and research 
proliferates under their umbrellas, for as long as and to the extent that they 
adequately accommodate the direction of research questions. Taught courses in 
universities and colleges continue for as long as students turn up to take them 
and as long as they are deemed legitimate by the powers that be.
So, to what extent is there a demand or a need for an enduring field of martial 
arts studies? Can it really be something tangible and enduring? Is work that is 
currently being done under this title actually doing something unique, new or 
different, or are we really only ever dealing with discrete studies of martial arts 
organised by established disciplinary concerns? On the one hand, it is certain 
that there will always be studies of martial arts that can be straightforwardly 
positioned as fitting comfortably into established academic fields. There will 
be straightforward ‘case studies’ of martial arts that are written in film studies, 
literary studies, anthropology, psychology, area studies, history, sports studies, 
and so on. But, on the other hand, there are questions whose exploration entails 
breaking out of and moving beyond conventional disciplinary parameters.
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This kind of work can be difficult, particularly for scholars working in 
 isolation. In the academic world, it is always safer and easier to stick to the 
established questions, methods, points of reference and protocols of discussion 
within a pre-established disciplinary field than to explore things differently, to 
explore different things, or to explore different things differently. Fortunately, 
many academics and scholars from many disciplines are now being drawn 
together under the umbrella or banner of ‘martial arts studies’, attending spe-
cific conferences and publishing in newly emergent journals and book series. 
The immediate effect of this is that people researching questions in and around 
martial arts are coming to feel less isolated and more able to locate or express 
their interests in terms of an emerging discourse.
The importance of developing a collectivity cannot be overstated. It 
is  absolutely vital for researchers. On the one hand, it produces not just 
 affiliations and supportive conversations, but also informed disagreement 
and focused criticisms, even rifts, all of which stimulate both circumspect and 
 precise questions, argumentation, analysis and methods. On the other hand, it 
must be remembered that, in the university, if you cannot demonstrate what 
your research contributes to, then you cannot easily justify your activities. 
And if you cannot justify your activities then you will sooner or later encoun-
ter  innumerable pressures to change them. There are certainly no funding 
 opportunities available for projects that cannot relate their point, purpose and 
value to existing discourses.
So, the establishment of a discourse is essential to the production of mean-
ingful work. As the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan put it, the first signifier (the 
‘unary signifier’) is always essentially meaningless or unintelligible. It is only 
when there is more than one – when there are binaries, iterations, reiterations, 
responses, differences, positions, and ultimately constellations – that meanings 
and values can start to be formed. Without a discourse, individual utterances 
will be taken to be nothing other than odd, eccentric, isolated, unintelligible, 
and therefore meaningless or irrelevant follies. A context of reception needs to 
be established.
Fortunately, in recent years, researchers have been attracted to martial arts 
studies conferences and to publishing in and reading self-consciously martial 
arts studies publications. This cross-disciplinary attraction to martial arts stud-
ies events and publications has enabled many kinds of discussions and interac-
tions to take place across disciplinary divides, where before they would have 
been unlikely. Inevitably, this cross-fertilization has begun to produce thought 
and work that exceeds the confines of any one discipline. The net result is that 
different work is happening, completely new discussions are underway, organ-
ised by new questions, in new debates, generating all kinds of new knowledge.
In this sense, martial arts studies is the term for an interdisciplinary research 
nexus. A shared interest in the organising terms – all that is conjured up by 
the term ‘martial arts’ – is what holds the field together. I was about to say that 
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a shared interest in martial arts is the ‘glue’ that binds it together, but I don’t 
think that this is correct. We may not even agree on what the term designates or 
evokes. We may not agree on an approach to the object or field. Yet ‘martial arts’ 
provides the magnetism that draws researchers together. People are attracted 
to the field, because of a shared interest in what is perceived to be a shared 
object. Whether people stay within the field or not depends on whether they 
are stimulated by what they find in it (Bowman and Judkins 2017).
This is why martial arts studies has to be a circumspect, open, interested 
and interesting field of serious research, one that responds and speaks to a 
range of academic and cultural concerns, rather than being organised by too 
much certainty (Bowman and Judkins 2017). As Stuart Hall once argued, 
‘ certainty stimulates orthodoxy’ (Hall, Morley, and Chen 1996, 44), and 
orthodoxy is anathema to genuine thinking. I have argued elsewhere that too 
much  certainty is surely one of the key reasons why so many earlier attempts 
to generate an academic field for the study of martial arts failed (Bowman and 
Judkins 2017).
In the end, the specific kind of certainty that scuppered earlier attempts to 
establish what we are today calling martial arts studies boiled down to certainty 
about what ‘martial arts’ is (or are). This is why I have always insisted on remain-
ing open to what people think and feel and say ‘martial arts’ may mean. Hence, 
the academic study of martial arts should be open to the possibility of examin-
ing whatever people refer to as martial arts. However, at the same time as being 
entirely open to this, I am considerably less hospitable to most efforts to pro-
duce ‘academic’ definitions of martial arts. I do not mind the use of short-hand 
characterisations of the things we might be referring to when we say ‘martial 
arts’. Nor do I mind the production of frameworks for grouping or distinguish-
ing between practices. But I am resistant to any supposedly academic work 
that proposes a definition of martial arts and then only looks at things that fall 
into that definition. At best, this produces self-inflicted myopia, where one only 
sees what one wants to see. At worst, it produces the invention of theoretical 
worlds that bear no relation to anyone else’s reality. I often encounter a feeling 
of suspicion in the face of many kinds of academic categories for precisely this 
reason: I tend to suspect that certain categories and frameworks neither reflect 
the world nor help us to gain insight into it, but rather invent a theoretical 
world. Certainly, the best academic categories, schemas, frameworks, and so 
on, can produce extremely useful ways of conceptualising and grasping reality. 
But bad categories can actually stop us from seeing reality.
This is why I have so often argued against definition (Bowman 2017d, 
2017c, 2017b), and will do so again in Chapter Two. For, first, definition 
itself often seems more disabling than enabling, at least when it comes to my 
 concerns about the places and functions of martial arts in culture. (Moreover, 
I often suspect that the drive to define reveals a drive to control, by policing 
things into categories and hierarchies, which the definer often seems to want 
to  control.) Second, definition often seems ‘logically’ self-defeating. After all, 
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if you already claim to know in advance what ‘martial arts’ are, then why 
would you need to study them academically? If you have already decided 
what they are, then you have already implicitly decided how to study them. 
So, the production of knowledge about them will always be the production 
of the ‘same-old, same-old’. This is why Donn Draeger’s ‘hoplology’ project 
failed. It already claimed to know, in advance, what it was studying. This is 
why sociobiological and social Darwinist approaches strike me as fairly feeble 
too. If everything must be as it is for evolutionary advantage, then that can 
only mean that we can all pack up early and go home – as if everything’s been 
solved and resolved!
No. Quite other than this, martial arts studies does not need a definition of 
martial arts, nor indeed a strong attachment to a specific orientation of study. 
In fact, fixation on either of these points will curtail it. Martial arts studies 
needs to be responsive to the actual practices, discourses, institutions, agents 
and agencies that operate under the term or using the category ‘martial arts’. 
What we will find under the term will take variable forms, depending on time, 
place and context. The social, cultural and even political status of each instance 
or (re)iteration of ‘martial arts’ will have multiple dimensions, and will be fruit-
ful for multiple types of enquiry.
The kinds of enquiry carried out by a sociologist will differ from that of a 
psychologist, semiotician or historian. Each form of enquiry produces specific 
genres and orientations of insight. Indeed, because of this, once again we might 
say that the kind of object constructed by various different genres of discipli-
nary attention produces yet another construct, also called ‘martial arts’. Dif-
ferent academic discourses produce a different ‘disciplinary object’ (Bowman 
2015a, 2007; see also Mowitt 1992), even if they each have the same name. Even 
‘the same’ martial art becomes something quite different when it is put under 
the lens of the psychologist to when it is put under the lens of the philosopher 
or that of the historian or that of the ethnologist, and so on. Each different 
discourse, each different manifestation, is a result of different combinations of 
elements, different emphases, different inclusions and exclusions.
In discussing ‘martial arts’ in different contexts or discourses, then, one is 
inevitably going to be discussing different things, different constructs. Saying 
this might reopen the charge of relativism. But context is always  everything – 
universally. Everything is relative, always. But one thing stays the same: For 
the martial arts practitioner and for the martial arts researcher, martial arts 
are an ‘object of knowledge’, not an ‘object of consumption’ (Spatz 2015). 
They are not used up in one moment of consumption, the way a matchstick 
is  finished and worthless a few seconds after it has been struck. Rather, they 
are infinitely and infinitesimally expansive; ever unfolding; ever familiar yet 
ever mysterious and enigmatic (Mroz 2017). There is always more to work out, 
always more to be gained, whether in the form of moving into new fields and 
unexplored terrain, or whether in the form of unearthing the ‘internal  foreign 
territories’ of that which is supposedly familiar, by deconstructing what is 
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 supposedly ‘well-known’. As Hegel put it, and as I have felt compelled to repeat 
on multiple occasions: ‘What is “familiarly known” is not properly known, just 
for the reason that it is “familiar” … [Familiarity itself] is the commonest form 
of self-deception’ (Hegel 2005, 35; cf. Bowman 2010d, 45, 58).
The Construction of this Book
In what follows, Chapter One engages with the question of whether martial arts 
and the emergent field of martial arts studies should be regarded as  trivial. In 
doing so, it explores possible rationales and raisons d’être of the field in terms 
of a reflection on the legitimation of academic subjects, especially those  closest 
to martial arts studies and from which martial arts studies can be seen to have 
emerged. It argues that the designation of martial arts as trivial reflects a  specific 
Western popular cultural history with connections to orientalism (Bowman 
2013b; see also Lo 2005). This evinces not only specific cultural values but also 
the complex economy of forces that structure cultural outlooks and interpre-
tations. Specifically, the chapter considers representations and strategies by 
which martial arts ideas and images have become trivial in Western popular 
culture. In so doing, the chapter further illustrates the value of deconstruction 
as an analytical approach to culture and its practices.
Chapter Two argues against all forms of scientism and the widespread 
 perceived need to define martial arts in order to study martial arts or ‘do’  martial 
arts studies. It argues instead for the necessity of theory before  definition, 
including theorisation of the orientation of the field of martial arts studies itself. 
Accordingly, the chapter criticises certain previous (and current)  academic 
approaches to martial arts, particularly the failed project of hoplology. It then 
examines the much more promising approaches of current scholarship, such as 
that of Sixt Wetzler, before critiquing certain aspects of its orientation. Instead 
of accepting Wetzler’s ‘polysystem theory’ approach uncritically, the chapter 
argues instead for the values of a poststructuralist ‘discourse’ approach in martial 
arts studies.
Chapter Three begins to deconstruct the idea that martial arts are purely 
physical or embodied practices. It does so by focusing on the contexts, forces 
and structures outside of embodied practices that influence, inform or even 
orientate physical culture in myriad complex ways. It approaches these in terms 
of Jacques Derrida’s notion of the supplement. This notion has already been 
touched upon earlier in the Introduction (above), but Chapter Three is the first 
chapter in which its full deconstructive potential will be explored.
Chapter Four presents embodiment as a uniquely challenging problem for 
certain traditions and approaches to scholarship, particularly those that are 
implicitly or explicitly organised by the aim of establishing meanings. Such 
an orientation is exemplified by semiotics, of course, but the chapter argues 
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that even approaches designed to critique semiotics and other forms of 
‘ logocentrism’ (i.e., approaches that focus on words and meanings) ultimately 
struggle in the face of dealing with aspects of embodiment. Even Derridean 
 deconstruction – which was developed as a strident critique of logocentrism – 
struggles to move beyond the focus on words and meanings. So, the question 
becomes one of whether scholars interested in embodiment should reject or 
move beyond approaches like deconstruction.
Drawing on a loosely autobiographical narrative that touches on aspects 
both of my own academic training and my investment in martial arts and 
other physical cultural practices, this chapter argues that it is not simply pos-
sible to ‘reject’ or ‘move beyond’ the logocentrism of traditional ‘search for 
 meaning’ orientations. It argues that, even though this observation may seem 
relatively passé to some, ‘embodiment’ is still very productively conceived of as 
‘embodiment of ’ – i.e., as the embodiment of something else; specifically, as the 
 performative and interpretive elaboration of something other that is received, 
perceived, felt, constructed, believed, assumed or otherwise lived as being 
either an aim, ideal, desire, objective, fantasy, or as a norm, or indeed as the 
warding off of something undesired or feared. The chapter poses questions of 
how to ‘capture’, ‘convey’ or ‘communicate’ embodiment in words, and it inter-
rogates the necessity of the current hegemony of the written word in academia. 
However, it seeks to avoid any kind of evangelism about new approaches or 
understandings of embodiment, and twists around at the end to propose that 
even certain forms of what we perhaps too quickly regard as ‘enlightening’ or 
‘emancipating’ practices and techniques of embodiment might be regarded as 
traps, or indeed prisons.
In a different way, our understanding of culture and history may also amount 
to a kind of trap. Certainly, embodiment is always supplemented by the semi-
otic, and the emergence of martial arts discourses and practices in the West has 
to be assessed against the backdrop of a complex cultural history. Accordingly, 
Chapter Five explores the mid to late 20th Century explosion in the circulation 
of ideas connected with Taoism and Zen (Chan) Buddhism in Western popu-
lar culture. It argues that the introduction of ostensibly Chinese and Japanese 
philosophical notions into Western contexts and consciousnesses was never 
a simple act of transparent cross-cultural communication, from East to West. 
Rather, it always involved huge imaginative leaps and complex processes of 
projection, translation and transformation.
With reference to examples such as the hippy counterculture, the films and 
writings of Bruce Lee, the TV series Kung Fu (1972-1975), and others, the 
chapter argues that Western popular cultural encounters with ideas, ideals 
and conceptual universes like those of Taoism were always ‘in bits’. However, it 
insists that this is not a negative or bad thing, and that, in fact, thinking about 
the ways in which ideas and practices travel and how they transform, over time 
and place, across cultures and within cultures, can teach us a great deal about 
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how culture and communication always ‘work’ – or don’t – and what we might 
make of such fragmentation and complexity.
The connections between Eastern martial arts and (embodied) philosophy 
are strong. Often ideas and associations involve images of calm detachment and 
tranquillity. Chapter Six deconstructs these images and the ways they  function 
in contemporary discourses. It explores a range of connections and associa-
tions, from ideas of Zen Buddhist meditation to contemporary mindfulness 
and from Samurai to kamikaze themes as they have related to various kinds 
of militarism and the explicit outlook of Norwegian mass-murderer Anders 
Behring Breivik. It does so in order to demonstrate the ideological, political 
and ethical complexity (indeed, undecidability) of martial arts discourse vis-à-
vis serenity, psychopathy, sanity and insanity.
But, after putting madness on the table, where can we go? How are  martial arts 
regarded in the wider world, outside of martial arts contexts ‘proper’?  Derrida 
and other proponents of deconstruction would often engage issues  tangentially 
or transversally, focusing on ‘minor’ or ‘marginal’ dimensions – things that 
lie on the outer limits of supposed relevance. Following this  deconstructive 
approach, Chapter Seven examines conversations, dialogues and statements 
about martial arts in films that can by no stretch of the imagination be regarded 
as martial arts films.
The chapter takes this unusual focus in order to glean unique insights into 
the status of martial arts in mainstream popular culture. It is interested in the 
ways that martial arts are understood, positioned, and given value within the 
wider flows, circuits, networks or discourses of culture. Films examined include 
Lolita (1962), Roustabout (1964), Rollerball (1975), The Wanderers (1979), An 
Officer and a Gentleman (1982), Trading Places (1983), Vision Quest/Crazy for 
You (1985), Full Metal Jacket  (1987), Once Were Warriors (1994), Napoleon 
Dynamite (2004), and Meet the Fockers (2004); and some discussion is given to 
‘limit cases’ – action films such as Lethal Weapon (1987) and The Matrix (1999).
The analysis suggests that martial arts tend to be represented in non-martial 
arts films audiovisually, and that on the rare occasions martial arts are discussed 
they tend to emerge as improper or culturally unusual activities or practices. 
Because of their familiar yet non-normal (unhomely/unheimlich, uncanny) 
status, along with their entwinement in senses of lack and related fantasies and 
desires, martial arts in these contexts are frequently related to matters of sexu-
ality, insecurity and the desire for plenitude. Accordingly, although occasion-
ally associated with higher cultural values such as dignity, martial arts are more 
often treated as comic, uncanny or perverse aberrations from the norm.
After so many different approaches to issues in and around martial arts, 
the conclusion begins by reflecting on the diversity and range of directions 
from, into, around, out of, and out into which studies could develop. It poses 
the  question of how and why, where and when we draw lines in our studies, 
whether of/around ‘martial arts’ and/or any other subject. In deconstruction, 
the question of drawing the line is often treated as contingent, conventional, 
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consequential and political. It is often thematised as ‘violent’ in its own right. 
Nonetheless, for multiple reasons, ‘drawing the line’ is both necessary and 
inevitable. Accordingly, the conclusion sets out some of the key implications 
relating to where, when, how and why academics draw the line in their foci and 
approaches, specifically in martial arts studies, but also in critical, intellectual 
and academic endeavours more widely.

CHAPTER 1
The Triviality of Martial Arts Studies
Introduction
Eyebrows raise. Sometimes there are sniggers. Glances are exchanged. Some 
people look confused. Some say, ‘What?’ People seem surprised. ‘Martial arts?’, 
they ask, incredulously. ‘Why?’ Or even, ‘Martial arts studies? What is that?’ 
These kinds of reactions come from all sorts of people – whether academics 
or not. No one ever just nods and says, ‘Oh, ok’, the way they would if you 
had just said Romantic poetry or urban planning or philosophy or music or 
fluid dynamics, or the way they might even if you’d just said that you ‘do’ one 
of the many obscure and often peculiarly named branches of modern science 
(whether neuroparasitology, nutrigenomics, cliodynamics, or something even 
more unexpected).
Sometimes there is surprise and delight. Sometimes there is shock. A lot of it – 
whether shock, delight, dismay, concern, or confusion – should, on reflection, 
be unsurprising. On the one hand, people are used to hearing about the  familiar 
subjects of the arts, humanities, and social sciences – the old, traditional fields. 
On the other hand, when it comes to the sciences, people almost expect to 
hear of new and unintelligible fields with exotic Latinate names, involving odd 
prefixes combined with all kinds of ‘ologies’, ‘ographies’, ‘omatics’, ‘otics’, ‘amics’, 
and ‘omics’. We measure our social progress through this ever-rising spiral of 
technical specialization.
But martial arts as a field of academic study? Martial arts studies? This kind of 
thing sounds highly dubious to most ears. It doesn’t seem to need explanation 
as much as it needs justification. What reason could there be for the existence of 
something so…so what? Words come out of the woodwork: iffy, dodgy, nerdy, 
niche, weird, boyish, hobbyist, or – of course – trivial.
What triviality is martial arts studies? What indulgence? What narcissism, 
navel gazing, nothingness, even naughtiness is this? These questions may 
seem hyperbolical. But recall a rhetorical question posed by Stuart Hall about 
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 cultural studies in the very early 1990s, in an essay written at the height of the 
era of the full horror of the AIDS epidemic. Hall asked: ‘Against the urgency 
of people dying in the streets, what in God’s name is the point of cultural 
 studies?’ (Hall 1992, 285). Hall posed this question to illustrate the marginality 
and  ineffectuality of academics who saw themselves as working in a field that 
sought to make a real difference to the world, a real difference in the world – 
because, as another famous thinker famously put it, surely the point is not 
merely to interpret or understand the world, ‘the point is to change it’.
Is this so for martial arts studies? Karl Marx believed that philosophy should 
not merely seek to interpret the world but to change it. Does martial arts 
studies seek to ‘change’ things, or is it ‘mere’ interpretation? There are other 
interpretations of our academic obligations than a kind of quasi- or pseudo-
Marxian radicalism, of course (Wetzler 2015). One does not have to struggle to 
change the world if one is working in academia. Indeed, one caricature of the 
 academic figure is someone who retreats from the world, someone who hides 
in books, who is indeed incompetent in the ‘real world’. Nonetheless, whether 
our  understanding of our academic activities boils down either to trying to 
interpret the world or to trying to change the world, what in God’s name is the 
point of martial arts studies?
Shortly after publishing my first book on Bruce Lee in 2010 (Bowman 2010d), 
as a relatively junior academic I was obliged to discuss my future research plans 
with a senior colleague. I stated my interest in developing further some of the 
lines of enquiry opened up by my work on Bruce Lee. (No one was talking about 
‘martial arts studies’ then. It wasn’t yet a ‘thing’ [Farrer and Whalen-Bridge 
2011].) In response, my colleague said, with a kind of paternal or avuncular 
concern that suggested he thought I might be making a big mistake, ‘Yeah, but 
that’s just a bit…’ and with a wince and a shrug and an expression that said, 
‘Don’t make me say it: You know what I mean, don’t you?’, his sentence tailed 
off, inviting me, obliging me, to finish it in my head myself. One word leapt up 
for the job: Trivial. ‘That sort of thing is just a bit (trivial)’.
Of course, I knew where he was coming from. Two places. A nexus, or 
 chiasmus. Two forces converged, driving his opinion. Two fields of  legitimation. 
The first force is the general force that has been exerting itself on the arts, 
humanities, and social sciences since at least the 1960s. This might be called the 
force of the political. Specifically, it is the force of the increasing consensus that 
grew to a crescendo by the final decades of the 20th Century, which held that 
the way to study something, the way to justify giving attention to something, 
the way to redeem something and to elevate it to legitimacy in the university, 
was to show that it was political (Young 1992; Readings 1996).
The second force in play in my colleague’s words was the age-old sense that, 
to borrow a phrase, ‘that just ain’t how we do things around here’. In many 
 departments, the obligation to work within the paradigm of the political has 
been interpreted and assumed in a very particular (literal and direct) way, and 
Bruce Lee and martial arts do not obviously or self-evidently fit within that space.
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This is not to say that Bruce Lee or martial arts were necessarily anathema to 
that space. But such objects of attention were always likely to be filed as ‘niche’. 
In a heavily politics- and journalism-focused school of ‘Journalism, Media and 
Cultural Studies’, Bruce Lee and martial arts could be made to ‘fit in’ – as part 
of the general non-journalism background of media and culture; just not as 
a  particularly central part, even of them. Bruce Lee or other things related to 
martial arts could always fall into the subcategories of ‘film’, on the one hand, 
and ‘popular culture’ (or, ‘worse’, fan/subculture), on the other. Indeed, such 
foci would arguably fall further, into such unspoken or unspeakable sub- 
subcategories as non-serious film, and playful – or trivial – popular culture.1 
Even the historical study of these subjects tends to focus on questions of the 
‘social’ and ‘local’, rather than the more prestigious (and properly political) 
 categories of military, diplomatic, or national history.
The problem is that the kinds of things that the subjects of martial arts seem 
to open out onto are exactly the kinds of things that a few decades ago caused 
problems for the image and reputation of the fledgling fields of media  studies 
and cultural studies. They are the kinds of things that once caused people to 
regard media studies and cultural studies as ‘Mickey Mouse subjects’ – i.e., 
non-serious, non-central, non-important: trivial (Young 1999). For similar 
representational reasons, areas like the sociology of sport or the academic study 
of other recreational pursuits or leisure activities never seem to carry the same 
prestige as ‘serious’ topics like economic class or religion.
The salvation or salvaging of the reputations of media studies and cultural 
studies came in the form of the quiet victory within the university of the idea 
that more or less everything is contingent and hence more or less political 
(Mowitt 2003). Politics – or, more precisely, ‘the political’ – became the sign 
under which certain previously excluded, overlooked, ignored, or disparaged 
things could justifiably and hence legitimately be studied (Marchart 2007). 
Women’s things, ethnic minorities’ things, postcolonial things, working class 
things, local things, new things, controversial things, and so on.
Unfortunately, it takes about three stages of argument to persuade the 
 uninitiated that things to do with martial arts, like, say, Bruce Lee, are in some 
sense political and hence in some sense important and hence worthy of at least 
some kind of academic time and attention (Bowman 2010d). This means that, 
even if everything is equal in the eyes of the paradigm of the political (because 
everything is in some sense political), it is still a hell of a lot easier to show that 
some parts of media, culture, and society are ‘self-evidently’ political and hence 
more important than others. Such self-evidently important things include such 
 1 People who are into things from popular culture – and even people who study such things 
– are regularly regarded as ‘fans’; but people who are heavily into, say, broadsheet journal-
ism or politics or news media are never called ‘fans’. You rarely have a ‘fan’ of The Times, the 
labour movement, cancer research, etc.
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‘obviously political’ parts of media, culture, and society as, say, serious news 
journalism, serious policy debates, protest, and so on.
So, things like journalism, news media, and protest, along with matters of 
gender and race and disability in representation, and so on, are easy to perceive 
as proper objects or fields to be privileged. This is because they are easy to 
regard as being somehow closer to politics or the political – or ‘more political’ – 
than certain other kinds of media and other kinds of cultural practice – like, 
for example, martial arts.
The fact that all things are potentially equal within the paradigm of the  political 
does not mitigate the fact that it will always take about three  argumentative 
steps to prove or persuade someone that martial arts are political (and ‘there-
fore’ valuable) in any number of possible ways. On the other hand, it takes little 
to no effort to show that political foci and political projects are political. They 
already seem political because they already seem political – even if it is actually 
possible to argue that they are not (Žižek 2001a; Bowman 2008).
Accordingly, senses and forces of propriety and impropriety vis-à-vis 
 academic foci take hold. Recall my opening anecdote, which involved a  senior 
colleague conveying a judgement that may be regarded as, intentionally or 
 unintentionally, subtly seeking to discourage a junior colleague from  pursuing 
a certain style or orientation of work or focus. Norms and values are being 
implied here: Good things to do and less good things to do. Of course, this 
anecdote is just an anecdote. But it could be followed up with quite a few others. 
In fact, the opening words of this chapter were a distillation of many possible 
anecdotes. Yet, what is the status of such anecdotes? And what of the innumer-
able possible counter-balancing anecdotes that could be considered?
In a rightly renowned essay called ‘Banality in Cultural Studies’, Meaghan 
Morris proposes that anecdotes ‘are not expressions of personal experience, 
but allegorical expositions of a model of the way the world can be said to be 
working. So anecdotes need not be true stories, but they must be functional in a 
given exchange’ (Morris 1988, 7). In this approach, anecdotes seek to say some-
thing about the way at least some parts of the world can be said to be work-
ing; in this case, in relation to the academic study of martial arts. Of course, 
the world of human interactions and conversational exchanges can be seen as 
an almost infinite ocean of potential anecdotes, so are we merely singling out 
only the reactions that suit our purpose? Indeed, are we maybe being a bit too 
sensitive to any perceived criticism of our shared field of work, whether real or 
imagined, no matter how slight the sleight may be, when evaluated according 
to more objective yardsticks? Do we protest too much?
Maybe so, but even if this is hyperbolic, or making a mountain out of a mole-
hill, there will nonetheless be some value in the exercise of reflecting on the 
problem posed. Indeed, it is arguably the case that any and all serious, rigorous, 
and sustained academic treatments of anything must necessarily magnify and 
intensify the object of attention’s status – and, in other words, make a mountain 
out of it, even when we know it is not a mountain, even if it really is a  molehill. 
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To someone seriously studying molehills, a molehill is at least a mountain, 
if not bigger and more significant. In fact, to someone studying molehills, a 
mountain may be entirely insignificant.
To put all of this in slightly different terms: Is there an issue here that is larger, 
more far reaching or significant than these anecdotes themselves and their 
local interpretations? How do they connect with ways that the world might 
be  working, and what might be the significance, importance, or  consequences 
of that?
Elsewhere in ‘Banality in Cultural Studies’, Morris discusses the dynamics 
of the then relatively new (and very Japanese) term ‘boom’ – as in, ‘economic 
boom’. As Morris notes via a variety of examples, in a period of boom, a certain 
kind of explosion in activity often goes hand in hand with another kind of 
limitation or prohibition. In her words, a boom involves not only ‘passion and 
activity’ but also ‘a pre-emptive prohibition and limitation of activity’ (Morris 
1988, 5). As such, in a boom, there are ample opportunities for the exploration 
and expansion of activities that are popular (or booming). But, by the same 
token, any attempts to engage in non-boom activities are likely to be met with 
blank stares, closed doors, and dead ends.
In thinking about the features of a boom, Morris argues that there is a 
 significant ‘difference between the Japanese concept of cultural boom, and the 
older European notion of “fashion”’ (Morris 1990, 4). Relating it to academia, 
she observes:
The notion of ‘intellectual fashion’ … is usually used to denigrate  passion 
and enthusiasm as ‘fickle’ – in order to imply that real, solid scholar-
ship is going on somewhere in spite of the market, within which it will 
 nonetheless find its true place of recognition once the fuss of  fashion 
subsides. A boom, however, overtly defines and directs what can be 
done at a given moment. [Indeed] booms positively shape the  possible, 
by stabilizing a temporary horizon in relation to which one cannot 
claim a position of definite exteriority, [meaning that] it also becomes 
possible to think more carefully the politics of one’s own participation 
and complicity. (Morris 1990, 5)
So, if and where there is a boom, there is possibility, facility, propensity, energy, 
ability. If and where there is not a boom, there is resistance, apathy, confusion, 
skepticism, and so on. Indeed, as well as the lack of interest that may face any 
non-booming activity, there may actually be a lack of ability to imagine why 
anyone could be interested in it.
What, then, is the situation vis-à-vis martial arts studies? Is martial arts  studies 
facing a boom, or facing its opposite – which is surely not a ‘bust’, as martial arts 
studies hasn’t yet had its day in the sun, but rather some kind of ‘pre-emptive 
prohibition and limitation of activity’? What would be the larger, only dimly 
perceived, intellectual trends which define this gravitational  horizon?
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One possibility is that martial arts studies is currently emerging thanks to 
the ground opened up by the victories won by subjects like cultural studies, 
the  success of which is attributable in part to the demonstration of the  political 
dimensions of culture and the contingency of norms, hegemonic values, and 
institutional investments. While not compiling a comprehensive list here and 
now, we might say that the movements of which cultural studies was a part 
revealed the extent to which our educations and our institutions were white, 
Western, male, heterosexual, Eurocentric, and upper class (Storey 2000). 
All of these things were deemed to require redress on ethical and political 
grounds. And a windfall-gain of the general deconstruction of elitist tastes, 
values,  formations, and practices in so many of their incarnations was the 
attendant ability to revalue hitherto devalued things – not only non-white and 
non-male things, but also things that had been regarded as supposedly low-
brow,  popular, low-class, and – hence – trivial. Things like martial arts in their 
many  incarnations, as well as the media, history, and training methods that 
accompany them.
So, in one sense, the emergence of martial arts studies owes a lot to the 
 intentional or unintentional redemption or salvaging and revaluation of the 
supposedly secondary, inferior, inauthentic, non-serious, and trivial that took 
place in and around cultural studies. But, on the flipside, perhaps this is also a 
source of problems for martial arts studies. For, thanks to it, martial arts studies 
becomes an heir to the most problematic inheritance of the deconstruction and 
reconstruction of academia – namely, the trivial. This is why martial arts  studies 
should expect to attract as much perplexity and even vitriol and vituperation as 
subjects like media studies, audience studies, fan studies, game studies,  fashion 
studies, and so on – all of which have for a long time easily drawn flak for 
sounding like so many different names for something that should really just be 
called Triviality Studies.
As many people intuitively know, these kinds of problems might always be 
circumvented or deferred by sheltering or smuggling martial arts studies under 
more established umbrellas, as in such formulations as: ‘I’m an  anthropologist, 
and I research…’; ‘I’m a historian, and I research…’; ‘I’m an ethnographer, and 
I research…’; ‘I’m a sociologist, and I research…’; and so on. In this way, the 
ground is prepared for the introduction of martial arts as a more obviously 
legitimate object of studies by framing it as merely one of the many  possible 
objects of an already valid and valued field. Or, alternatively, the martial arts 
might be transformed from a dependent variable (the thing examined) to 
an independent variable (an explanatory factor) within a better-established 
research programme.
Such an approach has its virtues. Indeed, how many of us could actually 
say that we work in schools or departments of martial arts studies, or that we 
 principally teach modules, courses, or degrees in martial arts studies? And 
for those handful of people in the world who could say something like this, 
what exactly is it that they are working in or teaching? Both of these questions 
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point to a problematic that I tried to tackle in my book Martial Arts Studies: 
 Disrupting Disciplinary Boundaries (Bowman 2015a). This problematic boils 
down to the question of whether martial arts studies could be said to exist as 
an academic field, and what it means to say that it does, or to operate as if it 
does. Phrased differently: We already know that martial arts studies can emerge 
parasitically, and exist as a kind of supplement, sub-field, or focus within other 
umbrella disciplines and departments. That has never really been in doubt. 
Many scholars have touched on the martial arts over the decades. Yet, might 
martial arts studies exist somehow independently? Is it possible to invent mar-
tial arts studies as an independent or discrete entity, and what would it look like 
if we were to try?
It soon becomes apparent that posing such questions very quickly opens out 
onto a whole range of questions about academic subjects, inspiring  questioning 
which could – perhaps should – ultimately open out into a far reaching 
 reflection on what a university subject (or discipline or field) is, what university 
disciplinary and managerial divisions and subdivisions are, why they exist, what 
they do, whether we ‘need’ them, what sort of interests and outcomes they serve, 
and whether we might dispense with them, or at least move them into different 
relations and dynamics.
I spent quite a long time on this (which I still think is a fascinating and 
important) subject in my 2015 monograph, so I will not tarry too long in the 
same terrain here. Instead, let us try to move things along by maintaining a 
focus on the question of triviality, and specifically the triviality of martial arts 
studies, before coming back to questions about the possible forms of existence 
of martial arts studies.
Triviality Studies
The Oxford English Dictionary says a lot of things about the words trivia and 
trivial, as well as the word trivium, from which they all substantially derive. 
As the OED tells us, trivial once referred to belonging to the trivium of 
 medieval  university studies, or ‘the lower division of the  seven liberal arts, 
 comprising grammar, rhetoric, and logic’. We could make a lot of this, but to 
do so would involve sophistry. This is because when people say trivial today 
they do not intend to mean anything related to this, unless they are having a 
specialist discussion on the subject of the medieval university. Nor do people 
mean triple or threefold. Nor do they mean ‘placed where three roads meet’. But 
they may mean ‘Such as may be met with anywhere; common, commonplace, 
ordinary, everyday, familiar, trite’, or – more likely – ‘Of small account, little 
esteemed, paltry, poor; trifling, inconsiderable, unimportant, slight’.
There are other technical meanings for trivial that are used in fields like 
 zoology and a range of sciences, but none of these relate to what is most com-
monly meant by trivial. However, one meaning of trivial that comes from 
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mathematics is suggestive to the point of being poetic. In it, trivial means: ‘Of 
no consequence or interest, e.g. because equal to zero’. So, we might say, trivial 
most often evokes something that is so ordinary, commonplace, familiar, or 
inconsequential that it is effectively deemed equal to zero. Or, if not nothing, 
then at least very little, almost nothing.
Again, we could make much of this and use all of the kinds of arguments made 
in cultural studies, gender studies and postcolonial studies and so on to argue 
for the revaluation, redemption, or reclamation of martial arts. But I will not do 
this here, because we should all already know how to do this. I’m sure I am not 
the only one who has, on many occasions – as I did in response to my anecdotal 
colleague – persuaded others of the value of martial arts studies by playing the 
political card. In one chapter in Theorizing Bruce Lee, I  actually ran through a 
check list of many of the key themes and  problematics that  organise not only 
cultural studies but also many other fields – such as  ethnicity, postcoloniality, 
polyvocality, polysemy, multimediality, cultural translation, intertextuality, sex/
gender identity performativity, postmodernity, enculturation, hegemony, com-
modification, resistance and subversion, and so on – and showed the extent to 
which Bruce Lee ticked all of such fields’ boxes. In The Creation of Wing Chun 
(2015), Benjamin N. Judkins and Jon Nielson engaged in a similar exercise, 
tackling themes such as imperialism, resistance,  modernization, marginality, 
nationalism, and social violence.
There are other ways to argue for the legitimacy of studies of martial arts, of 
course: Legitimation by numbers (just look at how many people in the world 
do martial arts), legitimation by money (just look at how big a range of busi-
nesses martial arts are), legitimation by area (just look at how central martial 
arts are to nationalism and national identity-building projects, particularly 
across Asia), legitimation by UNESCO (if it’s good enough for UNESCO to call 
it ‘intangible cultural heritage’ then it’s good enough for a study, right?), legiti-
mation by demographics, pedagogics, identity politics, ideological orientation, 
discursive status, and so on and so forth.
But existing scholars of martial arts, culture and society know all of this. If 
Judkins’ wide-ranging and field-defining blog Kung Fu Tea has taught us one 
single thing, it is this: That, nationally and internationally, martial arts are 
 massive. But lots of things are massive. Narcissism, nose-picking, and trains-
potting, for instance, might all be said to be massive. The question is whether 
such things might warrant an academic field and/or whether such a field might 
be deemed trivial.
To move things forward, perhaps what is needed here is to note that one vital 
thing the OED does not tell us about the notion of the trivial is that it is radically 
relational and that reflection on what a given perspective, person, or situation 
deems to be trivial constitutes something of a royal road to the unconscious 
biases or unthought regions of that perspective, person, or situation itself.
So, if we are in a conversation with our critic, we can deconstruct any  criticism 
of our position that proceeds according to the argument about something’s 
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triviality. Or, better, we can engage in discussion and win the argument and 
persuade our interlocutor of the validity or non-triviality of martial arts and 
martial arts studies. And so on. In fact, as just suggested, there are a range of 
options.
But whatever we decide to do, it is both theoretically and practically useful 
always to proceed in full awareness of the fact that all of us are very often going 
to regard certain other things as trivial. Moreover, some people, hostile to this 
or that academic focus or approach, are often likely to be inclined to wield 
whatever they think is properly important like a kind of sledgehammer to try to 
smash whatever it is they think is trivial. At cultural studies conferences it is a 
common (perhaps therefore apparently trivial – certainly frequent) occurrence 
for any session of presentations on more or less any subject – anything at all – 
you name it – to provoke a member of the audience to cry out, in exasperation, 
something along the lines of, ‘Why are you all wasting your time with this? 
What about the war?!’
Wars are serious. When measured against the seriousness of an ongoing war, 
and people dying in the streets, academic studies of more or less anything, in 
any discipline, will almost always seem somewhat trivial.
Of course, the irony is that some people working in martial arts studies may 
well have compelling, informed, intelligent, specialist, rare, or valuable insights 
into questions of war and violence. But a further and more pertinent irony is 
that experts and specialists on modern war or social violence are actually likely 
to be in the minority in martial arts studies. This is so even though ‘martial’ 
has to do with war. Nonetheless, the peculiarity is that – for a whole host of 
linguistic, cultural, and historical reasons – many of us mostly seem to forget 
the most literal meaning of the word ‘martial’ as soon as it is combined with 
the word ‘art’. This is why the very term ‘martial arts studies’ is rarely-to-never 
decoded, translated, defined, or interpreted as meaning anything like ‘studies 
of the art of war’ – even and perhaps especially within martial arts studies itself. 
Indeed, the tendency of the field today exhibits a definite bias towards studying 
armed and unarmed embodied fighting – or the very thing that Peter Lorge has 
suggested Chinese military experts throughout history have long regarded as 
being ‘a developmental rather than a functional skill in the army’ (Lorge 2012, 
Loc 3506).
The myriad other realms and components of the arts of war (or rebellion 
or riot) are rarely centralised or foregrounded in martial arts studies. Indeed, 
if the term ‘martial arts studies’ really meant ‘studies of the arts of war’ to us, 
this would make the field into a very different kind of thing – something that 
 arguably already exists, under a range of different names: War studies, conflict 
studies, peace studies, security studies, and suchlike. But do war studies,  conflict 
studies, or peace studies really capture or cover what we tend to think martial 
arts studies is or should be? And if so, why the new name, the new  demarcation, 
if martial arts studies is just another version of something or some things that 
already exist? What the hell is martial arts studies supposed to be anyway?
28 Deconstructing Martial Arts
I have argued many times against the drive to define martial arts and hence 
thereby to demarcate martial arts studies. I will do so again in the next chapter. 
As I have suggested on several occasions and will suggest again (in  Chapter 
Two), such an orientation is naïve in a number of ways. And I will add here 
and now, in this context, that succumbing to such an orientation (the drive to 
define, or the ‘definition drive’, if you will) would achieve the opposite of what 
most pro-definition academics hope for: Rather than conferring  scientific 
seriousness onto the field, it would most likely guarantee the marginality and 
triviality of any martial arts studies generated or facilitated by imposing a 
strict definition of martial arts. Or, to put it slightly differently, such a move 
would tend to isolate martial arts studies from the critical questions of the day, 
rather than asking what our hard-won understanding might contribute to the 
 conversation.
We will turn to this more fully in the next chapter. At this point, let us 
 consider an argument made by Mark Singleton about the word ‘yoga’ ( Singleton 
2010). Specifically, in a fascinating study of yoga, Singleton notes that, over 
the  centuries, and in different contexts and different minds, the word ‘yoga’ 
has long existed; but it has always referred to ever-changing and very different 
things – ideas, practices, ideologies, orthodoxies, orthopraxies, and so on. In 
the face of such polysemy, rather than adopting a position that would force 
him into feeling the need to specify anything like ‘this is real yoga but that is 
not real yoga’, Singleton instead proposes that we always treat the word yoga as 
a homonym.
Homonyms are words that are both spelled the same and pronounced the 
same but mean different things. When I say ‘martial arts’ and you say ‘martial 
arts’, we may well be thinking of very different things, with different forms, 
 contents, places, roles, functions, associations, implications, and so on. But we 
will undoubtedly be able to talk about this difference, because an  interesting 
thing about these homonyms is that the meanings tend to cluster together, 
overlap each other, interact together, reflect (and reflect on) each other, and 
so on.
This is why not only ‘we specialists’ but also all practitioners and, most 
 importantly perhaps, myriad non-practitioners and people who simply 
know as close to nothing as is imaginable about ‘martial arts’ will all have an 
 immediate pre-critical inkling of what the ‘martial arts’ of ‘martial arts studies’ 
is most likely referring to. This is because the term ‘martial arts’ is a discursive 
 achievement – a construct, not a trans-historical datum. It is a type of popular 
conversation (rather than a singular thing) that is already familiar to all.
Despite having a long history, ‘martial arts’ is nonetheless a comparatively 
recent term within English language popular usage. That is to say, it is a  current 
term. Yes, it also has a long history. But to claim that the English language term 
‘martial arts’, in the ways we use it today, is much older than the late 1960s 
is much the same as claiming that when people say ‘trivial’ they are referring 
to the disciplinary demarcations of the mediaeval university or that they are 
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 referring to ‘where three roads meet’. That is to say, it is a claim that overlooks 
the words’ currency, or current-ness. Martial arts has a certain currency now, in 
Anglophone cultures and societies. Again, it points to trends and conversations 
much more than to things.
Perhaps this widespread current currency is why studies of martial arts have so 
definitively broken free from anthropological or area studies paradigms, in which 
many research programmes are organised by notions of the  rituals of groups. As 
popular as such approaches continue to be, postcolonialist  deconstruction has 
taught us that, while subjects such as anthropology and area studies continue 
to invent their objects in terms of ideas about rituals and groups, white Western 
thinkers tend not to be quite as keen on the idea that white Western cultures and 
societies are themselves organised by groups and rituals. That kind of thing is 
easier to see in and as the societies of the others, not us and ours (Fabian 1983; 
Spivak 1993). So, if it’s something ‘we’re into’, something that’s happening here, 
it surely can’t be the traditional indigenous ritual practice of natives, now can it?
Nowadays, the flipside of this situation is never too far away. This is the 
belated realisation that the apparently ‘ancient’ traditional ritual practices of 
the natives ‘over there’ always turn out to be complex discursive formations and 
constructions, or a heady mix of ‘orientalisms’ and ‘invented traditions’. There 
is a lot that can be said about the ideological invention of history in the present. 
But here, in terms of the earlier discussion of the field of martial arts studies, 
of ‘currencies’ and ‘booms’, one thing that seems significant is the currency of 
theoretical terms like ‘orientalism’ and ‘invented tradition’ in the generation 
and organisation of so much research. How adept we seem to be at finding ‘our’ 
orientalism and ‘their’ invented traditions. And so we should be: Scholars have 
been making these kinds of discoveries over and over again since the 1970s.
Discussion of all of this could take us far afield. But the point to be made here 
is that, as much as so many of us are so ready, willing, and able to carry out 
discursive or conjunctural analyses of our objects of study these days (as long as 
our objects of study are others: The practices of natives, the practices of tribes, 
or subcultures, or working classes, or bourgeoisies, and so on), surely we have 
an attending obligation to consider the question of how and why we ourselves 
are doing what we do in the ways that we do it.
The question is one of what the discursive conditions of possibility for today’s 
emergence of an academic thing called martial arts studies are or have been. I 
have suggested that part of our enabling conditions relate to the revaluation 
of erstwhile trivia by former trailblazing projects like cultural studies. Might 
another key component relate to the enormous productivity of notions like 
 orientalism and invented tradition? These terms have been available since 
the late seventies and early eighties, yet they show no signs of fatigue, which 
 suggests that their work is not yet done (unlike countless other once  fashionable 
or once booming theoretical terms that seem to have evaporated today but are 
 presumably still skulking in the shadows or waiting in the wings – like the 
Baudrillardian ideas of ‘banal strategies’ and ‘fatal strategies’ that Morris’ essay 
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notes were dominating cultural studies in the 1980s. Are we still thinking about 
banal strategies and fatal strategies? Is that problematic even  remembered 
today?).
However, some might worry that reflections such as this – reflections on our 
enabling and organising terms – take the entire field of martial arts studies too 
far afield – away from ‘martial arts’ proper and into a kind of self-reflection 
that is narcissistic, or trivial. It is easy to disagree with such an idea. There is 
immense value and opportunity for mastering and improving our practices if 
we learn more about the forces that mould and shape our activities. We may 
not want to apply the notion of ‘invented tradition’ to our own activities, but we 
ought to think about why that is and why we are happy to apply it elsewhere.
In fact, as much as I am often fascinated by the kinds of objects of attention 
that are emerging in martial arts studies, I am possibly even more animated by 
the challenge of thinking about where we are now. This is not simply to do with 
the ‘newness’ of the field, but rather with what can be seen to be happening 
right now in terms of discursive creation, writing, construction, invention, and 
the articulation and stabilization of martial arts studies as a ‘thing’.
We are still close enough to ‘the start’ that the publication of a new book 
 generates widespread excitement and gets everyone talking, and for the 
announcement of a conference in the near future to get everyone looking at 
their diaries and hoping that they might be able to afford to go. New English-
language publications on martial arts are not yet merely felt as a drop in the 
ocean. Their status as ‘a contribution’ is still easily palpable.
Obviously, as this process continues and grows, the status of each new 
 conference, paper, article, chapter, journal issue, book collection, and 
 monograph will undoubtedly change, and maybe ultimately seem to diminish. 
The field will be elaborated and will proliferate, and in time it will surely mutate 
and reposition. But my hope (and sense) is that this will not be until after some-
thing has happened. For something has already started to happen. Something 
is happening. We have, at the very least, already resoundingly answered at least 
one question that haunted so many of us for so long: Will martial arts ever be 
a valid object of academic study? Remember how often and how pessimistically 
this question was posed? But now the answer is: Yes, look, it can be, it is, and 
look how diversely and dynamically connected with so many other things martial 
arts always turn out to be!
So, to use a well-worn question form: If martial arts studies is a thing, then 
what kind of a thing is it? What is it a case of? And, again: If something is 
 happening, then what kind of a something is it – and what kind of a happening?
To take any or all of these questions, in isolation or at the same time, any 
answer would always involve asserting that martial arts studies is emerging 
to answer a demand – not just an academic demand, whether by ‘academic 
demand’ we mean in the sense of ‘knowledge for knowledge’s sake’ (i.e., a 
demand to fill a perceived hole in the field of knowledge, simply because we 
have perceived that a hole is there) or in the pejorative sense of being a ‘merely 
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academic’ matter. Rather, martial arts studies is emerging because an untold 
number of conditions have been met that now allow into the university the 
kind of ongoing and widespread intellectualisation of martial arts that has been 
taking place for many years outside of the university (Bowman 2015a, 2017b, 
2017c). It is critical not to forget that intellectual discourse and scholarship on 
martial arts has long taken place, but mainly outside of standard university 
channels, and outside of the West. So, in this sense, Anglophone martial arts 
studies is belated. Nevertheless, finally, today – and helped in large part by hav-
ing organised itself around and in terms of the questions, concerns, languages, 
vocabularies, and purviews of established fields like cultural studies, anthro-
pology, history, and sociology – academic scholars have begun to find a way to 
legitimise martial arts as an academic field.
This kind of legitimisation is principally at the research level. Wherever 
martial arts studies has so far been instituted at the pedagogical level – that 
is, as a unique or discrete degree level subject taught to undergraduates – this 
has principally taken the form of practical and vocational orientations, i.e., as 
degrees involving learning martial arts and learning about them in terms of 
physical education delivery and self-defence pedagogy or industry (Wile 2014).
So, there is a difference between the research field and the pedagogical field. Of 
course, that’s not to say there are not connections and crossovers. But the point 
is that there have so far been different orientations and modes of  legitimation in 
which the research field has been legitimating itself via  questions and concerns 
of critical, social scientific, and historical theory, while pedagogical instantia-
tions of the field have proceeded according to a range of vocational, physical 
education, and industry questions and concerns.
The relations between these two levels are always going to be complex, 
and often fraught. But the homonym ‘martial arts’ that organises all levels 
and  orientations can and will facilitate many leaps and links and crosso-
vers and connections; it could indeed coalesce at times and in places into 
 enormously exciting and genuinely multiple and heterogeneous experimental 
 interdisciplinarities.
From any academic perspective, there is little to no triviality in this.  Similarly, 
if money talks, there is no triviality in securing research grants, establishing 
research centres, or setting up modules and courses and degrees. There is no 
triviality in cross-disciplinary discourses that have the capacity not merely 
to enrich but to alter the disciplines from which they began. Nor is there 
 triviality in transforming the wider cultural discourses on martial arts – in, say, 
 demonstrating orientalism, or debunking myths, or revealing the  inventedness 
of traditions. Orientalism and myths and invented traditions are big  business. 
The stakes are high. So, this kind of work has the capacity –  perhaps the 
 obligation – to change things.
These are just some of the levels, some of the contexts, some of the scenes 
and sites of struggle and activity of the emergence of martial arts studies. All 
in all, when thinking about martial arts studies, we should perhaps take the 
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famous phrase of Pierre Bourdieu that ‘sociology is a martial art’ and intensify 
it, by accepting that, in so many ways, martial arts studies is a martial art. 
The challenge is to understand both putative entities here (‘martial arts’ and 
‘ martial arts studies’) at the same time and in ways that are adequate to the 
 complexity, forces, violences, vicissitudes, promises, possibilities, and poten-
tials of their ‘passion and activity’ without any ‘pre-emptive prohibition and 
limitation of activity’, by reducing, simplifying, defining, or consigning either 
element to triviality.
CHAPTER 2
Theory Before Definition in  
Martial Arts Studies
Dealing with Disciplinary Difference
The matter of value that was broached in the previous chapter demands fur-
ther interrogation. To do so here, let me begin with an anecdote. I was once 
invited to contribute a chapter to a collection being prepared on martial arts 
and embodied knowledge. When all the draft chapters were in and the editors 
were happy with the collection, the entire manuscript was then sent off to be 
assessed by two academic reviewers. Of my own contribution, one reviewer 
said that the chapter by Bowman was terrible, not publishable, and should be 
rejected. The other reviewer said that the chapter by Bowman was the best 
contribution to the volume, and greatly enhanced and enriched it. Faced with 
two diametrically opposed views from two presumably equally reliable peer 
reviewers,1 the editors themselves held the casting vote. They decided that they 
liked the chapter overall, thought it had value, and wanted to include it. But 
they elected to share the reviews with me and invited me to make any changes 
I thought appropriate in light of them.
The experience of receiving such polarised views was educational. I share 
this anecdote here to introduce a cluster of interrelated issues. These start 
 1 At the time, the emerging field that we now call martial arts studies was yet to be established, 
and the editors later commented that they had actually struggled to find suitable academics 
to act as peer reviewers who were not already contributors to the collection itself. Today, 
there would be peer reviewers aplenty for such a collection. This could be taken to demon-
strate many things, including the proposition that the establishment of an academic field 
involves not only the establishment of (new) shared objects of attention, shared problemat-
ics and shared methodologies, but also the production of (new) academic subjects – i.e., indi-
vidual scholars with a recognisable disciplinary identity, conferred or established reciprocally 
in the process of emergence of the discourse itself.
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with the matter of how to establish value in an emergent academic discourse, 
the problematic of bias attendant to all acts and processes of evaluation and 
verification, and the fact that the shape, form, borderlines, organisation and 
orientation of academic fields are neither natural nor inevitable. Rather, these 
emerge in negotiation with decisions made by a host of agents and agencies, 
including academics, editors, reviewers, research councils, funding bodies, and 
publishers, all of whom make their evaluations with reference to established 
criteria and values. Accordingly, decisions as to what good or bad work looks 
like, and what ‘deserves’ to be published, are themselves reflective of values tied 
into interpretations of what good, correct or proper academic work in this field 
‘should’ look like.
This does not mean that everything is already decided or overdetermined 
by pre-established ‘structures’ or ‘systems’. Rather, it means that senses of pro-
priety, validity, appropriateness, fit, and so on, are always establishments or 
achievements that are ongoing, in negotiation, subject to dispute, up for ques-
tion, challenge, revision and review. Such negotiation and renegotiation can 
be perceived in all academic disciplines, but it is inevitably more cacophonic 
in newly emerging fields, where senses of tradition and tacit agreements about 
convention have yet to be set.
This is the situation of martial arts studies today, in which huge discipli-
nary differences are palpable from one work to the next. Such vast differences 
are present because even though the emergence of the field is being driven 
by a sense of shared and communal investment in an object (‘martial arts’), 
this shared interest is not yet matched by anything like a shared approach. In 
other words, the shared academic interest in ‘martial arts’ is currently drawing 
together academics from many very different fields. Yet the deceptiveness of 
the term ‘martial arts’ combined with the diversity of this community, with 
its myriad premises, multiple perspectives, methods and orientations, seems 
to necessitate the creation of some kind of consensus around the object, field 
and approach to ‘martial arts’. Hence, understandably, people feel the need to 
establish a definition of martial arts (Jones 2002; Lorge 2012, 2016; but see also 
Judkins 2016b).
Because of this perceived necessity, at this point, many works would move 
directly into a discussion of definitions, attempting to settle the matter of which 
definition of martial arts should and should not be used, and where and when 
(Channon 2016; Lorge 2016). However, rather than entering into the discus-
sion about how best to define martial arts, in what follows I will instead argue 
that the question of the definition of martial arts is both a distraction and a red 
herring for the emerging field of martial arts studies. The more pressing task, 
I argue, is not the establishment of a consensus around the definition of our 
object. Rather, it is the establishment of a shared, circumspect, literate, ana-
lytical and theoretically informed critical discourse with rigorously formulated 
problematics that can contribute in diverse ways to both academic and public 
debates.
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In short, I argue (somewhat against the current of recent debates, and even 
against the grain of many academic approaches) that we do not need to define 
martial arts at all. Rather, I propose that we need to theorise the entire field or 
nexus of research, including the place, point and purpose of definition within 
it. Indeed, my contention is that if we allow ourselves to be animated by defin-
ing martial arts without both theorising and constructing the field, then mar-
tial arts studies may founder and fail, like so many past attempts to establish an 
academic field of study for martial arts.2
Approaching Martial Arts Studies
Before following through on this, some further reflection on my opening 
 anecdote seems called for. Ironically, even back at the time of this brush between 
my work and two border guards at the gates of a then unclear and embryonic 
field, I had already long accepted Roland Barthes’ argument that readers can 
and will have very different responses to the same text (Barthes 1977). But I had 
never encountered such symmetrically opposed opinions from scholars I had 
presumed must work to some degree in the ‘same’ area, or at least close enough – 
i.e., holding an academic interest in ‘martial arts’ refracted through one or 
another approach of the arts or humanities. Even though I already believed I 
knew that academic disciplines are spaces of argumentation and disagreement 
rather than consensus, the vastly differing verdicts nonetheless surprised me. 
Today, I am no longer surprised by the appearance of such difference in what 
is still a very young and uncertain field. Indeed, as mentioned, encountering 
extreme disciplinary differences is currently our daily bread. The question is: 
Is such diversity simply something to be either shrugged off or celebrated, or 
might it harbour a problem? What might it mean if the object and field of mar-
tial arts studies continues to be conceived of very differently by different people 
from different disciplinary backgrounds? In short, is it a problem that we are 
still frequently experiencing such widely differing approaches to the academic 
study martial arts?
On the one hand, no. There will always be disciplinary difference, and even 
vast differences in conceptuality and orientation within ‘the same’ discipline or 
field. Different academic origins and kinds of training bring with them differ-
ing questions, differing objects of attention, differing values, methods, and so 
on. And, for the foreseeable future, martial arts studies will inevitably be built 
 2 For an important and valuable contrast to this argument, see Peter Lorge’s recent work 
(Lorge 2016), in which he argues against using theory – because it is difficult and off-putting 
– and instead for the virtues of deepening and refining historical knowledge. As Lorge sees it, 
deeper historical knowledge can both enrich martial artists’ practice and clearly illustrate to 
the academic community the value of martial arts as a valid topic of academic study. I believe 
it is possible to concede Lorge’s points and still argue for the value and necessity of theory 
‘before’ or ‘beneath’ this.
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from work and approaches hailing from different disciplines. Moreover, no one 
will ever be surprised, for instance, if a study of martial arts as they appear in 
one or more works of literature differs significantly from a study focused on 
questions of experiments in or around pedagogy (compare Liu 2011 with Lefe-
bvre 2016 for instance). So where might the problem come in?
Far be it from me to advocate any kind of unitary, univocal, mono- disciplinary 
or monoculturalist approach in martial arts studies. That would be neither 
desirable nor possible. Nonetheless, in order for a field or discipline to emerge 
and survive, there must be coherent and meaningful internal (community) and 
external (cross-disciplinary) discourses and exchanges. In order for this to hap-
pen, the matter of what we might call ‘the approach’ is important. There are 
stakes and consequences attached to the matter of the paradigms that organise 
our efforts.
To illustrate, one might briefly consider the possible reasons for the repeated 
failure of attempts to create a field of academic study of and for martial arts. 
Most famously, of course, Richard Burton in the 19th Century and Donn Drae-
ger later in the 20th Century attempted to found and ground an academic disci-
pline that they called ‘hoplology’ (for an overview, see Spencer 2011). However, 
this or these projects repeatedly foundered. The question is: Why?
Even more pertinently, perhaps, is the related question of why a connected 
field of martial arts studies took until today to begin to emerge at all. Consider 
the fact that over the last two decades it became increasingly easy to carry out 
online academic searches and to discover that all sorts of different kinds of 
studies of all sorts of issues involving martial arts are being carried out across 
a surprising number of different disciplines. Yet there have been few sustained 
dialogues and fewer dedicated spaces for the academic study of martial arts.3
My contention is that the matter of the approach or paradigm is central to 
both questions. It relates not only to all failed past attempts to establish any 
kind of martial arts studies but also to the stubborn non-appearance of mar-
tial arts studies until today, despite scattered studies of martial arts in diverse 
disciplines.
To consider the recent situation first: There is a sense in which the very het-
erogeneity of the ways of approaching martial arts – the very richness of the 
potential field – may paradoxically have played a part in preventing the crea-
tion of a single interconnected, interacting field. The logic of this proposition 
is as follows: The creation of an academic discourse requires the emergence 
of shared problematics and discussions around – at the very least – matters 
of which questions are to be asked and which methodologies are best suited 
for their exploration. Yet, in recent decades, although there have been a great 
number of academic studies on all manner of things to do with martial arts, no 
 3 The long-running Electronic Journals of Martial Arts and Sciences is a noteworthy project that 
has attempted to construct such dialogues and spaces (http://ejmas.com/). I defer a discus-
sion of this project here, however, in order to focus on more ‘stark’ examples for clarity.
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single field or conversation has emerged, because of the very heterogeneity of 
approaches to radically heterogeneous questions. (Moreover, far from inform-
ing, enlivening and expanding academic discourses on martial arts, the hetero-
geneity of approaches and diversity of kinds of work actually seems to have pre-
vented many people from reading, engaging, or even being aware of the plethora 
of academic literature being produced on martial arts across the disciplines. 
Works continue to appear that present themselves as if they are the first to deal 
with the martial arts. Whether proceeding by making grand proclamations to 
this effect or by lacking a basic literature review, the net result is the same.)
What seems key to disciplinary emergence is a sense of a shared project. But 
this does not mean that a field demands a unitary or univocal approach. Far 
from it. Taking too limited a conception of the object and of the field, particu-
larly when this is combined with too limited or problematic an approach, can 
equally stymie growth. This might be illustrated by a consideration of perhaps 
the most well-known past attempt to establish a field for the academic study of 
martial arts – hoplology.
Hoplological Hopes
Hoplology is surely the most famous example of the failure of martial arts stud-
ies to attain a stable and sustainable academic presence. According to the web-
site of the International Hoplology Society, hoplology was founded by Sir Rich-
ard F. Burton in the 19th Century. However, it then (says the website) ‘remained 
dormant’ until Donn Draeger picked up the baton at some unspecified point 
after the 1960s, a baton he carried until his death (‘About the International 
Hopology Society’ n.d.). The International Hoplology Society is now based 
in Hawaii and presents itself as ‘an independent, not-for-profit organization’ 
which ‘offers its services to scholars, universities, museums, collectors, private 
and governmental organizations, writers and publishers around the world’ 
(‘About the International Hopology Society’ n.d.).
Given this evidence of its continued and current existence, readers may be 
surprised by my claim that hoplology is a failed academic project. Hoplology 
still exists. The published work of Donn Draeger itself is of mythic status in 
most narratives of the history of Western attempts to establish serious and reli-
able scholarly knowledge of East Asian martial arts. Nonetheless, what provides 
the clearest evidence that the project failed is the lack of any significant aca-
demic presence for hoplology. It is neither a discipline, nor a discourse, nor an 
unfolding research programme, nor an interdisciplinary nexus of debate. The 
fact that hoplology continues to haunt us in the form of the hopes and aspira-
tions of its proponents does not change the fact that as a field of study it never 
really made it to where any such field of study most wants to be – the university. 
The university was always where Draeger and other proponents wanted hoplol-
ogy to be. But it never really made it.
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It ‘never really made it’ for lots of different kinds of reasons. There were of 
course both personal and ‘political’ elements at work that arguably hampered 
Draeger’s attempts to get hoplology into a university (Miracle 2015). But my 
contention is that, more significantly, there have always been fundamental 
obstacles to its academic survival, and that these have always boiled down to 
its flawed conceptions of its object and its flawed theoretical orientations – in 
other words, its flawed paradigm and approach.
There are many possible ways to illustrate the conceptual and orientation 
problems at the heart of hoplology. For the sake of brevity and clarity, I will 
limit myself to one quick example. This is taken from the front-page text of the 
International Hoplology Society website,4 which proudly trumpets the ‘three 
axioms of hoplology’. These three axioms are:
1. The foundation of human combative behavior is rooted in our evolution. 
To gain a realistic understanding of human combative behavior, it is nec-
essary to have a basic grasp of its evolutionary background.
2. The two basic forms of human combative behavior are predatory and 
affective. Predatory combative behavior is that combative/aggressive 
behavior rooted in our evolution as a hunting mammal. Affective com-
bative behavior is that aggressive/combative behavior rooted in our evo-
lution as a group-social animal.
3. The evolution of human combative behavior and performance is integral 
with the use of weapons. That is, behavior and performance is intrinsi-
cally linked to and reflects the use of weapons. (‘About the International 
Hopology Society’ n.d.)
From any academic point of view, the fundamental problem with these axi-
oms is that they are not academic. Rather, they are tenets, beliefs, and asser-
tions. They may appear scientific on first glance, but they are actually scientistic. 
Specifically, they reflect an attempt to align hoplology with the controversial 
(and equally dubious) field of sociobiology (Wilson 1975), which itself has long 
been accused, among other things, of scientism and biological determinism 
(Schreier et al. n.d.; Bethell n.d.).5 The function of these scientific-sounding 
 4 Although focusing on such an example may be open to the criticism that it has not been 
taken from a properly academic context and so should not be subjected to academic critique, 
nonetheless this example has been selected because these are words that have been placed 
‘front and centre’ and presented as expressing the heart of the hoplological academic project.
 5 The semi-autobiographical pseudo-academic book The Professor in the Cage: Why Men Fight 
and Why We Like To Watch by Jonathan Gottschall is perhaps the most well-known recent 
iteration of this kind of deeply problematic approach (Gottschall 2015). The book, appropri-
ately, starts from the failure of an English professor’s ongoing project to persuade anyone to 
use ideas from evolutionary biology in literary studies. From this failure, Gottschall turns to 
his stagnating academic career and the birth of his interest in MMA. In all of this, the book 
applies simplistic sociobiologistic ideas to the subject of ‘fighting’. There is much that might 
be said about the limitations and skewing effects of all such pseudo-, crypto- and actual 
sociobiologistic approaches, and they warrant sustained critique. But such critiques should 
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‘axioms’ on the homepage is to gesture to the society’s declared commitment to 
scholarship and research. Unfortunately, this gesture actually demonstrates the 
opposite: It reveals its constitutively doctrinaire orientation. As such, the text 
commits quite a few academic crimes, which all effectively add up to a kind of 
unintentional (but certain) self-ostracising and auto-abdication from the world 
of serious academic debate and discussion.
Of course, neither Burton nor Draeger authored these words. But it is clear 
that the table was set and the door opened to welcome them in advance by the 
kinds of approach common to hoplology since the beginning. The problem is 
that this is such a limited raison d’être, articulated with reference to and in terms 
of a very limited and problematic deployment of an already problematic set of 
contentions, that it will always be highly unlikely to pass as academic in any 
field or context. Few, if any, 20th or 21st Century academic journals, for instance, 
would accept any allegedly academic article that proceeded according to such 
‘axioms’ (as illustrated by the aforementioned case of Gottschall [2015]).
Rather than this, in order to thrive within academia, what is required is some-
thing very different. Specifically, martial arts studies must emerge as a coher-
ent communicative and self-sustaining field of meaningful and productive 
exchanges and interactions that might be diversely relevant. To achieve this, 
it will be necessary to undertake a sustained and explicit examination of, and 
engagement with, the stakes and consequences of the different conceptualisa-
tions, orientations and methods available to the field. This implies a sustained 
reflection on premises, remits, orientations and methods, along with ongoing 
dialogues with other disciplines and the principled awareness of other estab-
lished and unfolding approaches across academia. Any conceptualisation of the 
field that starts out as an apologetic exercise for only a single set of assumptions 
or methods by definition cannot do this and will be highly unlikely to attract 
wider academic interest.
This chapter now seeks to contribute to such a reflection by moving away 
from failed projects like hoplology and discussing instead some significant 
recent contributions to the crucial debate about what martial arts studies is and 
how it might elaborate itself and develop. Before engaging with these contribu-
tions, however, it will be worthwhile to give some more attention to the matter 
of the significance for academic discourses of differing approaches and values.
Moving from ‘Thing Itself ’ to ‘Field Itself ’
One helpful way to understand why differences of opinion and orientation 
will always occur within academic disciplines and discourses is proposed by 
Jacques Derrida (Derrida and Ferraris 2003). Derrida proposes that academic 
be careful to avoid being dragged into a scientistic cul-de-sac. There are far better approaches 
to ‘fighting’ available than those which rush naively and crudely to ideas of evolutionary 
advantage (see, for examples, Jackson-Jacobs 2013 and Gong 2015).
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fields are essentially always at war with themselves. The reason for this is that 
they essentially construct both their own objects and approaches and their own 
yardsticks for evaluating them. In this sense, a discipline essentially ‘constructs 
the object of argumentation and the field of argumentation itself ’ (Arditi 2008, 
115). There is no immutable or incontestable fixed point outside of the dis-
cipline’s own discourse from which to adjudicate anything that takes place 
within it. But what takes place within it depends on a host of variables, includ-
ing preferences in terms of premises, protocols, practices, procedures, and so 
on. Therefore, Derrida proposes that:
A field is determined as a field of battle because there is no metalan-
guage, no locus of truth outside the field, no absolute and ahistorical 
overhang; and this absence of overhang – in other words, the radical 
historicity of the field – makes the field necessarily subject to multiplic-
ity and heterogeneity. As a result, those who are inscribed in this field 
are necessarily inscribed in a polemos, even if they have no special taste 
for war. There is a strategic destiny, destined to stratagem by the ques-
tion raised over the truth of the field. (Derrida and Ferraris 2003, 13)
Any academic field is ‘a field of battle because there is no metalanguage, no 
locus of truth outside the field’. This ‘makes the field necessarily subject to 
multiplicity and heterogeneity’. Hence, when faced with divergent opinions or 
evaluations of any given approach, argument, assessment or experiment within 
a field, there can be no simple appeal to any higher authority outside the field.6 
After all, how could anyone outside of a field be universally acknowledged as 
existing or operating in an informed, experienced or expert enough fashion to 
adjudicate on what takes place within the field? Do scientists ask philosophers 
to adjudicate on and decide the value of their methods and findings? Do law-
yers? Kant thought that all fields could be interrogated and, in a sense, audited 
by philosophy. But do those working in fields other than philosophy agree? 
Indeed, do philosophers really (still) feel entitled, informed or expert enough 
to do so?
Of course, there are many crossovers and connections between certain 
fields. Work in one discipline often incorporates elements developed in other 
disciplines. Economics is often heavily involved in the use of mathemat-
ics, for instance. And the academic study of visual art regularly calls upon 
the approaches and insights of such fields as history, philosophy, cultural 
theory, sociology, and so on. But such crossovers, connections or collabora-
tions are neither entirely free, nor inevitable, nor established without a battle 
 6 During the 1980s, much was made of the fact that such a perspective reveals that there is 
always an aporia at work in the legitimation of knowledge (Derrida 1992), a kind of ineradi-
cable tautology, and even what Lyotard called a ‘legitimation crisis in knowledge’ (Lyotard 
1984).
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or disagreement. Rather, such connections are contingent achievements, pro-
duced either through a sense of ‘obviousness’ or appeals to norms (as in, ‘Of 
course the study of art and the study of history overlap and interact’) or through 
the effort of making the case for the validity of their connection (as in, ‘Perhaps 
recent advances in meteorology could be applied to help us learn more about 
cultural dynamics’).
Currently, art history rarely appeals to mathematics for justification or cor-
roboration of the knowledge produced in its own disciplinary space. Although 
it is not impossible or inconceivable, any move to make the discourse or disci-
pline of art history reliant upon mathematics – or subject to any kind of math-
ematical validation – would be met with considerable resistance within that 
field. To propose that the academic discourse around fine art, art history, and so 
on, should be subject to mathematical procedures would provoke a vehement 
battle. But the point to be made here is that this battle would merely be different 
in scale or intensity, not in kind, from the ongoing day to day disagreements 
within the academic study of fine art and art history around such matters as 
whether, say, the psychoanalytic paradigm developed in the wake of the work 
of Jacques Lacan is of more use to art scholars than the sociological paradigm 
of Pierre Bourdieu, and so on.
Again, these are battles around the question of the paradigm or paradigms 
that structure a field. The choice of paradigm determines the kind of questions 
that can be asked, the type of work that will seem to ‘need’ to be done, and the 
ways in which such work will be approached.
Reflecting on the ways that academic disciplines and universities work, Der-
rida argued that what takes place within academic discourses involves ‘not an 
opposition between the legitimate and the illegitimate, but rather a very com-
plicated distribution of the demands of legitimacy’ (Derrida 2003, 18). At the 
very least, then, the determination of such matters as best versus worst is no 
simple matter. It does not easily come down to a clear question of whether 
something is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. For, if there is no fixed point outside of and 
transcending the field, then the source of the determination of such values can 
only come from within the field itself – from among the paradigms constructed 
within it.
The problem is that because there will always be more than one paradigm in 
play (and in process), there will be no sustained consensus arising within the 
field. In a sense, there are only ever shared, modified or replaced problematics, 
and rarely any widely held consensus about the formulation of the object, the 
parameters of the problem, or the framework for any exploration or method 
of approach.
The proposition that academic disciplines are battlegrounds may either dis-
appoint or delight. It may disappoint those who cleave to the idea that aca-
demic disciplines principally trade in the establishment of truth about reality, 
and that they find out and know more and more about truth and reality as time 
goes on and as the discipline progresses. Conversely, the idea of disciplines as 
42 Deconstructing Martial Arts
battlegrounds may appeal to others, and for any number of reasons. However, 
it is important to point out that the type of ‘war’ being formulated by Der-
rida here is not some Darwinian or neoliberal notion of ‘survival of the fittest’. 
Rather, Derrida is making a claim about the inevitable and inescapable emer-
gence of pluralities of voices, positions and styles of attempting to establish or 
verify things within disciplines.
This depicts a condition of incessant and interminable disagreement, in 
which not only are there no absolute or eternal winners, there are not even 
agreed criteria for determining what notions like ‘survival’, ‘demise’ or indeed 
‘fittest’ might possibly mean. (Has hoplology ‘survived’? In what way? Is it 
‘the fittest’? For what?) In this kind of context, there will always be more to 
any disagreement than one matter or one issue. Indeed, ‘disagreement’, in this 
sense, can usefully be formulated as ‘less a confrontation between two estab-
lished positions – as in the case of a debating society – than an engagement 
between “parties” that do not antedate their confrontation. A disagreement 
constructs the object of argumentation and the field of argumentation itself ’ 
(Arditi 2008, 115).
In academia, the mode and manner of our argumentation, as well as the very 
object of our attention itself, must be understood to be particular kinds of insti-
tutional constructs. Our objects are ‘disciplinary objects’, essentially invented 
within, or at least ‘worked over’ by, our own discourses (Mowitt 1992). Our 
approaches to them are constructs too. This is so even though many people 
seem to believe that academic disciplines and fields just happen, that they are 
born spontaneously or emerge ineluctably in response to external realities of 
the world. However, this is not at all the case. Academic subjects are not born, 
they are made.7
The Paradigms of Martial Arts Studies
In light of this, it is important to realise that an early and essential challenge for 
the nascent field of martial arts studies was always going to be the field itself. 
That is to say, at the same time as exploring and engaging with problematics 
within the field, it is also necessary to more clearly and indeed securely establish 
martial arts studies as a field of study, that is, as a legitimate field of study (Bow-
man 2015a; Wetzler 2015).
 7 There are many accounts of these processes. See, for example, Anderson on the formation of 
English Literature as a global discipline (Anderson 1991), Hall on the formation of cultural 
studies (Hall 1992), Fabian on how anthropology constructs its objects (Fabian 1983), Chow 
on the invention of film studies (Chow 2007), or, perhaps most famously, Foucault on the 
invention of psychiatry (Foucault 1989). Indeed, as one commentator put it to me: Why 
should there be a field of martial arts studies, distinct from the wider study of movement, 
performance and embodied knowledge?
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This matter may not seem to amount to too much of a serious problem, 
given the abundant empirical evidence that martial arts studies is a field that 
is mushrooming internationally. There are currently conferences and publica-
tions appearing in many languages in many countries. But the fact that this is 
happening without much in the way of a conversation about how to study mar-
tial arts is troubling (Bowman 2015a; Wetzler 2015; Judkins 2016a). History is 
littered with failed attempts to establish any kind of coherent and sustainable 
academic discourse of martial arts studies. As I have been suggesting, perhaps 
this is in large part because of a lack of sustained communal effort to forge con-
ceptual development via cross-disciplinary dialogues.
Moreover, in the present moment, we should not forget that until very 
recently one of the most frequently posed questions in and around these waters 
was: Will martial arts ever be a valid topic of academic study? If today we are 
hearing a resounding ‘Yes!’, there nevertheless remain not only ‘strictly aca-
demic’ but also ‘pressingly practical’ reasons for posing such why and how ques-
tions. Different answers produce differing conceptualisations of the aim, object 
and field, and entail different approaches. So, we need to ask: What are our 
aims? Which approaches best serve such aims?
In the terms of Thomas Kuhn’s now classic approach to understanding the 
ways that academic knowledge is produced, established and transformed, the 
emergent field of martial arts studies would currently be classified as ‘pre-
paradigmatic’ (Kuhn 1962; Nicholls 2010). This is because there is little to no 
consensus about its objects, orientations, methodologies or approaches. Some 
connections, crossovers and collaborations across disciplines are being formed, 
thanks to newly formed research networks, conferences and increasingly visible 
publications, but the wider field has long been confined to discrete islands of 
disparate disciplinary approaches in small enclaves. So, although some scholars 
are now producing works that engage with the question of the approaches and 
paradigms of martial arts studies, there remains much that still needs to be 
done to establish anything like a coherent topos.8
There is much to be said about this. But what I principally want to emphasize 
in what follows – in an argument that runs contrary or transverse to many 
discussions and impulses in and around the field – is that none of this entails a 
‘need’ to define martial arts.
 8 Hence the importance of the question of the paradigms of martial arts studies. From the 
outset, we must pluralise the question because it is evident from the range of scholarship 
and avenues of enquiry currently beginning to be explored across the disciplines that differ-
ing conceptualisations of both object and field emerge reciprocally with different approaches 
and orientations. To establish the paradigms of martial arts studies, one approach would 
be to map current approaches, analyse their orientations and interrogate their current and 
potential interconnections, in order to generate an overarching awareness of the field in its 
multiplicity and heterogeneity. Of course, the question that arises here is that of the map 
itself: What are the characteristics of the lens through which the cartographer is looking?
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Against Definition
As mentioned, there is a widespread belief in and around the nascent discourses 
of martial arts studies that a primary and orientating task must be to define 
martial arts (Monahan 2007; Cynarski 2008; Lorge 2012, 2016; Channon and 
Jennings 2014; Cynarski, Sieber, and Szajna 2014). The matter of defining mar-
tial arts has also prompted some valuable recent reflections on the many prob-
lems and issues that it raises (Wetzler 2015; Judkins 2016b; Channon 2016). 
However, I want to intervene by arguing that this very belief and orientation 
harbours problems (Bowman 2015a, 2017b). More precisely, my argument is 
that it is actually an error to think that forging definitions must be primary, or 
indeed even necessary, in academic work. Often, the belief in the necessity of 
definition is already an effect of a tacit acceptance that a certain manner, mode 
or register of academic discourse must be the proper, best or necessary method. 
Indeed, it arguably boils down to a belief that the only or best kind of academic 
work is scientific, and that science starts from definitions.
There are at least two problems with this. One problem lies with any attempt 
to make studies of human life, culture and society emulate science. In our case, 
this would take the form of trying to force the study of martial arts to con-
form to a certain (scientistic) conception of science. For it is important to be 
aware that scientific approaches are neither the only nor necessarily the best, 
assuming they are even viable, approaches. (Must we use scientific methods to 
explore martial arts in/and literature, film, music, gaming, philosophy, religion, 
gender, identity, or politics, and so on?) The second problem relates to the idea 
that science starts with definitions. This involves a misunderstanding of sci-
ence. Science starts from theory. Scientific method always and only boils down 
to the attempt to test, verify or falsify a theoretical hypothesis.9 Such work often 
seems to involve numbers, but science does not necessarily involve numbers. 
Some statements about science or elements of it involve numbers. But what is 
primary in science is theory.
On the other hand, or at the other end of the supposed spectrum of 
approaches, even putatively non-scientific approaches to any subject also 
involve theory – whether consciously acknowledged or not, and whether the 
theory is postulated explicitly (to orientate the work) or whether it emerges 
out of the work, through different kinds of encounters with ‘objects’, ‘things’, 
‘processes’, ‘phenomena’ or ‘stuff ’ – and regardless of whether we want to call 
such stuff ‘text’, ‘evidence’, ‘material’, ‘archive’, ‘fieldwork’, ‘results’ or ‘data’. The 
 9 One reviewer of this chapter challenged my use of the word ‘verify’ here, as it jars with 
scientific terminology. However, I have elected to keep the word, because my thinking is 
more influenced by Jacques Rancière than by scientific method per se. Rancière argues 
that attempts to establish, prove or argue for something – anything, anywhere – ultimately 
involve constructing ways of trying to verify (rather than falsify) the proposition, position or 
belief one is supporting (see for instance Rancière 1992).
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belief that such encounters, or any results or statements about any of this, 
necessarily or properly begins or ends with ‘definition’ is a misunderstanding. 
As such, any approach that positions the matter of how to define martial arts 
as if it is a primary or somehow fundamental question is misconceived or 
badly formed.
As Alex Channon has recently reminded us (although he argues for the utility 
of principled moments of definition), definitions quickly produce hierarchies, 
and help to erect values, borderlines, norms and exclusions (Channon 2016).
For Theory
Fortunately, early work in the recently established journal Martial Arts Studies 
has, from the outset, attempted to move beyond the (dis)orientation caused by 
becoming trapped in the taxonomical labours associated with defining. Issue 
One of Martial Arts Studies, for instance, contained several different efforts to 
conceptualise the field and to work out ways that it could profitably and pro-
ductively develop (Bowman 2015b; Wetzler 2015; D.S. Farrer 2015; Barrow-
man 2015b). Significant among these is Sixt Wetzler’s ‘Martial Arts Studies as 
Kulturwissenschaft: A Possible Theoretical Framework’ (Wetzler 2015).10 This 
article is a particularly notable contribution to the field, to which I would now 
like to turn.
In his article, Wetzler carries out a number of important tasks. He identi-
fies the pitfalls that can arise when academics use the object-, folk-, or practi-
tioner-language of the practices that they are taking as their objects of study. 
From here, he broaches the problem of adequate academic terminology, ask-
ing: What terms should scholars use when talking about this or that aspect of 
martial arts in/and/as culture, politics, history or society? He then argues that 
academic terms should surely not be the same as the terms and concepts used 
by practitioners themselves, either to characterise what they do or to carve up 
the conceptual spectrum of categories and hierarchies. This discussion moves 
Wetzler into a reflection on the well-worn problems of conceptualisation and – 
surprise, surprise – definition.
In an important move, however, rather than arguing for or against this or 
that definition of martial arts, Wetzler deconstructs and reveals the limits of 
a range of conventional and popular categories that circulate within martial 
arts discourses and points to the essential impossibility of establishing fixed 
referential categories in these waters (Wetzler 2015, 28). He proposes instead 
that martial arts studies analyses should be orientated by looking for and at 
 10 My own contribution was entitled ‘Asking the Question: Is Martial Arts Studies an Academic 
Field?’ (Bowman 2015b) In this chapter, I stopped short of explicitly addressing the question 
of which particular theories or approaches the field might involve (even though my prefer-
ences are surely readily inferable).
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the ‘dimensions of meaning’ attendant to any given construct of martial arts. 
To this end, he proposes five plausible but always provisional dimensions of 
meaning: Preparation for violent conflict, play and competitive sports, per-
formance, transcendent goals, and health care. After making a case for these 
dimensions and inviting others to expand or refine his conceptualisation of 
them, Wetzler turns to the matter of how to conceive of, frame, and conceptu-
ally manage (in order to analyse and discuss) matters of martial arts studies 
without falling into what Derrida would call ‘metaphysical traps’, what cultural 
theorists would call ‘essentialisms’, and what Wetzler himself calls pitfalls of 
‘lexical illusion’.
The way to avoid making conceptual mistakes, Wetzler argues, is to find an 
adequate theory. The one he proposes as valid and viable for martial arts stud-
ies is Even-Zohar’s polysystem theory. Wetzler quotes the following important 
passage from Even-Zohar:
Systems are not equal, but hierarchized within the polysystem. It is the 
permanent struggle between the various strata … which constitutes the 
(dynamic) synchronic state of the system. It is the victory of one stratum 
over another which constitutes the change on the diachronic axis. In this 
centrifugal vs. centripetal motion, phenomena are driven from the cen-
tre to the periphery while, conversely, phenomena may push their way 
into the centre and occupy it. However, with a polysystem one must not 
think in terms of one centre and one periphery, since several such posi-
tions are hypothesized. A move may take place, for instance, whereby 
a certain item (element, function) is transferred from the periphery of 
one system to the periphery of an adjacent system within the same poly-
system, and then may or may not move on to the centre of the latter. 
(Even-Zohar 1990, 13-14, quoted in Wetzler 2015, 28-29)
Wetzler goes on to explain how this theoretical paradigm might be used in 
martial arts studies:
Transferred to the development of the Asian martial arts in Western 
culture within recent decades, this means: The total realm of the martial 
arts is the polysystem in question, which can itself be understood as a 
system within the ultimate polysystem ‘culture’. The cultural meaning 
of the polysystem ‘martial arts’ is not monolithic, but instead consists 
of several systems that each have their own relevance within the poly-
system. Such systems might be ‘use for self-defence’ or ‘preferred way of 
combat for the silver screen’, while the ‘items’ that occupy these systems 
are the individual martial arts styles. (Wetzler 2015, 28)
Furthermore, the theory seems to offer ways to conceptually grasp change 
within and across systems. Wetzler continues:
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To clarify with an example: Upon its arrival in the West, karate was 
perceived mostly for the Dimension 1: Preparation for Violent Con-
flict, and thus at the centre of the system ‘self-defence’. However, it has 
been driven to the periphery of ‘self-defence’ by other styles, especially 
by wing chun, which was then in turn driven from the centre by krav 
maga. Regarding the perception of Dimension 2: Play and Competitive 
Sports, karate was again driven from a centre, this time of the category 
‘tough combat sport’, in this case by kickboxing, which was replaced by 
Muay Thai, which was replaced by MMA. However, not all is lost for 
karate. When the style held the centre of the self-defence system, it also 
had a connotation of being a pastime for bullies and hooligans. While 
losing the centres of those systems karate was able to gain ground in 
the systems including ‘martial arts for pedagogical purposes’ and ‘self- 
perfection by Eastern practices’ (both systems obviously representing 
Dimension 4: Transcendent Goals), whose centres it shares today with 
other Japanese budo styles, along with yoga, qigong, and various medi-
tation practices in the second case. (Wetzler 2015, 28)
Wetzler’s ensuing discussion of the insights that such an approach opens up is 
extremely suggestive and rewarding – even though it does not broach the mat-
ter of how anyone might ever establish what is at the ‘centre’, ‘periphery’ or other 
‘position’ of this or that ‘system’ – all of which will surely always be in question. 
Nonetheless, it has already generated (or at least enriched) some highly signifi-
cant work, most notably in the form of Benjamin N. Judkins’ recent study of the 
Star Wars inspired phenomenon of Lightsaber combat (Judkins 2016a).
Using the ‘five dimensions of meaning’ that Wetzler proposes can be associ-
ated with martial arts practices in different configurations at different times 
and in different places, Judkins easily demonstrates that the perhaps unlikely 
pastime of Lightsaber combat training can in fact entirely reasonably be 
classed as a martial art. This is so even though such a conclusion might sur-
prise or dismay certain scholars of martial arts and even if many of Lightsaber 
combat’s own practitioners would not feel entirely comfortable making such 
a claim.
Judkins’ approach to the quite possibly controversial example of Lightsaber 
combat, informed by Wetzler’s intentionally rigorous (looking) framework, 
has the benefit of challenging quite a few different positions – including, most 
importantly, any essentialist or ‘referentialist’ approach that proceeds on the 
assumption that something is a martial art if it is somehow ‘obviously’ a martial 
art. So, such works as these by Wetzler and Judkins – along with the arguably 
even more radical approach taken in the recent work of Chris Goto-Jones, who 
argues that certain kinds of computer gaming can become martial arts practices 
(Goto-Jones 2016) – are all valuable, and not least because they foreground the 
limitations of any hasty attempt to define martial arts. Moreover, not only do 
such approaches all problematize the impulse to rush to definitions, they also 
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do so without sidestepping or avoiding the issue of how to specify and handle 
martial arts as an object of academic attention.
For my purposes, a key value in this work is the demonstration of the pri-
macy and productivity of theory before definition. Such frameworks clearly 
exceed the frames and orientations of hoplology, for instance, which is mired 
in inessential preconceptions and doxa. As such, it is in full support of Wetzler’s 
efforts and in broad agreement with the orientations of such scholars that my 
present contribution to this debate about definition and theory aspires to be 
read. This is so even though my own contribution does involve criticisms of 
Wetzler’s proposed theoretical paradigm for martial arts studies. But these are 
less like fundamental disagreements and more like questions for further con-
sideration. Importantly, any criticisms I have will neither be ‘anti-theory’ nor 
‘pro-definition’. Rather, in what follows, I seek less to disagree with Wetzler and 
more to point out some potential pitfalls and problems attendant to any avoid-
ance of theory or insistence on definition in martial arts studies.
Defining Problems: Relationality before Definition
A well-known part of the problem that arises when trying to define the objects 
or foci of martial arts studies is semiotic openness, slippage, instability and the 
incessant ongoing changes that take place across cultures, communities, socie-
ties, technologies and practices. Wetzler tackles this by proposing a framework 
for structuring academic enquiry and proffering a set of theoretical terms for 
grasping what he represents as ‘systemic’ but what I would prefer to call discur-
sive change. I prefer to approach the world in terms of the language of texts and 
discourses rather than elements, functions, systems/polysystems, and so on, for 
ontological reasons that boil down to the primacy (proposed by poststructural-
ist theory) of relationality rather than notions of ‘system’ or even ‘systematicity’. 
As Derrida writes of ‘system’:
If by ‘system’ is meant – and this is the minimal sense of the word – a sort 
of consequence, coherence and insistence – a certain gathering together –  
there is an injunction to the system that I have never renounced, and 
never wished to. This can be seen in the recurrence of motifs and refer-
ences from one text to another in my work, despite the differing occa-
sions and pretexts … ‘System’, however, in a philosophical sense that is 
more rigorous and perhaps more modern, can also be taken to mean a 
totalization in the configuration, a continuity of all statements, a form 
of coherence (not coherence itself), involving the syllogicity of logic, 
a certain syn which is no longer simply that of gathering in general, 
but rather of the assemblage of ontological propositions. In that case 
deconstruction, without being anti-systematic, is on the contrary, and 
nevertheless, not only a search for, but itself a consequence of, the fact 
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that the system is impossible; it often consists, regularly or recurrently, 
in making appear – in each alleged system, in each self-interpretation 
of and by a system – a force of dislocation, a limit in the totalization, a 
limit in the movement of syllogistic synthesis. Deconstruction is not a 
method for discovering that which resists the system; it consists, rather, 
in remarking, in the reading and interpretation of texts, that what has 
made it possible for philosophers to effect a system is nothing other 
than a certain dysfunction or ‘disadjustment’, a certain incapacity to 
close the system. Wherever I have followed this investigative approach, 
it has been a question of showing that the system does not work, and 
that this dysfunction not only interrupts the system but itself accounts 
for the desire for system, which draws its élan from this very disadjoin-
ment, or disjunction. On each occasion, the disjunction has a privileged 
site in that which one calls a philosophical corpus. Basically, deconstruc-
tion as I see it is an attempt to train the beam of analysis onto this dis-
jointing link. (Derrida 2003, 3-4)
Systems fail to be systematic; system is impossible. This also accounts for the 
desire for it, and the possibility of the deconstruction of it. Adding ‘poly’ to the 
word ‘system’ does not solve, resolve or dissolve the matter. Pluralizing merely 
defers acknowledging the fact that there may be no system other than in the 
‘lexical illusion’ of the eye that wishes to perceive/believe that there is system-
atic organisation and some kind of systematic process at work, even if we can 
only ever ‘discover’ (invent) it afterwards.
As an alternative to what Derrida would call ‘metaphysical’ thinking about 
systems, the poststructuralist notions of text and discourse provide alternative 
concepts, metaphors, vocabularies and paradigms (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; 
Mowitt 1992; Bowman 2007). Key here are the notions of relation or relation-
ality, on the one hand, and force, on the other. It seems worthwhile to discuss 
these notions further, as they are important dimensions, but they are currently 
undeveloped, or at best underdeveloped, in Wetzler’s proposed framework for 
analysis in martial arts studies.
To start with the matter of relation first: Can an identity ever be said to be 
anything other than relational? As Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe argued 
in the 1980s, ‘identities are purely relational’ so ‘there is no identity which can 
be fully constituted’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 111; Bowman 2007, 18-19). 
Already this kind of perspective, with origins in Saussurean linguistics and 
semiotics, problematizes the notion of ‘elements’ within a ‘system’ and replaces 
the notion of ‘entities with identities’ with a much more fluid sense of their 
ongoing incompletion and irreducible contextuality.
Almost two decades after his influential 1985 monograph with Chantal 
Mouffe, in a dispute with Slavoj Žižek about politics and society, Laclau was still 
making the same arguments. In response to Žižek’s now infamous (and what 
Laclau always regarded as ill-thought-through) adoption of a kind of crude 
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Marxist and quick Leninist position on the question of how to make radical 
political change in the world, Laclau argued that:
We gain very little, once identities are conceived as complexly articu-
lated collective wills, by referring to them through simple designations 
such as classes, ethnic groups and so on, which are at best names for 
transient points of stabilization. The really important task is to under-
stand the logics of their constitution and dissolution, as well as the 
formal determinations of the spaces in which they interrelate. (Butler, 
Laclau, and Žižek 2000, 53)
Laclau pitched his argument about how to approach political entities, identities 
and processes in terms of the vocabulary and concerns of a poststructuralist 
and post-Marxist political theory, whose essential proposition runs like this: 
Because everything – and by ‘everything’ what is meant is everything – can 
be seen to be contingent and hence conventional, everything is therefore to be 
regarded as irreducibly political (Arditi and Valentine 1999; Marchart 2007).
There is much to be said about this argument (Bowman 2007, 2008). I return 
to it here not just as a rejoinder to Wetzler’s metaphorical invocation of the 
putatively non-metaphorical notion of ‘system’ but also because I believe it is 
vital (and vitalising) to try, as Laclau urges us, ‘to understand the logics of [the] 
constitution and dissolution [of entities and identities], as well as the formal [or 
informal] determinations of the spaces in which they interrelate’.
This is important not least because, if ‘identities’ can also be understood as 
‘complexly articulated collective wills’, then to understand either ‘wills’ or ‘identi-
ties’ as arising ‘systematically’ could have a problematic impact on the way we 
understand such important matters as (for example) political struggle. Stated 
bluntly, to rely on polysystem theory might cause us to follow a line of thinking 
in which political struggles and political identities come to be conceived as some-
how merely being the systematic unfolding of some kind of predetermined plan.
This is why the notion of force is also key. Entities and identities are not just 
matters of signification, or of systems, but also of force. Force is the other side of 
signification, a key part of the process of establishing meaning (Protevi 2001). 
This is why Laclau believes we should not be content with the moment of refer-
ring to entities and identities ‘through simple designations such as classes, eth-
nic groups and so on’: Because such terms ‘are at best names for transient points 
of stabilization’. In other words, signification should not be studied in isolation 
from considerations of force.11
 11 Laclau’s use of the word ‘stabilization’ here is significant. It seems to owe something to the fact 
that Derrida once emphasised the importance of the ideas of stabilization and destabilization 
in a published conversation with Laclau in the 1990s (Mouffe 1996). In his response to Laclau 
and others, Derrida said: ‘All that a deconstructive point of view tries to show, is that since con-
vention, institutions and consensus are stabilizations (sometimes stabilizations of great dura-
tion, sometimes micro-stabilizations), this means that they are stabilizations of something 
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So, Laclau’s broadly deconstructive perspective challenges us to think about 
the making or establishment of any identity in a way that exceeds the lexical 
illusion of systematicity and emphasizes instead the complexity of contingent 
processes of articulation (Laclau 1994). This differentiated perspective – which 
replaces ideas of structures and systems with those of iteration, reiteration, dis-
semination, dislocation, and so on – forms the main part of my critique of the 
use of polysystem theory in martial arts studies, or at least my critique of Wet-
zler’s advocation of it. However, to reiterate, making such a critique is not my 
primary aim here. Wetzler is a sparring partner, not an opponent. Rather, the 
matters that I ultimately want to challenge are somewhat different.
Changing Discourses
Specifically, I want to point out that Laclau’s approach to discourse analysis 
involves rather different investments than thinking about the academic defini-
tion of any activity, entity or identity. Indeed, although Laclau’s argument here 
includes the injunction that academics be rigorous and forensic in their con-
ceptual grasp of their key terms, it is not limited to this injunction. Moreover, the 
position Laclau advocates does not merely involve the endless or supposedly 
‘useless’ problematizing of terms (something deconstruction was once regularly 
accused of), whether to try to reconfigure and refine the definitions and dis-
tinctions that academics use in their work or those that practitioners use in 
their practice, or to show them to be impossible.
Rather, for Laclau – and indeed for the overwhelming majority of works of cul-
tural theory developed through and since the 1980s – the fundamental point to 
be taken on board is not that we should work out how best to define something; it 
is rather that we must face up to the fact that ‘things’ are neither simply nor nec-
essarily ‘things’, that all identities are at root contingent discursive achievements, 
or establishments, or – to use Laclau’s words, ‘transient points of stabilization’.12
essentially unstable and chaotic. Thus it becomes necessary to stabilize precisely because sta-
bility is not natural; it is because there is instability that stabilization becomes necessary; it is 
because there is chaos that there is a need for stability. Now, this chaos and instability, which is 
fundamental, founding and irreducible, is at once naturally the worst against which we strug-
gle with laws, rules, conventions, politics and provisional hegemony, but at the same time it is 
a chance, a chance to change, to destabilize. If there were continual stability, there would be 
no need for politics, and it is to the extent that stability is not natural, essential or substantial, 
that politics exists and ethics is possible. Chaos is at once a risk and a chance, and it is here that 
the possible and the impossible cross each other’ (Derrida 1996, 84).
 12 Accordingly, given that ‘martial arts studies’ takes its very name and focus (‘martial arts’) from 
what Wetzler deems to be the dubious and problematic realm of ‘object language’, there can 
therefore be no ‘metalanguage’ that is not contaminated by this fact. As Laclau and Mouffe 
argued in the 1980s, because there is never anything like a fixed centre, stable system or 
simple outside, there can be no metalanguage (1985).
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Moreover, our shared use of a term like ‘martial arts’ or ‘system’ stabilizes 
our discourse. But it can also impose and project a fixed view – our present 
view – of all sorts of dimensions of culture and society, both backwards in time 
and outwards across different linguistic, geographical, cultural, religious and 
social contexts. So, the establishment of a shared and stable term has its bene-
fits (predication and communication being among them). But it inevitably also 
comes at a cost – which we might render in a number of ways, including pro-
jection, simplification, hypostatisation, generalisation, transformation, or even 
cultural, conceptual or linguistic imperialism.
Wetzler calls this ‘lexical illusion’, as in: We say ‘martial arts’ in English here 
today, but did or do they say or mean anything like it there (elsewhere) or then 
(elsewhen), without difference or remainder? Or are we misrecognising the 
things ‘out there’ (and ‘then’) that we talk about in our terms, here and now? 
As an example, consider how frequently it is currently said that ‘mindfulness 
meditation’ has been practiced within Eastern movement traditions and mar-
tial arts for millennia. (Before we heard this claim being made about mindful-
ness, we heard the same claim being made about qigong [Palmer 2007]. And 
before that, it was said about yoga [Spatz 2015]. And so on.) Such propositions 
are all based on acts of fantasy and projection, back into a fantasized notion of 
‘long, long ago’ (Fabian 1983).
Such acts of projection are clearly faulty. They also have any number of 
potential ideological dimensions and material and discursive effects. Consider 
a second example. On a tour I was given during a visit to the new Mecca of 
Taekwondo in South Korea, the Taekwondowon, our guide pointed to a picture 
of an old statue and said, ‘Look, this is a statue of someone doing taekwondo. 
That posture comes from taekwondo’. The facts that (a) taekwondo was only 
invented in the 1950s (Gillis 2008; Moenig 2015) and (b) its patterns, or kata, 
were only subsequently changed from the Japanese martial arts from which it 
was derived would seem to problematize the idea that an ancient statue could 
possibly depict a taekwondo posture. The possibility that the taekwondo pos-
ture might have been invented deliberately to depict the ancient statue in order 
to strengthen the ideological claim that taekwondo is ancient was not really 
encouraged or entertained at all.13
Entities and identities are discursive achievements, produced through efforts 
and institutions, arguments, articulations, demonstrations, and indeed pro-
cesses and acts of institution (where ‘institution’ is to be read as both noun 
and verb). What something ‘is’ emerges through forceful – often enforced – 
processes of narration and representation. ‘Mindfulness’ is an entirely modern 
construct. ‘Taekwondo’ is no older than the 1950s. The resignification of such 
 13 After my visit, I blogged about this here: https://goo.gl/FXVF6T. I also went on to discuss 
it in ‘Making Martial Arts History Matter’ (Bowman 2016) and in Mythologies of Martial Arts 
(Bowman 2017b).
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institutions as ancient is an effect of the contingent but motivated modes and 
manners of their discursive articulation and emergence.
Optimistic Relations
Theoretically, I have revisited some broadly poststructuralist points (all too) 
briefly here because I believe that remembering and taking into consideration 
these lessons in our various ongoing research projects into martial arts – and 
the international development of the field of martial arts studies – will allow us 
to move on, and specifically to move on from a certain kind of fixation on defi-
nition. (Neither Wetzler nor Judkins suffers from this fixation, however, and 
my comments about the problems with definition, though inspired in part by 
engagements with their work, are not directed towards either of these scholars.)
I am drawing attention back to poststructuralist theory because, rather than 
orientating and habituating us into an academic life of taxonomical labours 
centred on defining and demarcating, such approaches proceed from the prop-
osition that identities are always irreducibly relational and incomplete, and 
hence contingent, open and ongoing. Identities are constituted by and within 
discourses, and they always emerge as points in clusters of moving constella-
tions of related, contiguous, cognate, differentiated, associated, contrasting and 
oppositional terms, in all kinds of possible relations – linguistic, semiotic, lived, 
institutional, academic, legislative, and so on.
One point to be emphasised again is the role not just of lexical illusion but 
also of force within the construction of entities and identities. Whether using 
what Wetzler terms object language or what Derrida terms metalanguage, we 
always think through and with inherited terms, and hence conceptual differen-
tials and differentiations – inheritances that we are more or less forced to work 
with and, to some degree, within (Derrida 1976).14
 14 Nonetheless, as Saussure taught us, when we are thinking about our linguistically instituted 
categories, first and foremost we must remember that there are only ‘differences without 
positive terms’. Moreover, as Derrida went on to demonstrate, there are no easily specifiable 
or simply stable referents ‘behind’ these differences. The flipside of signification is force 
(Protevi 2001). There is no stability in signification without force. Furthermore, as Gayatri 
Spivak added, the institution of any difference in the production of an identity in discourse, 
the drawing of any demarcation that distinguishes and hierarchizes entities and identities, 
is essentially and irreducibly a political act, with more or less overtly political consequences 
(Spivak 1990, 1993). (Such poststructuralists sometimes even formulate dimensions of this 
in terms of violence [Bowman 2010a]. This means that, if we were to follow this logic through 
to one of its conclusions, it would become possible to argue that more or less any identity is 
in some sense ‘martial’ (it has either been fought for or fought against), as well as stabilized 
but conflictual.) Within martial arts studies, quite what these acts and their consequences 
may be remains to be seen. But hopefully such reflections as this may cause some hesitation, 
and possibly reorientation, before the battles continue over this or that ‘correct’ definition. I 
return to this point at the end of this chapter.
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Now, although I am critical of the scramble for definitions, nonetheless, it 
strikes me that the growing prominence of the matter of definition does attest 
to a lot that is promising in the current stage of development of martial arts 
studies. It is evidently a reflection of the drive to found and ground and legiti-
mate and build the field rigorously, and according to proper academic proto-
cols. To this extent, despite the scientistic features of some forays into this new 
terrain, our current moment is of great significance. So, we may be optimis-
tic. However, in the current rush to try to define and establish ‘things’, there 
is always the risk that we labour under misapprehensions. My concern is that 
some of the misapprehensions we see arising today may come to constitute 
an obstacle or impediment in the development of the field tomorrow, pushing 
it towards becoming something dominated by what Žižek once termed ‘naïve 
empiricism’ or ‘naïve cognitivism’ (Žižek 2001a). Decades before Žižek, Der-
rida too had worried about something similar, which he called ‘incompetent’ 
and even ‘irresponsible’ empiricism (Derrida 2001).
What such thinkers mean in making claims like ‘empiricism is naïve, incompe-
tent, or even irresponsible’ – is that there is a kind of untenable idealism and sim-
plicity at the heart of approaches that begin from the premise that to make sense 
of the world we should simply look around us, focus on things, classify them 
and count them, and that, through a process of testing and disputing around 
categories, we might eventually get at the truth of reality and get it right. Their 
more or less opposite opinion is that, on the contrary, what we all always need 
is an explicit theory. I say explicit theory, and not just ‘theory’, because, arguably, 
everyone always has a theory, even if they don’t consciously know what it is. By 
‘explicit theory’ I am referring to anything from an overarching theory of ontol-
ogy to an actively thought-through image or sense (to use Laclau’s terms again) 
of how discourses and identities are constituted and the logics of their processes 
of establishment, stabilization, interaction, transformation, and dissolution.15
It is in this sense that I am arguing for more theory, an injection of theory, and 
the permeation of theory, before definition. But I am not proposing a return to 
the intellectual battles of the 1980s and 1990s, in which the introduction of 
Continental Philosophy into the humanities led to a state of trench warfare 
between those who ‘did theory’ and those who ‘did empirical work’ (Hall 2002). 
Furthermore, although I am arguing explicitly ‘for theory’, I want to be clear 
that I am certainly not therefore arguing ‘against empirical work’, or ‘history’, or 
‘reality’, or anything like that.
Rather, I want to insist that it will be vital and vitalising for work in martial 
arts studies to embrace certain aspects of cultural theory, especially when – as 
in the current moment – people seem to feel an apparent ‘need’ to do something 
 15 I use the word ‘sense’ here because I think that we can only ever get an image, sense or feel-
ing for ontology anyway. I hesitate to say ‘structure of feeling’, though, for, as Derrida himself 
made clear, the very idea, term, notion or (possible) concept of ‘structure’ is rarely ever much 
more than a metaphor anyway.
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properly academic, a need that so many people seem to believe is to be inter-
preted as defining our object. For, faced with the (apparent) challenge of ‘need-
ing’ to define, as we have already seen, with even the tiniest bit of theory, we are 
able to pause to reflect on the fact that before definition there is relation. Words 
and meanings and practices and values travel and twist and turn and change 
and move in relation to larger and other forces and processes. These may or 
may not be systemic, systematic (Wetzler, Even-Zohar), conjunctural (Hall), 
discursive processes of articulation (Laclau), or ‘dislocated’, ‘out of joint’ or even 
‘hauntological’ (Derrida 1994), and so on.
All such theories would concur that martial arts will always be relationally 
determined. Laclau and Mouffe theorised this in terms of ‘discourse’ and ‘artic-
ulation’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Hall insisted on the need to establish a sense 
of what he called the ‘conjuncture’; according to him, any analysis requires 
what he called ‘conjunctural analysis’ – that is, an analysis informed by an acute 
awareness of the historical moment and context as well as the forces and rela-
tions that produced it. Without this, we cannot really know or understand any-
thing about any entity or identity, whether martial arts, class, ethnicity, or any 
other kind of identity or entity in process.
Of course, there may be many ways to characterise and analyse a conjuncture. 
As deconstruction sought to teach us, no context is ever fully closed (Derrida 
1988). We might never know for sure that we know for sure everything salient 
about a context or a conjuncture. Maybe we can’t really know for sure that we 
know anything at all for sure. Yet, what we can do is attempt to assess a context 
in terms of forces and relations, relative weights and gravities, and the ways in 
which forces and fields constitute, colour and condition entities, identities and 
practices. This may not be too far from Wetzler’s proposed use of Even-Zohar’s 
polysystem theory – or it may be a world away.
Alternative Discourses
In this chapter, I have so far proposed the necessity of theory for martial arts 
studies and entered into a critique of one proposed branch of theory. I have 
done so because part of what needs to be theorised is the orientation of the dis-
cipline’s discourse, and I would prefer to steer that discourse as far away from 
anything approaching scientism as possible. My chief criticism of the tropes of 
‘systems’ would be that this approach risks pointing the discourse of martial 
arts studies back towards a scientistic orientation.
Given this criticism, an obvious question is what, therefore, my proposed 
alternative approach would be. My answer relates to my ongoing arguments 
from poststructuralism about the need for attention not just to signification 
(‘dimensions of meaning’) but also to force, as in the forms of different relations 
to and entanglements within different kinds of social, cultural, economic and 
other forms of power.
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In Britain, Raymond Williams long ago proposed that it is possible to formu-
late and look at entities, practices and identities and to assess them in terms of 
whether they are dominant, residual or emergent, and to ask whether they may 
be acting in ways that are either in line with a dominant or hegemonic ideology, 
or whether they may be alternative or even oppositional to such an ideology 
(Williams 1977). This may seem like quite an old and crude paradigm. This 
kind of approach has certainly been significantly refined and developed over 
the decades (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Laclau 1994; Butler, Laclau, and Žižek 
2000). But I draw attention to this seminal paradigm here because, even as 
simple as it is, it offers a viable and flexible framework through which many 
different kinds of studies of martial arts and society might be initiated. All of 
these are happily liberated from the stifling imperative to define and demarcate 
without any real sense or sensitivity to the complexities of matters of time, place 
and the interplay of forces that both produce and transform meanings, prac-
tices and contexts.
To illustrate the value of this framework, we might quickly consider one 
final example: The deliciously marginal or problematic case of taijiquan. Using 
Williams’ approach, we will be able to reconfigure discourse and debate about 
taijiquan from a sclerotic fixation on the question of whether it can even be 
‘defined’ as a martial art or a combat sport, or self-defence, or a form of what 
we now insist on calling ‘mindfulness meditation’, etc., and to an understanding 
of what ‘taijiquan’ has been and has done and might be and might do in a given 
conjuncture.16
As Douglas Wile has argued, taijiquan emerged in a discursive foment in 
which China was threatened ideologically, economically and politically (Wile 
1996). Its 19th Century proponents elaborated its philosophy along obscurely 
yet immanently nationalist lines, so that taijiquan came to stand in stark oppo-
sition to any and all things Western or European (see also Lorge 2016). In this 
process, residual Taoist ideas and principles were mixed into a growing alterna-
tive worldview that was oppositional to everything supposedly non-Chinese. 
This is also precisely why Maoism tolerated taijiquan, of course, and why it 
‘survived’ the Cultural Revolution: It amounted in its elaboration to a collec-
tive, combined, non-Western, non-competitive, non-individualistic calisthen-
ics avowedly rooted in a non-religious worldview. But this was ‘survival’ via a 
formalisation that amounted therefore to a mutation on a genetic level. So, in 
a sense, post-Mao, the term taijiquan essentially had a transformed meaning 
referring to a transformed practice (Frank 2006).
In its journey to the West, as we know, taijiquan was ostensibly deraci-
nated from any nationalistic inflection or valence, and became articulated to 
 16 Note again the way that we now ‘see’ ‘mindfulness’ everywhere, from meditation in modern 
America to martial arts in ancient China, even though even a few years ago we wouldn’t have 
seen anything as mindfulness, anywhere, because no one, other than a few specialists, was 
using the term.
Theory Before Definition in Martial Arts Studies  57
(connected with) a range of open-ended discursive configurations or conjunc-
tures, from the counterculture to new age ideology and onwards into therapeu-
tic and even medical culture (Frank 2006). In all this, it becomes differently 
articulated or constructed at different times and places, often existing with 
utterly contradictory and heterogeneous (non-systemic, non-systematic) par-
tial, immanent or potential meanings at the same time. Furthermore, any of 
those involved in taijiquan in any of its different times and places will believe 
themselves to be either or both learning a martial art, either or both for sport 
or for self-defence, and/or involved in healthful calisthenics, and/or preserving 
or changing a culture, and/or involved in a religious or mystical practice. And 
so on.
We can multiply our examples to look at the ways in which certain words 
and moves have drifted and disseminated and flipped and mutated all over 
the place, around the world, through time and space, and examine the pro-
cesses of their emergence and development within each new context, the ways 
they become mixed up and mixed in with existing concerns and outlooks, and 
reciprocally modify and move existing situations. This may or may not be sys-
temic or systematic.
I have mainly referred to the theoretical models of people like Laclau, Der-
rida, Hall and Williams here. And I have done so mainly because I believe that 
there is – to a greater or lesser extent – a kind of theoretical ontology that con-
nects their outlooks, despite their many other differences. This outlook is essen-
tially poststructuralist or postfoundationalist (Sedgwick 2003).17 And as much 
as many people may still have a distaste for so-called ‘high theory’, I maintain 
that martial arts studies will only benefit from a sustained engagement with 
what there is to be learned from high theory – as much as there is to be learned 
from engaging with the most intimate ethnography, the most detailed histori-
ography, the most multi-layered sociology, and so on.
Some of the first lessons relevant to us here would relate to an awareness of 
the slippage and vicissitudes of signification that require us to pay very close 
attention to the shifting and drifting apparent referents of our focus, their 
different meanings in different times and places, the genetic mutations and 
quantum leaps that occur in ‘cultural translation’ from one time to another, 
one place to another, one language to another, even one utterance or instance 
to the next, and the rather frustrating fact that, despite our eternal desire to 
see unity and simplicity, cultures and practices are always ‘in bits’, always in 
process, incomplete, disputed and contested. There is no unity to the lexical 
illusion that guides us, whether it be martial arts, combat sports, self-defence, 
culture or society – apart from that which seems to be conferred by the use of 
such terms themselves.
 17 Interestingly, Sedgwick (2003) also sees an affinity between poststructuralist and Buddhist 
ontologies, and she ponders whether she is drawn to the former because of her interest in 
the latter or to the latter because of her agreement with the former.
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Discussing such entities often has much in common with discussing unicorns, 
fairies, justice, Father Christmas, or how many angels might fit on the head of 
a pin or through the eye of a needle. Discussing such things can create a ‘reality 
effect’ that can lead people to believe these are actually existing real and unitary 
things (Bowman 2012). All meanings, all practices, are stabilizations. The ques-
tions to be asked then surely include explorations of why certain stabilizations 
take place at certain times in certain ways, why some people often become so 
fixated on fixation or stuck on stabilization, and what it is that both stabilization 
and destabilization are ‘doing’ in any given context at any given time.
The Stabilization of Martial Arts
Martial arts as a cluster of familiar ideas, motifs, images, and as a category has 
certainly achieved stabilization in contemporary discourses, even if it lacks 
both precision and a stable referent. Nonetheless, it is a relatively stable term – 
perhaps no more or less stable or precise than any other familiar term, such 
as ‘society’, for instance. That is to say, despite its familiarity, the term ‘society’ 
could have a number of different conceptualisations and configurations, and it 
could mean different things within different configurations.
This ‘semiotic openness’ around even the most familiar terms is interesting. 
Even more interesting is the fact that the most widespread scholarly response to 
semiotic openness and instability is not to embrace it and explore it, but rather 
to try to close it down and eradicate it, by such strategies as imposing defini-
tions and insisting upon strictly demarcated meanings. Such responses seek to 
eradicate or banish predicative instability, in order to try to be clear. Accord-
ingly, such an impulse is understandable. Nonetheless, one problem with it is 
that academic definitions and strict meanings often give short shrift to the ways 
that terms actually circulate and function in the discourses of the everyday lives 
of the people who use the terms out there in the world. Consequently, this form 
of stabilization may come to be problematic, especially if we are indeed inter-
ested in the things as they exist ‘out there’ rather than as they might be made to 
seem to exist within a scholarly discourse.
Of course, the meanings and definitions generated in scholarly discourse 
often come to inform, enrich and even transform the meanings of terms as 
they circulate in wider cultural discourse. But self-reflexive scholarship ought 
to interrogate this relation rather than just assume everything is straightfor-
ward. It may turn out to be valuable to work out where a term and its meaning 
came from – was it inherited from ‘folk’ or ‘popular’ discourse, or was it gen-
erated in a laboratory, so to speak? And what are the consequences of either 
inheritance? There is always drift and condensation and displacement going 
on. We think through and with inherited terms, and hence conceptual differen-
tials and differentiations, that we are more or less compelled to work with and 
within (Derrida 1976). But, as Saussure taught us, when we are thinking about 
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our linguistically instituted categories, first and foremost we must remember 
that there are only ‘differences without positive terms’. Moreover, as Derrida 
went on to point out, there are no easily specifiable or simply stable referents 
‘behind’ these differences. The flipside of signification is force (Protevi 2001). 
There is no stability in signification without force. Furthermore, as Gayatri Spi-
vak added, the institution of any difference in the production of an identity in 
discourse, the drawing of any demarcation that distinguishes and hierarchizes 
entities and identities, is essentially and irreducibly a political act, with more or 
less overtly political consequences (Spivak 1990, 1993). But what is being stabi-
lized, and in what ways? This question supplements the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3
Martial Arts and Media Supplements
Martial Bodies
As described in the previous chapter, when we speak of martial arts, we are 
never referring to a simple, stable or fixed entity. Rather, ‘martial arts’ is a con-
stellation conjured up from clusters of ideas that play, drift, transfer across and 
transform within different media. Our senses of martial arts refer to what early 
semioticians like Roland Barthes might have termed ‘martial art-ness’ (Bar-
thes 1972; Bowman 2017b; Wetzler 2017; Judkins 2017), and this derives from 
key coordinates of a contemporary cultural discourse: Reiterated images, signs, 
tropes, conventions, clichés, and of course innovations, interminglings and 
hybridizations, moving from one medium to another, across geographical, lin-
guistic, generic and other borders.
Perhaps the key anchor (or what theorists from Jacques Lacan to Ernesto 
Laclau called the key ‘point de capiton’ [Laclau and Mouffe 1985]) in discourses 
about martial arts is the body – or rather, a range of contingent, conventional, 
motivated or interested constructions of the body. Certainly, the notion of ‘the 
body’ has an overdetermined relation as both foundation and keystone of ‘mar-
tial arts’. The body is seemingly always implied in the term ‘martial arts’. This 
is so even though a long and powerful line of thought, from Sun Tzu’s The Art 
of War to Chris Hables-Gray’s Postmodern War and beyond, all but ignores 
the individual body and focuses only on all of the other technical, technologi-
cal, tactical, logistical, strategic, political and ideological arts of war-craft (Gray 
1997; see also Cooling et al. 1972 and Turner 1997). Yet, when we evoke ‘mar-
tial arts’ today, the term almost always implies the body.
We should pause to reflect on this contemporary configuration of meaning. 
Has the term ‘martial arts’ really always referred to the body? Or is this a false 
universal – an example of a false sense of eternality that Althusser regarded 
as the very definition of an ideological view? Of course, we might nonethe-
less note that, even in works that seem to take a far broader view of the art of 
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the martial, the body is not actually absent (Gray 1997). It is always strongly 
implied. And if there is always reference to a martial body when martial arts 
are evoked then we might enquire into the forms that the martial body takes.
Studies of the figures of what we might call ‘the martial body’ as they emerge 
and circulate in different discursive contexts would be extremely rewarding. 
To refer this back to my argument in the previous chapter, I would propose 
that exploring such constructions and figurations would be more worthwhile 
in martial arts studies than the production of any more definitional lists and 
hierarchies of what supposedly is and what supposedly is not a martial art. For, 
if we were to pick out the contour lines of the discursive figures, configurations 
and representations of martial bodies in different contexts, then we would be 
able to reflect on how these constructions reflect back on or illuminate the con-
texts in which they were produced. Or, put differently, such textual analyses 
might help us glean more about the ideological contexts and discourses within 
which the texts and figures have been produced – much more so than dreaming 
up and trading in disputations around definitions.
Figures and figurations of the martial body are multiple. Yet, they may not be 
all that numerous. Figures of the martial artist vary from place to place, but they 
frequently include the following familiar figures and forms. First, within West-
ern orientalist discourses, we have the martial artist as the oriental (Iwamura 
2005; Frank 2006). Then, we have the martial artist as the soldier, police officer, 
or agent of the law (Chong 2012; Bowman 2015a; Barrowman 2015a, 2019). 
(This figure appears in many, perhaps even all, cultures). Also, the martial artist 
as underdog is a staple of both Hollywood and Hong Kong traditions (Mor-
ris 2001). Then there is the martial artist as the wanderer or drifter (Bowman 
2013b). We also have the figure of the woman warrior, from Yim Wing Chun to 
Buffy the Vampire Slayer and beyond (Funnell 2014; Channon and Matthews 
2015). And then the warrior monk, a figure that has been much appropriated 
in Western orientalist texts and discourses but who is not exclusive to them, 
as it is also popular in Eastern cultural texts and discourses (Iwamura 2005). 
We also have the gangster, whether triad, yakuza, mafia, or generic ‘hard man’ 
(Park 2010). And a cluster of intermingling figures that might be called the 
shaolin ninja Jedi superhuman, along with the cousin species, the superhero 
(Judkins 2016a; Goto-Jones 2016). There is also, of course, the competitor, ide-
ally the Olympic athlete (Channon 2012), and the bodybuilder (at least in the 
modern Western imaginary the martial body has long been connected with 
athleticism, which itself has even longer been connected with often impossible 
images of mesomorphism [Spatz 2015; see also Krug 2001]). Then, conversely, 
the flipside of the hyper-visible martial body: The invisible man or woman, the 
surprising, unexpected expert, who has skill without physical markings, the 
master of pure technique rather than muscular hypertrophy.
There is also another figure that interests me quite a lot: The Janus-faced fig-
ure of the martial artist who also amounts to a kind of psychiatric patient-in-
waiting. I am thinking here of the ‘troubled’ or ‘damaged’ figure who needs 
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the ‘therapy’ of pugilistic training to be ‘saved’ (think of a figure like Robert 
Downey Jr. here, whom I have written about before [Bowman 2017b]). But, at 
the same time (on the opposite face of the Janus-mask), we also have the sup-
posedly serene hippy, the new ager, or the modern mindfulness practitioner, 
moving and meditating via taiji and qigong but whose need for such practices 
ultimately suggests the presence of a previous or underlying problem – for who 
needs therapeutic practices to attain serenity unless serenity has been missing 
or lacking? (I reflect on the problematic discourse of ‘martial arts as therapy’ 
more extensively in my book Mythologies of Martial Arts [2017].)
The figures on this surely incomplete list might be categorised and organised 
in many ways, perhaps clustered into three groups. First, people in films; second, 
people of moral fibre; third, degenerates. Such a grouping seems apt to conclude 
or summarise the list – encompassing as it does, first, media or representational 
simulacra; second, figures of supposed social improvement; and third, supposed 
agents of social decay. And if the figure of the martial body can encompass such a 
range then it should be possible to pose and test many hypotheses about whether 
martial arts are (to be) regarded as socially righteous or socially deleterious, and 
also to come up with any number of possible conclusions.
Martial Movements
However, being attentive to the construction of such figures via reiterations and 
reconfigurations of imagery and textual features that travel across cultures and 
across media suggests that the study of martial arts requires a different kind of 
attention. One kind of attention would be the approach that Rey Chow pro-
posed in her 1995 essay ‘Film as Ethnography; or, Translation between Cultures 
in the Postcolonial World’ (Chow 1995). In this essay, Chow advanced both a 
theory and a method that she proposed any scholar of film, cultural, media 
or literary studies concerned with questions of cultural crossovers or cultural 
translation should take on board.
To develop it, Chow reads (among other things) Walter Benjamin’s essay ‘The 
Task of the Translator’ (Benjamin 1999) with a view to instituting premises and 
protocols of cultural analysis that grasp from the outset the extent to which 
‘translation between cultures’ already takes place a great deal of the time in our 
‘postmodern’, media-saturated ‘postcolonial world’. Crucially, Chow proposes 
that translation between cultures takes place neither simply nor even primarily 
by way of conscious or linguistic translation. Rather, cultural translation, in the 
sense Chow conceives it, proceeds by way of the movement across borders and 
from context to context and media to media of material objects, commodities, 
techniques, technologies and practices (Chow 1995; Bowman 2013a). She does 
this ‘in order to highlight the problems of cross-cultural exchange – especially 
in regard to the commodified, technologized image – in the postcolonial, post-
modern age’ (Chow 1995, 182).
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When it comes to the question of the relations between martial arts culture 
and media culture, this kind of approach is arguably not merely desirable but 
necessary. For, in the (notional) West, at least, and accelerating exponentially 
throughout the 20th Century, ‘martial arts’ have arguably always been both 
mediatized and overwhelmingly represented as ‘Asian’ (Farrer and Whalen-
Bridge 2011). Their emergence and proliferation throughout the 20th Century 
was always bound up with their media representations, and these overwhelm-
ingly tended to make at least some reference to their putatively Asian ‘origins’ 
or ‘character’. Indeed (and although there may be exceptions), it seems rea-
sonable to propose at the outset that, in many cases, and certainly for most 
practitioners (other than, say, police, security and military personal), media 
representations of martial arts came first, and that these representations very 
often involved reference to ‘Asia’.1
However, there is more to the global spread of ‘Asian martial arts’ than a 
simple anticipatory structure of orientalist desire. That is to say, there is more 
to this than seeing, then wanting, then doing. For, if we consider the global 
dissemination of what we might term for convenience ‘East Asian martial arts’, 
one thing to note would be all of the other things – everything else – that is car-
ried, transported and transferred along with them. Asian martial arts bring 
with them modified worldviews, outlooks, philosophies, ideologies, exercise 
principles, posture modifications, dietary considerations, lifestyle changes, sar-
torial choices, ethical norms, aesthetic tastes, cultural and intellectual interests, 
and so on. In fact, so much ‘baggage’ comes along with Asian martial arts that 
it is effectively impossible to disambiguate the primary from the secondary, the 
essential from the add-on, or the inside from the outside. Inevitably, therefore, 
the question always waiting in the wings is that of what we even think we are 
referring to when we refer to martial arts or when we evoke the movement of 
Asian martial arts from the East to the West (Chan 2000).
Despite saying this, I do not want to return to the debate around how to 
define martial arts discussed in the previous chapter. As I have already argued, 
academic study does not oblige us to plough all of our efforts into the taxo-
nomic and judgemental labours of deciding what is in and what is out, what 
is good and what is bad, what is right and what is wrong, etc. Rather, because 
‘martial arts’ is always essentially a discursive construct, it seems better to 
explore the ways that martial arts are constructed in discourse – the ways they 
are evoked, tacitly understood, recognised, represented, talked about, fanta-
sized, stereotyped; the ways practitioners self-identify, how they dis-identify 
and differentiate; what it is that fans or practitioners (think and/or say they) are 
 1 Such reference of course is neither essential nor eternal. Even quite quickly after the demise 
of Bruce Lee and the first ‘kung fu craze’ of the 1970s, Western martial artists and actors 
began more and more to disassociate themselves and their representations from ‘Asia’. Sylvia 
Chong, for instance, discusses the exemplary example of Chuck Norris, who moved from 
discussing his films in terms of Asian martial arts towards discussing them in terms of the 
tradition of John Wayne movies (Chong 2012; see also Krug 2001 and Bowman 2015a).
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fans or practitioners of; and so on. From such a perspective, it seems reason-
able to suggest that when people say ‘martial arts’ they tend to think of a rela-
tively limited range of images: Either of people, wearing something like white 
or black pyjamas, in training halls, practicing punches, kicks, holds and throws, 
or other intelligible or perhaps inscrutable movements; or of the dramatized 
representations of skilled fighters in action film, comic book or computer game 
contexts. Between these two realms – between the one we might witness or 
experience at the local sports centre and the one we might witness and expe-
rience on TV – I propose that more people will regard the former (the lived 
practice) as ‘primary’, ‘real’, ‘true’ or ‘actual’, and therefore think of the specific 
scenarios of people training, or trained people fighting, as being the principal 
object of or referent for ‘martial arts’. The common belief might therefore be 
formulated like this: Martial arts reside immanently as skills and propensities 
within trained people and they are revealed or actualised only in certain specta-
cles, such as fights (dramatized, sporting or spontaneous), or when people train 
(practice, repeat, reiterate, explore and experiment) in self-defined martial arts 
movements, techniques and principles, in pedagogical environments and rela-
tionships. Conversely, therefore, my proposal is that most people will therefore 
regard the media images of martial arts as ‘secondary’, ‘false’, ‘fake’, ‘parasitic’, or, 
at best, ‘supplementary’.
I indulge in such generalising statements not in order to legislate or  adjudicate 
anything, but rather to show why the types of complex, material, technological, 
textual and often deconstructive approaches of scholars like Chow (in a differ-
ent context), Tim Trausch, Chris Goto-Jones, Benjamin N. Judkins, and oth-
ers, can help us to move on from simple schemas like Eastern versus  Western, 
past versus present, or the inside versus the outside of ‘martial arts’. For, in line 
with their broadly deconstructive approaches, I want to reiterate: ‘ Martial arts’ 
cannot actually be neatly circumscribed or demarcated, nor can ‘ primary’ be 
simply or neatly separated from ‘secondary’. (Nor does this matter – although 
showing how and why we should move on from this discussion is an important 
and consequential matter, as discussed in the previous chapter.)
Moving from Primary to Supplementary
As mentioned, from the beginning, if we evoke the global spread of East Asian 
martial arts such as judo,2 taekwondo and styles of karate and kung fu, then we 
inevitably evoke much more than the spread of specific training techniques, 
practices and skills in isolation. Rather, the movement of the practices went 
hand in hand with the movement of clusters of ideas, values, ideologies, and 
 2 Judo, however, was a very ‘Westernized’ innovation from its inception, at least to the extent 
that its founder both studied and advocated Western(izing) and modernizing principles in its 
development (Law 2008).
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myriad material objects, either directly or indirectly associated with martial 
arts – whether taking the form of a taste for green tea or kimchi, meditation 
or wuxia pian in film or literary tastes, as well as different fashion, design and 
other aesthetic and lifestyle choices, from haircuts to tattoos to ways of speak-
ing to comportment to demeanour.
Moreover, if we organise our thinking according to the terms of the famil-
iar import/export or ‘movement’ narrative, in which East Asian martial arts 
were ‘exported’ to the West – or ‘Eastern things’ moved West – then we should 
be aware of the possibility that there were at least two other attendant move-
ments – and that these movements were not simple or unidirectional transfers. 
Rather, these transfers involved transformations. For, first, as mentioned, other 
things also moved West, along with ‘martial arts’, and second, correspond-
ingly, things moved (transformed) in the West. Such movement/change can be 
regarded as both a precondition and consequence of the importation, adoption 
or appropriation of ‘East Asian martial arts’ in the West (Krug 2001; Barrow-
man 2015b).
As poststructuralist political theorists would say, we must enquire into the 
‘conditions of possibility’ of any event or situation (Derrida 1997; see also 
Laclau 1996). What conditions of possibility enabled the emergence of such 
things as Chinese or Japanese martial arts classes in the West? One of the key 
ingredients for the possibility of the emergence of martial arts classes in the 
West was the prior circulation of images and ideas. The idea of doing karate or 
kung fu came first, for most non-military Westerners. And such ideas always 
come from images: Media images; images in newspapers; images of exotic Asia; 
images in comic books, travellers’ tales, war stories, serials and novels.
The two themes I have so far picked out – the strange primacy of the suppos-
edly secondary image and the inextricability of ‘martial arts’ from their entan-
glement in clusters of putatively peripheral objects, practices and values – can 
be approached fruitfully according to some of the arguments offered by Jacques 
Derrida. The two most relevant aspects of Derrida’s thought for approaching 
martial arts and (or within) media culture are his intertwined arguments about 
what he called ‘supplementarity’ and the ‘metaphysics of presence’ (Derrida 
1976, 1982, 2001). These are relevant in terms of this discussion of martial 
arts because, although we tend to prioritise and hierarchize in terms of what 
Derrida regarded as our (‘metaphysical’) presuppositions or (‘metaphysical’) 
biases – in which we place living, embodied presence first, and non-living, non-
embodied non-presence second (or last) – it often turns out on closer analysis 
that the things we had deemed secondary, derived, supplementary or inferior 
are in fact strangely primary. Think here of all of the things ‘around’ martial 
arts that we so easily regard as ‘peripheral’, inessential, extra, added-on – or, 
in other words, supplementary. Where would we be without them? They con-
stantly refer to, evoke, conjure up, allude to something else, some other essence 
or entity, somewhere else: Martial arts. Martial arts paraphernalia constantly 
refers away from itself, (as if) to that certain something else, somewhere else, 
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that thing that ‘really is’ martial arts. But if we try to look for this essence, this 
evoked essential entity, we can never seem to find it. It’s always somewhere else. 
Even one instance or example of it is not fully or truly or decisively ‘it’. Derrida 
famously called this effect différance.
Différance is even active in what we might like to think of as reality. In other 
words, it’s not just martial arts paraphernalia and quirky consumer goods that 
incessantly refer away from themselves to the elsewhere and elsewhen of some 
true essence and identity of martial arts. Différance is also active in the realms 
of actually-existing martial arts practices themselves. This or that dojo refers 
incessantly to Japan, this taiji class refers relentlessly to China. But which or 
where or when ‘Japan’, and which or where or when ‘China’? This martial arts 
style or club or that martial arts practice does not seem to encapsulate or cover 
everything that seems essential or proper to ‘martial arts’. But they allude to it, 
they try to approach it, to actualise it. Yet, what is the ‘it’? It’s never quite there 
and never quite that.
This is the very definition of différance. Mostly, rather than a referent, a sense 
of a ‘spirit’ is conjured up: Spectres of Funakoshi haunt us, spirits of Zhang San-
feng inspire us, and so on and so forth (on ‘haunting’ in this sense, see Derrida 
1994). In other words, always absent presences are conjured up in the rituals, 
rhetorics, concepts, imaginings, objects, evocations, terms, and other parapher-
nalia of the practices. But, more than this, it is surely even the case that any one 
dimension of the cluster of practices only ever refers to the others, needs the 
others, and none can ever, in and of themselves, amount to the essence of the 
practice, entity or identity. At this point, everything starts to seem secondary, 
supplementary, peripheral, partial, incomplete…. This is why critics of decon-
struction argue that it is problematic to follow such a style of thinking all the 
way: Because deconstruction seems to make everything impossible. However, 
this is a nihilistic way of relating to deconstruction, because, rather than deny-
ing things, deconstruction merely insists upon the supplementarity of things – 
their constructedness, the contingency of their constructedness, and hence the 
potential for transformation and change in all things. In this sense, deconstruc-
tion is essentially optimistic and always interested in constructive change. To 
quote Derrida on this point once again:
All that a deconstructive point of view tries to show, is that since con-
vention, institutions and consensus are stabilizations (sometimes stabi-
lizations of great duration, sometimes micro-stabilizations), this means 
that they are stabilizations of something essentially unstable and cha-
otic. Thus it becomes necessary to stabilize precisely because stability is 
not natural; it is because there is instability that stabilization becomes 
necessary; it is because there is chaos that there is a need for stability. 
Now, this chaos and instability, which is fundamental, founding and 
irreducible, is at once naturally the worst against which we struggle with 
laws, rules, conventions, politics and provisional hegemony, but at the 
68 Deconstructing Martial Arts
same time it is a chance, a chance to change, to destabilize. If there were 
continual stability, there would be no need for politics, and it is to the 
extent that stability is not natural, essential or substantial, that politics 
exists and ethics is possible. Chaos is at once a risk and a chance, and it 
is here that the possible and the impossible cross each other. (Derrida 
1996, 84)
At the very least, deconstructive interrogation is useful to the extent that it asks 
us to challenge, test and sharpen the otherwise rough and ready hierarchies 
that it is easy to come up with, and so easy to be led by, in our thinking. This is 
relevant here because, as I have been suggesting, it is all too easy to assume that 
when we say ‘martial arts’ we are primarily referring to the living embodied for-
mal pedagogical practices of conscious, living, striving human beings. To think 
like this is fine, in one sense. But the problem with such an assumption is that 
it necessarily carries the implication that therefore we are not referring to com-
puter games, media fictions, cuddly toys or comedy caricatures. We may regard 
our image of the proper practice as primary and most of the paraphernalia that 
goes around it as secondary, derived, inferior. Obviously, we assign some of 
the ‘paraphernalia’ a different status: Training swords, staffs and other weap-
ons, punch bags, kick shields, sparring mitts and so on are easily regarded as 
proper to the proper object or practice, whereas toy swords, foam nunchakus, 
and inflatable Kung Fu Panda punch bags are less easily regarded as proper to 
(nor the proper property of) the proper object or practice.
I am aware that these more or less deconstructive formulations around the 
idea of what is proper and what is improper to, or the property of, something 
may sound convoluted.3 But I want to propose that ultimately they can help us 
to see further and more clearly, because thinking along such lines asks us to 
examine what we deem to be proper or primary to an object, field or practice, 
and what we conversely deem to be improper, secondary, derived, and infe-
rior, or indeed a digression from, a perversion of, or aberration away from the 
proper (Bowman 2001). Asking such questions helps to reveal both our own 
and others’ values, biases and orientations more clearly.
It is likely that there will long be a need to draw attention to the important 
status of ‘media supplements’ in studies of martial arts practices and discourses. 
This is because many of the disciplinary fields within which scholars operate 
and carry out studies of different aspects of martial arts remain ‘metaphysi-
cal’ in Derrida’s sense – that is, subject-centred, often ‘Cartesian’, and quick to 
move on from the complicating dimensions that the media supplement threat-
ens to introduce into any study of martial arts culture. So, this is a perspective 
that remains worth reiterating, repeating, and insisting upon. Indeed, with-
out impressing upon people the strength of these arguments time and again, 
 3 In another context and with another focus I have written explicitly about the determination 
of senses and values of propriety and impropriety (Bowman 2001).
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‘media studies’ and ‘cultural studies’ will always remain consigned to the status 
of being regarded as second-class academic citizens rather than as ‘serious’ sub-
jects, ‘proper’ subjects, or fields in which proper things are studied properly. 
Not sociology, not history, not psychology, not politics, not economics, not 
anthropology – media and cultural studies have long been cast (out) as ‘Mickey 
Mouse subjects’ (Bowman 2003).
Much as those who work in media or cultural studies may baulk at the accu-
sation of working in a ‘Mickey Mouse’ field, my argument here is that a strong 
response from media and cultural studies to such an accusation would not be 
to deny or disavow the place of ‘trivia’ like cartoons/animation, movies, enjoy-
ment, playfulness, fantasy, childhood or childishness, consumerism or cuddly 
toys, and so on. Rather, there is a value in embracing the accusation and argu-
ing strenuously for the importance and power of all the ‘Mickey Mouse supple-
ments’ that we are surrounded by.
Such supplements are everywhere, and they are both big business and trans-
formative of many things, including societies, histories, individual and group 
psychologies, politics, economies, and all manner of anthropological areas. To 
mention a few examples: We know that Bruce Lee films are responsible in large 
part for the global popularity and proliferation of wing chun, just as we know 
that they are equally responsible for the recent revisionist filmic hagiographies 
of Ip Man (Bowman 2013b). We know that the 1982 film The Shaolin Temple 
was directly responsible for a massive and immediate increase in international 
tourism to the Shaolin Temple and other areas in China (Frank 2006). And so 
on. In fact, it is easy to point to example after example of films intervening into 
– and even dramatically changing – other areas of reality, in all sorts of ways. I 
have discussed before the ‘rediscovery’ – in actual fact, the complete invention 
– of a new ‘ancient’ martial art in China, in the immediate aftermath of two key 
events: First, the massive international success of the Disney animation Mulan 
(1998), and second, the Chinese government crackdown on Falun Gong, the 
suppression of its practice and the arrest of many of its practitioners (Palmer 
2007). As Adam Frank notes in his study of taijiquan in Shanghai (Frank 2006), 
after the crackdown on Falun Gong, hundreds and hundreds of practitioners 
of a hitherto unknown art called Mulanquan were literally bussed into Shang-
hai and other cities in China to perform it in the public parks, as they would 
otherwise have been empty, having been evacuated of qigong and Falun Gong 
practitioners by the police (I discuss this more fully in Bowman 2015a).
The impact of a media text is massive here. The choice of ‘Mulan’ as the name 
of the simulated and ersatz martial art of Mulanquan strongly suggests a delib-
erate Chinese state attempt to cash in on the success of the orientalist Holly-
wood film by supplying the demand it sparked in potential Western tourists for 
a new/ancient ‘feminist’ and hyper-oriental(ist) practice. Furthermore, the very 
fact that there was a perceived need – or strategic value – in ensuring the con-
tinued presence of a certain style or aesthetic of martial arts practice in China’s 
parks speaks volumes too. (As Adam Frank argues, the aesthetic of taijiquan 
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appears to have been elevated to the very symbol of Chineseness – a key part of 
the ‘brand’ that puts a new twist on the meaning of the ‘PR’ in ‘PRC’.) Clearly, 
martial arts fictions, fantasies, simulations and simulacra are big business; they 
impact on policies of all orders – not just Chinese policies, but those of other 
countries, as well, more and more of which have begun to elevate their ‘indig-
enous’ martial arts to ‘national sport’ or ‘national treasure’ status, following the 
lead set by UNESCO, with its attributions of ‘intangible cultural heritage’ to 
practices like wing chun kung fu in Hong Kong, and so on.
From this perspective, it is apparent that we have hardly begun to scratch the 
surface of the possibilities of media-focused martial arts research. Works in the 
emergent field of martial arts studies to date have begun the exploration and 
examination of martial arts as they exist within and across some, but not all, 
contemporary media texts and technologies, and have begun to unearth several 
rich seams and reserves of martial arts tropology that permeate and even orien-
tate key dimensions of contemporary transnational media culture. But there is 
more to do. Without a principled focus on such supplementary matters, studies 
of martial arts could continue to ignore, downplay or exclude the media sup-
plement and hence be skewed by a kind of myopic realism.
The obverse of this situation is equally problematic: Many film, TV, gam-
ing and other media studies scholars are not prepared to take the step out of 
text-focused disciplinary discourse and into an exploration of the implications 
and consequences of their text- and technology-focused studies and insights 
in other contexts, such as lived bodily practices, social relations, para-textual 
ideological constructions, embodied martial arts practice, and so on. In a world 
in which cosplay and battle re-enactment enthusiasts have begun to research, 
study and develop discourses around such matters as how to use Jedi weapons 
like the Lightsaber properly, there is clearly room – and obvious starting points, 
staging posts, or gateways – for media studies to leap across and to become new 
and other forms of cultural studies (Judkins 2016a).
But there is a reluctance to do so. The people who are looking into cosplay 
martial arts from academic perspectives are currently less likely to be media 
studies researchers than they are to hail from disciplines such as history, dance 
or theatre studies, or scholars and hobbyists with a focus on such topics as His-
torical European Martial Arts (HEMA). But such innovations are opportuni-
ties, linking points, potential bridges, between the supposedly discrete realms 
of media and body, or between textuality and corporeality. As such, they are 
crying out for the attention of creative thinkers, experts, researchers, scholars 
and analysts of media.
In other words, the situation arguably remains effectively the same as it was 
when I proposed – as a call to arms – in a 2014 journal issue editorial (Bowman 
2014a) that if film, media and cultural studies scholars do not jump into this new 
field then it will be hegemonized by approaches that more than likely will down-
play or exclude the media supplement. By this I meant, and mean, approaches 
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that are limited by the absence of, and that often even actively militate against, 
any kind of deconstructive, media or cultural studies paradigm or approach.
The key question is: Why is there reluctance – even palpable resistance – to 
crossing boundaries such as those between the media on the one hand and 
embodied practices on the other? Just as I have often grumbled that sociologi-
cal studies of martial arts rarely venture seriously into the realm of the film and 
media that are obviously at the origin and heart of martial artists’ fantasies and 
orientations, so the reverse is also true: Martial arts film studies rarely ventures 
into sociology. Forces of resistance are evidently active on both sides of the 
divide. Accordingly, we should give the divide itself some serious attention.
Disciplined Movements
For, what is the divide between, say, film studies and sociology, anthropology or 
psychology? It is a divide between disciplines. It is a disciplinary divide. This is 
why scholars are reluctant to traverse it: They have been disciplined in quite par-
ticular ways (Foucault 1977). As disciplinary subjects, they want to stay where 
they know that they know what they know and where they know how to find 
out and how to know what they don’t yet know. This is what disciplines give us, 
and make us: Ways of knowing, ways of doing, ways of being. Different disci-
plines do things differently. Crossing into a new field is always a new beginning, 
it is always to start from scratch. Few of us have the patience, time, humility, or 
even desire to take such steps.
True interdisciplinarity has long been understood by theorists and those 
who have attempted to do it as being genuinely conflictual, and often conflicted 
(Mowitt 1992; Bowman 2003, 2007, 2015a). Academics and researchers cannot 
simply traverse disciplines the way that bits and pieces of Bruce Lee imagery, 
signs, ideas and tropes can traverse multiple texts and technologies in almost 
any media, region or language of the world. The movement of academics across 
fields is not quite like the movement of martial arts across media – even if 
the movement of some academic points and perspectives may have similar 
abilities to travel (and translate): Bits and pieces, fragments, terms, concepts, 
can be picked up and redeployed in multiple contexts. Just think of the after-
lives of once-critical/theoretical terms, like text, discourse, postmodernism or, 
indeed, deconstruction. All of these words have had precise academic formu-
lations in certain texts, and such terms and their meanings have been picked 
up, fleshed out, contested, expanded or contracted, modified and transformed, 
in various academic fields. Some have proved suggestive in other contexts – 
from journalism to cultural commentary, photography, dance or even more 
distant disciplines and fields; or, indeed, with words like ‘deconstruction’, in 
culinary conversations and cookery programmes (where we now have dishes 
like ‘deconstructed apple pie’, and so forth).
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This suggests that the fruits of academic labours may indeed traverse myriad 
regions and realms. However, the form and direction of that movement is out-
side of the control of intentional agents (such as the nuncupators, neologists or 
theorists of the terms that travel). Moreover, their movement from one context 
to another and one medium to another inevitably involves transformations, 
both in the meaning of the term and in the context of its deployment. (It is 
doubtful that Derrida would ever have intended or accepted that ‘deconstruc-
tion’ could to refer to a dessert served inside out, for instance.)
Nonetheless, it seems likely that one of the reasons why terms like text, dis-
course, postmodernism, and deconstruction caught on in so many ways and in 
so many places is that they seemed useful and appropriate in helping to con-
ceptualise and describe things. One of the things such terms help us to grasp 
and express is precisely the fragmented and porous character of contexts in 
a media-saturated (postmodern) world. This is doubtless why – even though 
disciplines still have fights at and about their boundaries – we currently seem to 
be living through the effects of the deconstruction of the erstwhile hermetically 
sealed or at least well-policed and sacrosanct borders of academic disciplines. 
People now talk about disciplines, like many other parts of life, as being more 
‘fluid’ or ‘liquid’ (Bauman 2005). Some have proposed that we are now fully 
moving into an era of ‘post-disciplinarity’.
‘New’ media technologies are clearly prime movers in some of this disci-
plinary deconstruction. The emergence of para-academic blogs, for instance, 
such as Benjamin N. Judkins’ hugely popular Kung Fu Tea (which he has been 
publishing since 2012 at www.chinesemartialstudies.com), and a few others, 
including perhaps my own martial arts studies blog (http://martialartsstudies.
blogspot.com/), have been key in drawing together both academic and non-
academic researchers from multiple fields and disciplines in remarkably con-
vivial and collegial discussions about martial arts and how to study them. So, 
whereas before the era of such blogs academics would operate in more isolated 
academic islands, today it seems hard not to perceive what others are doing. 
And, perhaps because the institution of the blog always stands midway between 
‘proper’ academic scholarship and ‘personal opinion’, more readers seem more 
prepared to read more open-mindedly, for curiosity and pleasure. Hence such 
blogs have helped to generate a new sense of community. In the emerging 
field(s) of martial arts studies, disciplinary differences that might otherwise 
have precipitated antagonisms and passionate disagreements seem currently 
to be taking a back-seat to the shared interest in, love of or fascination with 
all aspects of martial arts – whether ‘proper’ and ‘primary’ or ‘improper’ and 
‘peripheral’.
Perhaps this is because of the newness of the field. Or perhaps it is because 
of the strange situation in which there is an obviousness and consensus around 
what is meant by ‘martial arts’ combined with a peculiar impossibility in terms 
of defining them rigorously, and despite the persistence of so much scholarship 
that always tries to define, demarcate, hierarchize and legislate on what martial 
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arts are and what they are not. For, despite such orientations, we all just feel that 
we know what martial arts are and what martial arts stuff is. There is, to use 
Raymond Williams’ term, a ‘structure of feeling’ around martial arts in media 
culture; or, as many academics now prefer to say, economies or fields or struc-
tures of affect (Highmore 2011). Martial arts have many manifestations within 
shifting and multiple discursive formations. We understand the terms and we 
recognise the manifestations because there are regularities and repetitions, 
serial structures4 and more or less predictable forms and contents, albeit often 
combined with newness, innovation, hybridisation and unpredictable aspects, 
in all of the iterations of martial arts signs, symbols, supplements, tropes, signa-
tures, events and contexts, across the multiple institutions and discourses that 
supplement and are supplemented by martial arts in media culture.
This perspective raises questions about the status of some more established 
terms in the study of martial arts, such as ‘the body’, ‘embodiment’ and ‘embod-
ied knowledge’. It is to these questions and problematics that we turn in the 
next chapter.
 4 For fascinating work on the force of ‘seriality’ in modern culture, see the work of Ruth Mayer 
(2013).

CHAPTER 4
On Embodiment
Introduction (Trigger Warning)
‘Embodiment’ is a very current term. Many academics talk about it, and they 
do so very fluently, comfortably and easily. However, this chapter proposes 
that embodiment is a uniquely challenging problem for certain traditions and 
approaches to scholarship, particularly those that are implicitly or explicitly 
organised by the aim of establishing meanings. Such an orientation is exem-
plified by semiotics, but this chapter argues that even approaches designed to 
critique semiotics and other forms of ‘logocentrism’ (or approaches that focus 
on words and meanings) ultimately struggle when trying to deal with aspects of 
embodiment. Even Derridean deconstruction – which was developed as a stri-
dent critique of logocentrism – struggles to move beyond the focus on words 
and meanings. So, the question becomes one of whether scholars interested in 
embodiment should reject or move beyond these kinds of approaches.
Drawing on a loosely autobiographical narrative that touches on aspects both 
of my academic training and my investment in martial arts and other physical 
cultural practices, this chapter argues that it is not simply possible to ‘reject’ 
or ‘move beyond’ the logocentrism of traditional ‘search for meaning’ orienta-
tions. I argue instead that, even though this may seem relatively passé to some 
scholars, ‘embodiment’ is still very productively conceived of as ‘embodiment 
of ’ – i.e., as the embodiment of something else; specifically, as the performative 
and interpretive elaboration of something other that is received, perceived, felt, 
constructed, believed, assumed or otherwise lived as being either an aim, ideal, 
desire, objective, fantasy, or as a norm, or indeed as the warding off of some-
thing undesired or feared.
The chapter poses questions of how to ‘capture’, ‘convey’ or ‘communicate’ 
embodiment in words, and it interrogates the necessity of the current hegem-
ony of the written word in academia. However, it seeks to avoid any kind of 
evangelism about new approaches or understandings of embodiment, and 
How to cite this book chapter: 
Bowman, P. 2019. Deconstructing Martial Arts. Pp. 75–90. Cardiff: Cardiff University 
Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.18573/book1.e. License: CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0
76 Deconstructing Martial Arts
twists around at the end to propose that even certain forms of what we perhaps 
too quickly regard as ‘enlightening’ or ‘emancipating’ practices and techniques 
of embodiment might be regarded as traps, or indeed prisons.
In other words, please be aware that in what follows I am at times going to 
be quite shamelessly autobiographical. But this is not merely self-indulgent. 
Rather, it is because I think that personal anecdotes can offer an economical 
way of getting a lot of concerns on the table quickly, by conveying the ways 
that some key problematics around ‘embodiment’ have arisen in relation to my 
research and thinking, and the ways they have both vexed and stimulated me.1 
However, when I say ‘me’ I do not just mean me as some kind of unique, iso-
lated individual; rather I mean ‘me’ as an academic who has searched for theo-
retical and practical academic ways out of many of the problems discussed. So, 
my hope is that when you read about ‘me’ here, you will think less about me and 
much more about ‘we’. Either way, please have patience with the autobiographi-
cal aspects of what follows. They are doing some heavy lifting.
A Brief History of No Body
I have always loved martial arts and I have always loved writing. I loved mar-
tial arts films as a child. As a teen, I tried to learn how to do the flashy moves 
that I saw on screen. At the same time, I found writing essays for school to be 
one of the easiest things I’d ever been asked to do. So, although I far preferred 
other subjects (economics, geography, art), it transpired that, with no effort at 
all, for some reason, I started to come top in English. In due course, without 
really knowing anything at all about what it meant, I was advised to apply to 
go to university. Following a path of least resistance, I pragmatically elected to 
take a subject I was ‘good at’ and found easy, simply because I was good at it 
and found it easy (and because it had the added attraction of minimal contact 
hours and maximal assessment by essay). So, I studied English. The irony was 
that I came from a barely literate working-class family in which no one had ever 
passed a written exam. I was regarded as a kind of freak of nature by my father 
and brothers, because I could and would read and write, I was left handed, and 
I spent most of my time doing things that they did not do and did not under-
stand or regard as ‘proper activity’, because none of what I did involved visibly 
making, fixing, altering, tinkering, moving and obviously doing.2
 1 As mentioned earlier, in the influential essay ‘Banality in Cultural Studies’, Meaghan Morris 
argues that ‘anecdotes for [her] are not expressions of personal experience, but allegorical 
expositions of a model of the way the world can be said to be working. So anecdotes need not 
be true stories, but they must be functional in a given exchange’ (Morris 1990).
 2 We could easily psychoanalyse this, of course. It all sounds very Oedipal. But we could also 
‘sociologize’ it too: The supposed lack of comprehension of ‘intellectual work’ by working 
class subjects is a very Bourdieuian way to illustrate ‘habitus’ – as in, ‘How can you say you 
are “at work” when you are in your dressing gown reading a book?’
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At university, I genuinely loved literary theory from the moment I met it (for-
malism first, then structuralism, poststructuralism and – my favourite at the 
time – semiotics) but I was increasingly bored by literature. After my degree, a 
friend told me about a subject called cultural studies. I looked into it. I did an 
MA, using erstwhile ‘literary’ theory (now redubbed ‘cultural’ theory) to look 
at more interesting things than literature – such as martial arts films, music 
videos, the rise of body consciousness in men via bodybuilding, and the politi-
cal possibilities of stand-up comedy. I was invited back to do a PhD. What did 
I want it to be on? Something about ‘theory’ had hooked me. I chose to inter-
rogate the political theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (primarily 
Laclau and Mouffe 1985). There was no ‘body’ there. Just words, institutions, 
mechanisms, political processes, hegemonies, relations of articulation, power/
knowledge, semiotics, interpellations,3 conflicts of interpretation, and so on.
Throughout my PhD studies and in the years immediately thereafter, I kept 
writing about problems in political and cultural theory using poststructuralist 
approaches (see Bowman 2007). But, all the while, what I wanted, more and 
more, was to write about a completely different thing – martial arts, in terms of 
what we now call ‘embodiment’. However, the problem was that I was immersed 
in the world of problematics and approaches and paradigms that were primar-
ily kitted out to deal with very different things – principally, the philosophi-
cal critique of, in Derridean terminology, logocentrism and the metaphysics of 
presence, conceived of as key parts of the wider ethico-political deconstruction 
of essentialisms of all kinds.
Being Haunted by The Body
It is probably worth remembering that Jacques Derrida (the so-called ‘father’ 
of deconstruction) was always widely denounced and defamed by opponents 
as someone who did not believe in and who tried to deny the existence of real-
ity, or the reality of existence (for discussion see Derrida and Weber 1995). I 
mention this unfair critique here not because it is correct but because there is 
something close enough to a spectral or chimerical grain of truth in it to illus-
trate the predicament I was in. For, if deconstruction does not simply deal with 
‘things’ – ‘real things’, like, say, our bodies – then surely trying to use Derrida to 
think about embodiment is a bit like trying to use a chocolate teapot to make 
tea. Nonetheless, when I did eventually, tentatively, (re)turn to trying to write 
about embodiment, I did so via the only means I knew: Derridean deconstruc-
 3 The Althusserian theory of ‘interpellation’ of course very strongly and directly involves a 
body that is ‘turned’ by being addressed by another embodiment of power (such as a police 
officer). But the type of cultural theory I was immersed in at this stage was much more inter-
ested in the power effects within a world conceived as a world of power relations than in the 
bodily effects in a world conceived of as a world of bodies.
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tion, poststructuralist discourse theory, and Barthesian textual analysis (Bow-
man 2008, 2010d).
This may sound a bit like trying to dig your way out of a hole, or like Slavoj 
Žižek’s joke about searching for a lost key under the light of a streetlamp rather 
than in the surrounding darkness where you actually lost it because you can’t 
see anything over there in the dark. But you start from where you are, you think 
with the tools and in the terms you have learned to think with, and you write 
the way you know how, about things that interest you. So, my first attempt to 
deal with the impact and importance of martial arts on the lives and minds and 
bodies of people (like me) took the form of using the approaches of Derrida, 
Laclau and Stuart Hall to account for the emergence and to assess the signifi-
cance of the ‘kung fu craze’ of the 1970s. My very first attempt was a conference 
paper called ‘Enter the Derridean’ which reflected on the impact and enduring 
significance and effects of Bruce Lee films on people’s imaginations, activities, 
lives and loves.
At the same time, however, it was important to me not to consign ‘Bruce Lee’ 
and ‘martial arts’ to the status of being treated as mere examples, to be (ab)used 
only in order to unproblematically ‘prove’ a certain theory – in this case, the 
theory of ‘discourse’ as developed by the likes of Laclau and Hall, following on 
from Michel Foucault (mixed with a lot of Antonio Gramsci). So, as the title of 
my first paper on this (‘Enter the Derridean’) hopefully suggested, the work was 
also attempting to assess the emergence not only of what might be too easily 
dismissed or categorized as the kung fu ‘craze’ – or some kind of ‘subculture’ 
– but rather the emergence of the ‘discursive formation’ of cultural studies, cul-
tural theory, and deconstruction themselves. After all, all of these things took 
off during the same kind of period, yet we tend not to regard academic move-
ments as being crazes or subcultures, do we? We tend rather to connect them to 
wider issues and problematics and to dignify them with labels like ‘intellectual 
developments’. Reciprocally, I wanted to accord the same dignity to figures like 
Bruce Lee and to cultural changes such as the uptake of ‘Asian martial arts’ 
in Western popular culture. I did not think these were mere crazes. Nor did I 
accept that they should they be categorized as ‘subcultures’. Such designations 
keep the scholarly gaze that creates them safely free from the same kind of scru-
tiny that it applies to everything else.
Papers like that (which was eventually worked up and worked into the first 
chapters of my book Theorizing Bruce Lee [2010]) were my first baby-steps into 
working towards matters of embodiment. So, I suppose you could say I followed 
an eccentric route into such waters. (Or maybe I wasn’t even in the waters yet, 
but still stuck on the rocks, looking around me for a viable sandy route down to 
the water.) For, overwhelmingly, my approach was textual (principally organ-
ised by looking at films, books and magazines); it was self-consciously part 
of a tradition (cultural studies) that had a strong commitment to redeeming 
so-called ‘popular culture’ from the stigma of being branded trivial and incon-
sequential and it was informed and organised by paradigms that focused on 
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macro-political discourses. And (while Barthes’ approaches extended to audi-
ovisual culture, Derridean deconstruction and much poststructuralism was 
principally a critique of ‘logocentrism’) my approach, despite my best inten-
tions, was arguably very much focused on words and pictures.
In The Beginning Was The Word – and Pictures
Of course, things are not so simple. In the history of the notion of ‘discourse’, 
the work of Foucault looms large. And there are two obvious sides to Foucault, 
first his studies of the effects of arguments, ideas, texts, legislations and institu-
tional operations on, second, the human subject, in mind, body, flesh, blood, 
muscles, skills and disciplines. So, there are clearly at least two directions that 
a Foucault-inspired or informed ‘discourse approach’ could go. One is macro-
historical and/or institutional. The other is focused on minds and bodies and 
persons and people. All of my prior training (indeed, all of my disciplining) had 
been in the world of the first orientation. So, when I tried to turn to the question 
of things like non-logocentric knowledge and embodiment, my efforts essen-
tially took the form of conceiving of embodiment as embodied discourse. That 
is, I understood embodiment as always and necessarily involving discursive 
factors and forces (words and pictures). These forces found their actualization 
in and as aspects of embodiment via what may be called ‘performative elabora-
tions’ or ‘performative interpretations’. (I take these terms more from Derrida 
[1994] than Judith Butler [1990].) Accordingly, embodiment in my thinking 
was always likely to be associated with wordy or audiovisual discursive injunc-
tions, imperatives, ideals, and so on.
So, my approach could be accused of believing that ‘in the beginning was the 
word’. And pictures. But pictures translated into words. And actions. It is defi-
nitely the case that I have always read many ‘words and pictures’ as being – or 
becoming – injunctions (or Foucauldian discursive statements), such as ‘Aspire 
to be like this’ or ‘Desire this’. Doubtless this orientation is a residue of the 
influence that Barthes’ arguments in Mythologies (1972) had on my thinking. 
Indeed, I still regard almost any deliberately selected and crafted audiovisual 
textual image of people, places and things to be injunctions – aspire to this, 
desire this, be like this – or their obverses – avoid this, reject this, be disgusted 
by this.
This is hardly a radical position to take. Many others go much further. In a 
different context, and in a slightly different direction, Andrew Barry goes sig-
nificantly further than this. In Political Machines, he notes that even the ‘factual’ 
world – the world of ‘facts’ – is constructed and works in terms of injunctions. 
Neither ‘data’ nor ‘information’ are ever neutral. As he puts it: The existence of 
data about, say, smoking and mortality, or diet and diabetes, and so on, implies 
a subject who ‘needs’ that ‘information’ and who should respond to its impli-
cations and act accordingly because of it – give up smoking, lose weight, etc. 
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(Barry 2001). This is relevant to embodiment because it would mean that any 
subsequent actions undertaken in light of the ‘facts’ or ‘information’, leading 
to body modification or enskillment (running skill, say, or the production of a 
‘yoga body’ [Singleton 2010]) would amount to the embodiment or performa-
tive interpretation or articulation of a certain kind of discursive injunction.
In my approach to bodies, embodied knowledge and bodily practices (spe-
cifically, to martial arts), I have tended to prioritise cases of the ‘translation’ 
of visual material (say, moving or static pictures of someone like Bruce Lee) 
into being a kind of injunction (‘Be like this!’ ‘Desire this!’) or indeed a Fou-
cauldian ‘statement’ (Foucault 1970), and, from here, on into the transforma-
tion of lived practices – and hence the transformation of bodies, bodily skills, 
lifestyle norms, values and sensibilities, and so on (Bowman 2010d, 2013b). 
But the key point has always been that, in the case of moving or static pictures 
of Bruce Lee, such ‘messages’ were not solely translated into words. Rather, in 
the case of words and pictures about martial arts, such cultural ‘messages’ were 
and are often translated by people into physical practices – the taking up of 
new activities or living life according to new values and different orientations. 
The ‘creation myth’ image here is one of children and teens seeing a martial 
arts movie for the first time and leaving the cinema making Bruce Lee catcalls 
and trying to do flying kicks (the exemplary work on this creation scenario is 
Brown 1997). Over the coming days and weeks and months, how many such 
erstwhile spectators went on to seek out a martial arts class? The evidence (or 
at least the accepted narrative) says many. This means that embodiment is also 
often supplemented by media spectacles – or, in other words, mediatized – as 
discussed in the previous chapter.
In turning to the impact of martial arts films on people and on popular cul-
ture, I was trying to step away from the world of institutionally and macro-
politically focused poststructuralism and to start thinking and researching 
the ways that cinematic images have  functioned effectively in and as fantasy 
identifications and other forms of psychic/psychological processes  to  inspire 
and induce certain embodied practices. My first focus was Bruce Lee and I 
was interested specifically in martial arts practices. Of course, this means that I 
was still entirely subjected to thinking of ‘culture’ and ‘subjectivity’ (embodied 
or otherwise) in the terms of poststructuralist semiotics, in which everything 
becomes signifiers sending messages and pointing to other signifiers, and so on 
(see Silverman 1983). Consequently, I don’t really think that any of this work 
actually or simply got to the matter of ‘embodiment’. It focused on the nexus of 
media representation, identification and fantasy, conceived as a kind of motor 
that inspires and/or sustains physical practice.
Phrased like this, it all sounds very technical and grand. Yet, maybe we don’t 
even need the trappings and baggage of the language of psychoanalytical cul-
tural theory to describe it. Maybe we could just as easily talk about people’s 
beliefs or hopes or ambitions being the things that generate and sustain their 
practices. If we think of the common case of running, for example, people can 
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(and do) talk a lot about why they run (for health, to lose weight, to raise money 
for charity, for a sense of wellbeing, or because they are ‘addicted’, and so on). 
But none of these words give us any insight into any matters of embodied run-
ning, from anything about the experience to any other kind of (non-wordy) 
insight. Rather, such conversations about running are often chiefly about rea-
sons for running or problems and achievements in terms of measuring the 
activity. When we try to probe the experience of running itself, our words often 
come up short. There seems to be a dearth of terminology, of vocabulary, of 
concepts. There are shared ‘technical’ phrases, and shared descriptions: We can 
speak of muscle cramps, how we might feel like we can’t get enough air into our 
lungs, how we hit the wall, and so on. Past that, the experience of running in the 
discourse of runners often seems to find its way out into speech and language 
as nothing other than euphemisms and value judgments about something that 
cannot otherwise be expressed. The experience of a run was great or terrible or 
hard or easy or exhilarating or harrowing, and so on. But what was the ‘that’ that 
we are saying was good or bad or hard or easy or fun or challenging?
How To Do Things With Guts
Before we rush headlong into saying that we are now in the realms of phenom-
enology, we should note that what we are facing here is a general problem of 
signification. To translate something from an individual experience into words 
and meanings always requires a move away from the perceived essence or heart 
of the matter via a necessary (invented, poetic) connection with another coor-
dinate. An experience is like one thing, and not like another thing; it can only 
ever be evoked through comparison, analogy, metaphor, contrast, and so on. 
Admittedly, the communication of a non-linguistic event, phenomenon or 
experience is a particularly knotty kind of semiotic problem, but it is a semiotic 
problem nonetheless. Like everything, attempting to signify ‘that thing’ will 
always involve composition, construction, and a perhaps ultimately impossible 
or forever unsatisfying effort of translation.
All of this has been reflected upon since at least the time of Charles Sanders 
Peirce. People have found fascinating ways out of this abyss, or ways to bridge 
it, or bypass it. But I have always insisted on remaining frustrated by any appar-
ent solution or attempt to dissolve this problematic. I have always felt the need 
to hold onto the tensions, gaps, disjunctions, aporias, absences and irrelations 
between experiences and words. This is because trying to keep ahold of this 
tension imposes a gnawing, generative problematic. Loïc Wacquant expressed 
it well, I think, when he wrote, on the subject of learning boxing:
How to go from the guts to the intellect, from the comprehension of 
the flesh to the knowledge of the text? Here is a real problem of con-
crete epistemology about which we have not sufficiently reflected, and 
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which for a long time seemed to me irresolvable. To restitute the carnal 
dimension of ordinary existence and the bodily anchoring of the practi-
cal knowledge constitutive of pugilism – but also of every practice, even 
the least ‘bodily’ in appearance – requires indeed a complete overhaul of 
our way of writing social science. (Wacquant 2009, 122)
For a long time, this passage stood out for me as a near perfect statement of a 
problem that animated – or, rather, agitated, aggravated, frustrated, sometimes 
paralyzed – me. I still don’t feel like I have actually resolved it.
Wacquant himself says his attempt to solve the problem took the form of 
adopting a strategy of mixing different styles of writing, different modes of 
address: Sometimes literary/descriptive, other times confessional, emotional, 
ethnographic, analytical, and so on. The purpose of using different modes of 
address and manners and conventions of writing when talking about his expe-
riences of learning boxing (Wacquant 2004) was his attempt to find a way to 
capture and convey as much about ‘the comprehension of the flesh’ as possible 
in the medium of words. Different modes and conventions of address could be 
said to capture and convey different dimensions, so Wacquant’s ‘solution’ is one 
of mixed modes and multiple voices. Such an approach both acknowledges and 
attempts to outflank the kind of abyss that often seems to exist between (the 
experience of) embodied know-how and the communication of that embodied 
knowledge in words.
A few things always jump to mind when I think about this. One is the expres-
sion ‘one showing is worth a thousand tellings’. Another is ‘that which cannot 
be said can be shown’. Another is ‘he who knows does not speak, he who speaks 
does not know’. And still another is from a scene in a David Lodge novel in 
which someone considering studying psychology at university (because they 
want to know how people’s minds work) is advised by a literary scholar that if 
they really want to gain an understanding of human psychology they’d be better 
off studying novels.
These fragments spring to mind here because Wacquant’s adoption of differ-
ent literary modes acknowledges that the attempt to convey embodied knowl-
edge via words will always require different conventions: The academic, philo-
sophical or phenomenological will be helpful, but partial and incomplete; as 
will ‘thick description’; as will poetic, emotive, rhetorical and otherwise literary 
language. Taken together, perhaps the effect will be more rounded than one 
style of writing alone, or in isolation. But, still, all will in some sense fail. This is 
because the act of moving from the guts to the intellect requires a leap, an act of 
bridging, connecting different worlds, translation, and catachresis. Catachresis 
refers to ‘drawing a face on that which does not have a face’, or indeed embody-
ing that which doesn’t really have a body (e.g., the cliff face, the table leg) (Sacks 
1978; Spivak 1990).
Viewed from here, even Wacquant’s choice of the word ‘guts’ can be regarded 
as hugely metaphorical and poetic. It was doubtless chosen precisely because of 
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its complex historical and cultural overdetermination, i.e., its residual, resound-
ingly emotive, evocative force. For, the word ‘guts’ has a range of mythological 
associations, all of which suit Wacquant’s purposes. These associations range 
from conjuring up senses of ‘the body’ to ‘bravery’ via ‘the abattoir’ and even 
‘peasant food’ or ‘working class fare from days of yore’, and so on. So, it sounds 
gritty and earthy and manly and basic and essential and real. Yet, the embodied 
knowledge of pugilism both is and is not a knowledge of, from, or centred on 
or in ‘the guts’. Guts are involved, but that still doesn’t actually capture what we 
are trying to convey here, or what ‘guts’ evokes (catachrestically, rather than 
metonymically or synecdochally).
For, what is Wacquant trying to convey with the word guts? I think he is 
talking about a specific kind of enskillment and that general kind of encultura-
tion that he refers to via Bourdieu’s theorisation of ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu 1979; 
Wacquant 2013). Of course, probably more literally important than ‘how to go 
from the guts to the intellect’ would be ‘how to express such things as balance, 
proprioception and timing skills in written words’.4 But none of these terms 
sound quite as good as ‘guts’ as a contrast to ‘intellect’.
Rather than doing something like designating Wacquant a sophist or dualist 
or anything like that, it seems more reasonable to acknowledge the inevitabil-
ity of imprecision, evocation and contrast, and to acknowledge that, in going 
down the line of trying to escape poetic language by trying be literal or specific, 
we quickly become ensnared in the paradox of blason poetry. As a lover’s hymn 
for the woman he desires, the blason attempts to itemise and wax lyrical about 
each and every part of the desired lady’s beautiful body – to try to isolate and 
comment on precisely why and how it is so beautiful and attractive. The prob-
lem is that in attempting to do so the overall image that is created becomes 
heterogeneous, improbable, often ugly, always literally preposterous, and just 
generally ridiculous. In blason poetry, women come to be made up of the cob-
bling together of things like flowers, apples, milk, silk, oceans, precious stones, 
music, landscapes, stars, planets, feathers, and so on – or indeed ‘sugar and 
spice and all things nice’.
Nonetheless, just because something requires a work of translation in order 
to be expressed or communicated, this should not deter us from trying it. 
Derridean deconstruction essentially held that a true, complete or adequate 
translation was ultimately impossible. But this never stopped dyed in the wool 
Derridean deconstructionists from translating the texts of Derridean decon-
struction into language after language. Similarly, embodied knowledge need 
not be regarded as something ineffable, inexpressible or mystical, as if it were 
the Tao of Taoism or indeed the divine in any kind of negative theology.
 4 Practitioners and aficionados of Chinese ‘internal’ martial arts may disagree and retort that 
in many respects the ‘guts’ are indeed literally the key area to discuss, as deep in the guts is 
where we find the dantian (dantien, or tantien).
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So, despite its problems, Wacquant’s statement of the problem stands as a 
challenge. His proposed solution of mixed modes and manners of expression 
even seems reasonably acceptable. But if we accept it then our questions should 
henceforth become something like: What concepts, metaphors, images, vocabu-
laries and genres and conventions of writing are best able to convey embodied 
knowledge, skill, technique, experience?
This is one viable and valuable line of exploration. But, before rushing into 
it, maybe there is further cause for hesitation. For, in posing things in this way, 
maybe we are still being unnecessarily blinkered. Maybe we are not seeing the 
bigger picture – or, once again, perhaps we are insisting on looking for our 
lost keys under a streetlight rather than in the surrounding darkness where we 
actually lost them – or trying to dig our way out of a hole. If we were to take a 
slightly broader view, perhaps the real question would be: Is the written word 
actually capable of communicating any of this, or (more modestly put) might 
other, newer, media be better?
Simulacra and Stimulation
The recently established Journal of Embodied Research gives resounding and 
unequivocal answers to these questions: No, the written word can’t be, or isn’t 
simply, the best, and it should now be regarded as inadequate and inferior 
when assessed in relation to the potentials or propensities of new audiovisual 
media technologies. The latter far outpace and utterly reconfigure the possibili-
ties for capturing, conveying, communicating and developing knowledge and 
discourse about embodiment. Ben Spatz theorised this in his important book 
What A Body Can Do (2015), and it was principally he who went on to establish 
the agenda of the Journal of Embodied Research in light of his earlier work.
As someone who remembers Jean Baudrillard’s arguments about the sup-
posed loss of the real, in and because of the audiovisual image, I delight in the 
inversion and displacement of the gauntlet thrown down in the editorial mani-
festo of the Journal of Embodied Research inasmuch as its argument seems to 
be precisely the opposite of the Baudrillardian hypothesis of the loss of the real. 
Rather, proposes the journal, it is actually going to be by exploring and devel-
oping the capacities and propensities of audiovisual media that academics and 
other researchers will be able to establish a kind of ‘royal road’ to the body, in 
terms of audiovisual studies of embodiment, skill, practice, experience, and the 
establishment of embodied knowledge.
The Body of Knowledge
Unfortunately, to argue that new media technologies trump the written word 
when it comes to establishing, documenting and discoursing academically on 
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embodied knowledge (thanks to the creative and innovative audiovisual texts 
that they can allow us to construct) produces a whole new problem. This is the 
problem of the legitimation of different kinds of texts, such as audiovisual media 
texts, in the face of the ongoing absolute hegemony of the written word, as rep-
resenting the pinnacle and yardstick of academic propriety within academia.
That is to say, despite innovations here and there, academia (like other insti-
tutions) continues to produce principally written documents. So, innovations 
like the Journal of Embodied Research are posing a direct challenge to this 
hegemony, not by rejecting writing but by attempting to massively expand the 
range of possibilities for new kinds of academic writing – including inscription, 
analysis and discourse, not just ‘documenting’. (For a compelling discussion of 
this, I encourage readers to read the final chapter of Spatz’s What A Body Can 
Do [2015].)
To restate all of this via a deliberately naïve rhetorical question: If we want 
to translate from embodied experience and into some other mode, manner or 
medium, why do we continue to single out and prioritize writing? We live in an 
audiovisual age, one that has been called ‘post-literate’, as it is characterised by 
the waning of older kinds of literacy, and the emergence of newer kinds of lit-
eracy (Chow 2012; Bowman 2013a). Indeed, even the word ‘literacy’ reveals the 
residual hegemony of the written word. Yet, book reading is increasingly being 
supplanted by different kinds of interaction with different kinds of audiovisual 
text or platform, many of which can hardly be called ‘reading’ anymore, even 
if we still treat them as if they are. The era has passed in which the dominance 
or hegemony of the written word was unquestionable and necessary, in which 
knowledge and skills centring on written cultural forms such as the novel or 
poetry equalled both the yardstick and the pinnacle of necessary learning.
Like the once-presumed imperative educational value of teaching children 
to be able to locate countries and cities on a map of the world, certain forms of 
‘cultural literacy’ wither and die.5 Educational imperatives and values always in 
some sense reflect the concerns, orientations, technologies and values of their 
times and places (Young 1992). Despite Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s 
attack on the arts and humanities, I grew up believing in the almost unques-
tionable and surely timeless value of ‘English literature’. It always felt like there 
might be ‘something about class’ involved in learning to love it (Bourdieu 
1984), but it was only much later that I learned of the Eurocentric colonial-
management basis of the subject’s origins and development (Anderson 1991).
Of course, we are definitely now not simply or directly talking about embodi-
ment here. We are now talking about the ways that attempts to advance the 
study of ‘it’ (singular or plural, noun or verb) reciprocally challenge estab-
lished conventions that ostensibly have nothing to do with bodies, the body, or 
 5 When I was growing up, the older generation bewailed our inability to populate blank maps 
of the world with country and city names. But the British Empire was no more. Former edu-
cational imperatives were now redundant. So we weren’t forced to learn them.
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embodiment. But my sense is that this will (maybe even should) always be the 
case. The body isn’t simply one thing. We so easily say ‘the body’ – but there is 
not just one body. And there are not just lots of different ethnic and gendered 
and sexualised and classed and interpellated and self-identified bodies either. 
So ‘politically correct’ pluralisation doesn’t get to the heart of the problem either 
– because nor is there simply one body for one person. All of this and more is 
why the word embodiment, for me at least, will continue to imply at least a sense 
of referring to ‘the embodiment of something else’. As mentioned earlier, maybe 
the fact that I think and see it in this way is a symptom of the eternally returning 
force of my schooling in poststructuralism and deconstruction. Nonetheless, I 
also think that much scholarship on the body, on bodily learning, embodied 
skill, and so on – at least in and around the area of martial arts that I most 
frequently read – supports my sense of this inevitability. In fact, if embodiment 
doesn’t mean ‘embodiment of ’, then I struggle to see what it does mean.
In a way, this is fine. I am unlikely ever to renounce my ‘secondary habitus’, 
which involved my schooling or (antidisciplinary) disciplining in all things 
poststructuralist. So, I am quite content to discover that when reading stud-
ies that are ostensibly about embodiment I actually find that I am reading just 
another book or article about nationalist projects, institutional structures, ped-
agogical relations, ritualistic fetishizations of orientalist fantasies, and so on. 
I’m happy because often this is great scholarship, and it feels really stimulating 
and important.
But, thinking about it now, one thing that strikes me is that, as I become more 
and more immersed in reading and researching ‘the body’ in different ways, 
the force of the problematics that first captivated me have lost some of the once 
powerful hold they had on my imagination. For instance, I can remember the 
extent to which I used to wonder and worry and fret and work away with the 
‘guts to intellect’ problematic on my mind, in my mind, but, as I have dug down 
into various schools of scholarship that have engaged with embodiment in vari-
ous ways, this problematic has lost its prominence, albeit (for me) without ever 
having been resolved.
Maybe this is what ‘becoming disciplined’ is like. It is as if, by reading more 
in ethnography, anthropology, performance, and so on, and becoming more 
literate, more circumspect, more informed about the work being done in these 
fields, the prominence of this once agonising problematic has more and more 
settled down (rather than having been resolved); as if I have simply and without 
really realizing it just become used to it and stopped seeing it, or stopped feeling 
it. Surely this is what ‘discipline’ is, or does – it gets you used to things, so that a 
thing that once seized hold of your soul ceases to be quite so striking, shocking, 
disruptive, forceful, jolting, deforming, transforming.
Or perhaps it’s just that new and equally fascinating problematics have arisen 
and seized hold of my soul: Questions of how embodied practices (such as 
martial arts kata, forms, patterns or taolu) emerge, stabilize, stay the same over 
time or mutate, deform, transform, and so on; questions of how bodily skills 
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and types of knowledge are conveyed or communicated from one person to 
another, how or whether that happens without omission, addition, or trans-
formation; whether certain types of practice are isolatable or abstractable from 
larger formations, and whether ‘elements’ or ‘components’ of supposed enti-
ties are ‘portable’, and, if so, whether they stay the same, or, if not, what they 
become. I know there are many in-depth studies of the complex stabilizations, 
transformations and deformations of complex cultural practices (some of my 
favourites include Wile 1999, Frank 2006, Singleton 2010, Sieler 2015, and 
Judkins and Nielson 2015, but there are many more), but, on a smaller, more 
personal, level, I often find myself consumed with questions about whether 
you could learn taiji push-hands ‘properly’ without learning taiji forms and/or 
qigong standing postures; what the borders and boundaries are between, say, 
qigong and yogic pranayama breathing; whether the training ethos and values 
of taiji practice could or should be applied in escrima training, or whether there 
is an absolute and necessary divide, how and where and why this applies if there 
is, and so on. These are the kinds of questions that currently consume me.
Yet, as all-consuming as such questions sometimes feel, I always seem to 
want to keep them amateurish. I want to keep them rough and ready. As soon 
as they are too easy to articulate, or as soon as an academic idiom steps up and 
presents itself as being totally able to handle, conceptualise and communicate 
the problematic, I tend to feel like they have vanished. To resurrect Paul de 
Man’s phrase, I tend to cleave to the idea that the real should involve at least 
some ‘resistance’ to theory (de Man 1986). If there’s nothing resistant there, no 
friction or drag, then it starts to feel like I’m no longer dealing with something 
real, and maybe just completely immersed in a kind of non-referential theory.
In this and other ways, my amateurish and principally autodidactic (or at least 
iconoclastic) physical training informs much of my intellectual and academic 
thinking and writing. More precisely, my worries about my physical training 
practices inform many of my academic reflections and ruminations. And I do 
worry deeply and profoundly and at length about my physical training. Ques-
tions that keep me awake at night and wake me up in the morning tend to take 
the form: Can I combine this with that? If I do this then do I have to do that? 
What happens if I add this but omit that? And so on. Yet, despite obsessing over 
so many questions, I almost never ask an authority figure to tell me the answer. 
This is less because I fear reprimand from former martial arts teachers for ask-
ing heretical questions or abusing traditions with the way I am doing things 
now and more because my academic studies have alerted me to the very real 
likelihood – indeed, inevitability – that even the most ‘authentic’, ‘traditional’ 
and ‘masterful’ of authentic, traditional masters – on some fundamental level – 
do not know ‘the truth’ and are inevitably either making it all up themselves or 
religiously repeating something that was really basically just made up.
Somebody had to make it up. It had to come from somewhere. And, despite 
what people like to believe, it almost certainly hasn’t come from some unbro-
ken millennia-long tradition. If it wasn’t made up by your teacher, it was almost 
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certainly modified by them (Bowman 2016b). So, where does that leave us? Or 
rather, where does it take us?
Perhaps if I were entirely content and confident that what I were doing in 
my physical practices were right or true or correct or best or essential then 
maybe I would not worry so much about whether, say, a Lacanian language (of 
symbolic lack and imaginary plenitude, and so on) or a Deleuzean language 
(of affect and rhizomes and reterritorializations, and so on) were more or less 
appropriate for capturing or expressing the truth or reality or relevant features 
of my embodied experiences. But I am not. I do not have complete faith in the 
truths and axioms and tenets of either realm – neither my martial arts practice 
nor my academic practice.
For Better or For Worse, In Sickness and In Health
I suspect (sometimes I worry) that my irrepressible skepticism might make me 
a better theorist but a worse martial artist. The promiscuity of my martial arts 
practice has definitely broadened my perspectives and enabled me to grasp and 
to feel confident enough to talk about a wider range of practices. But if I had 
been more faithful to fewer martial arts then I would surely be a much better 
practitioner. However, I have never been able to limit myself to one established 
set of practices, or one paradigm. I do one thing and then I worry that I am not 
doing another, and inexorably I flip over into practicing that other thing for a 
period of time, until I worry that I am not doing something else, so I flip across 
to that; and then I flip back, a bit like the Chinese elements, or rock-paper-
scissors, each thing overcoming another and being overcome by another. If I 
am obsessing about taiji and qigong, all of a sudden I will find myself consumed 
with worry that I am not engaged in enough hard-core pugilism or grappling 
and I will flip over to that. Then I will worry about the damage I feel I am 
doing to myself and flip into more therapeutic practices, like yoga. Then I will 
worry about strength, and flip into weightlifting. Then I will worry about losing 
my taiji sensitivities and flip back into that. So, perhaps my embodiments, the 
things I could be said to embody, seem to involve worries about what I am not 
doing and constant crises of confidence and faith.
Yet, despite my eternally-returning skepticism and rhythmically predictable 
crises of faith, this does not mean that I lack faith or that I am somehow eman-
cipated from belief. Rather, I am constantly plagued by doubts and worries. 
Worries about some vague, unspecified Terrible Thing that might happen if, 
for instance, I were to stop doing my taiji forms, or to stop doing standing 
qigong, or the associated stretches that are said to be necessary supplements to 
the practice of the standing postures. Or worries about what might happen if I 
were to stop sparring.
These are, of course, my own personal existential matters, which might per-
haps only be connected to my own sense of self and my own sense of identity. 
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Certainly, you could psychoanalyse me and easily diagnose me as screwed up 
in any number of ways. That is entirely possible. But, as I said at the beginning, 
although I am talking about myself here, I believe the implications of what I 
am discussing extend beyond my own personal idiosyncrasies or neuroses. The 
connections between physical practices, senses of identity, and wider discursive 
movements and ideological formations are not just related to psychology. They 
are a large part of anthropological, ethnographic, sociological and cultural 
studies approaches to embodiment. I mention crises of faith, anxieties, worries 
about sticking to one course or taking another, taking a bit of one course and 
combining it with another, and so on, because I think it suggests something 
important about ‘embodiment’.
For instance, I have a weird relationship with taiji. I have practiced taiji for 
nearly two decades, yet I no longer feel like I ‘really believe in’ taiji as a martial 
art. I also don’t particularly rate it as a physical exercise or health-giving prac-
tice. (I would rate qigong, yoga and weightlifting far higher.) And yet I cannot 
bring myself to stop practicing taiji at the same time as I find myself unable to 
articulate clearly and directly what my investment in the forms is.
For me, this casts a very real kind of light (or shadow) on Peter Sloterdijk’s 
recent argument that religions are essentially misrecognised or ‘misinterpreted 
anthropotechnic practice systems’ (quoted in Spatz 2015: Loc 517) inasmuch 
as it suggests that taiji has the status of a kind of religion for me. Or, worse, 
a very particular kind of relationship to religion: The relationship of a non-
believer who still goes to church. The automatism of the form seems to have 
produced a compulsion to repeat. Here we are in the orbit of Althusser, Pascal 
and Freud, and of the profound effects of institutions and ideologies on pathol-
ogies (Althusser 1971). The forms are pleasurable, to be sure; they definitely 
used to mean certain things to me, and I definitely used to believe that they 
were, if not ‘actual’ combat, at least about combat. But what are they to me now? 
They seem to have the status of a kind of ‘warding off ’ of something terrible 
that might happen were I to stop doing them, a kind of gently pleasurable yet 
inexorably compelling exorcism ceremony that I feel drawn to and feel I have to 
perform.6 (This thought about taiji practice as ‘warding off ’ something terrible 
that might happen if I were to stop doing taiji often intrudes to bother me when 
I am performing the taiji move called ‘ward off ’.)
I raise all of this at the end of this chapter because I think it is important not 
to be too evangelistic about the possibilities of embracing embodiment, in aca-
demic study and in daily life. It is definitely marvellous to be ‘in touch’ with one’s 
body, to become differently enculturated, enskilled, enabled, even emancipated 
from many problems that can plague people who are not ‘in touch’ with their 
bodies. But, at the same time, we need to realise that our forms of embodiment 
 6 For more on the relationships between martial arts and exorcism, see Scott Park Phillips’ 
fascinating recent study Possible Origins: A Cultural History of Chinese Martial Arts, Theater 
and Religion (Phillips 2016).
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can also become our bondage. I remember reading an article about the effect 
of nicotine on the body in a ‘how to give up smoking’ article. The author wrote 
that smokers feel like nicotine gives them something. But what smokers need to 
realise is that nicotine has actually originally stolen something from them, and 
they are driven to return to nicotine in order to temporarily remember what 
it is like to be reunited with the stolen thing: Namely, the feeling of calmness 
and not-craving-nicotine that non-smokers don’t even realise they always and 
already have and that smokers miss and attempt to recreate by smoking another 
cigarette.
That article certainly helped me to establish a perspective that helped me 
to give up smoking. And that’s definitely good, right? Smoking is definitely 
bad, right? But what if the nicotine-effect extends to other things? I remem-
ber as a teenager and twenty-something feeling compelled to go to the gym to 
lift weights. I had to. I felt like a bicycle tyre with a slow puncture, and that I 
would deflate to nothing if I did not keep going and pumping up my muscles. 
Strength training and bodybuilding was certainly very enabling for me. But it 
also trapped me. I’m still not sure that I have actually escaped from the clutches 
of that particular affliction. But the same is also true with taiji, qigong, yoga, 
sparring. In some respects, they feel like a life sentence. And like the ‘lifers’ in 
The Shawshank Redemption (1994), my worry is that I would not (will not) 
know how to cope, what to do, how to be, without it, or outside of it.
Maybe I need a coherent and overarching philosophy. Perhaps Taoism would 
be most appropriate. With this in mind, the next chapter attempts to  examine 
Taoism, the philosophical worldview with which the most quintessentially 
 Chinese and/or esoteric martial arts are often said to be aligned.
CHAPTER 5
Taoism in Bits
A Bit of Orientation
I would never claim to be an expert on Chinese thought, culture or philoso-
phy. In fact, I would never claim to be an expert on anything. I tend to object 
to discourses organised by the notion of ‘expertise’. This is because the notion 
of expertise is often invoked as a way to exclude, subordinate or de-legitimize 
non-professional voices from discussions. Rather than being an ‘expert’, at best 
I am a scholar of cultural studies, popular culture and ideology with a life-
long interest in martial arts. Almost everything I have learned about Chinese 
thought, culture or philosophy, I have learned through and in relation to mar-
tial arts and popular culture. As such, some may question what I could possibly 
have to say to anyone about Taoism; they may contest my authority to hold 
forth on such a complex subject and challenge the legitimacy of any claims I 
may make. However, any claims I could make in this respect relate to my long-
term research interests in ideology and popular culture. In other words, this 
chapter will principally draw not on my ‘expertise’ but rather on my research 
(and) experience in these areas.
For this reason, this chapter begins from what might be called two ‘popular’ 
propositions. First, the proposition that it is widely understood that Taoism is 
Chinese. Second, the proposition that there was a veritable explosion of interest 
in Taoism in Western popular culture in the wake of (and arguably in response 
to) some of the major wars of the second half of the 20th Century, particularly 
WWII, the Korean War and the Vietnam War (Watts 1990).
To flesh out the second proposition briefly: In particular, different kinds of 
Western interest in Taoism can be seen in the interests and orientations of the 
Beat Generation, the counterculture and, of course, hippies everywhere. It is 
often said that these interests had much to do with different kinds of rejec-
tion of, or protest against, the institutions that carried out the wars. In other 
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words, Western institutions and their ideologies were regarded by the Beats, the 
counterculture and the hippies in particular as being inhuman and driven by a 
machine-like rationality involving industrial-scale, exploitative instrumental-
ity, all of which came to be regarded as something to be rejected (Clarke 1997; 
Heath and Potter 2006). In contrast to the dominant Western religions, phi-
losophies, ideologies and worldviews, Taoism always seemed very different: A 
philosophy of the moment, the present, the experience, the natural, the ecologi-
cal, and the ethical relation to the other. So, among other Eastern worldviews 
and philosophies, Taoism is often regarded as offering a genuine alternative to 
the outlooks driving the dominant status quo.
As for Taoism itself, there are many things to say about it. But these first two 
points – on the one hand, that Taoism comes from China, and, on the other 
hand, the Western interest in it – will structure much of what follows. In many 
respects, this chapter will chiefly be exploring the theme of the interest in Tao-
ism in the West and the connection of this with martial arts. But all of this will 
be referred back and related to the subject of Taoism in China.
A Bit of Taoism
Because of the ‘macro’ perspective that my framing has just set up, the coor-
dinates that are already being used in this chapter are the highly problematic 
notions of the supposed East and the supposed West (Hall and Gieben 1991). 
As problematic as these terms have often been shown to be, there is worse to 
come: Sometimes I am going to talk about China, sometimes East Asia; some-
times I am going to talk about Europe, sometimes America; and other times 
I am going to talk about some nebulous monster called Euro-America. The 
reasons for using such shifting and mostly unsatisfactory and imprecise coor-
dinates boil down to familiarity, convenience and the effort to produce an effect 
of clarity, even at the cost of a huge lack of specificity.
Given the use of such problematic, shape-shifting and crude mirages as East/
West coordinates, one might reasonably hope for more precision regarding the 
object of attention itself, namely ‘Taoism’. However, the problem here is that an 
implied distinction between ‘Taoism in China’ and ‘Taoism in the West’ has 
already been generated, as if there were two different things with one name. 
However, there may be considerably more than one understanding of ‘Tao-
ism’. As this preliminary distinction already suggests, there may be at least one 
Eastern one and at least one Western one. And these may not be the same. Yet, 
if such a proposition is unproblematically accepted and assumed, this is going 
to have consequences. For instance, such a binary may lead us to leap to a pre-
dictable conclusion, one that has two faces. First, it will become both possible 
and likely that we will be inclined to presume that it will obviously be the case 
that the Chinese Taoism is the one that must be regarded as the original and 
therefore authentic and therefore superior or true Taoism. And second, that 
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therefore any ‘Western Taoism’ must necessarily be secondary, derived, inau-
thentic, ersatz or inferior.
A deconstruction would unpick these assumptions at both ends, in terms of 
the complexity of the situation ‘in the real world’ and in terms of an awareness 
of the fact that this very binary was effectively invented (constructed) within 
this present argument itself. Although the kinds of assumptions that this argu-
ment reflects are certainly very familiar, a deconstructive approach would not 
follow this line of thinking at all. This is because this type of ‘binary’ thinking is 
saturated with all sorts of problems and introduces all sorts of prejudices (Chow 
1995; Bowman 2010c). So, it is important to deconstruct and avoid them. At 
the very least, what should be borne in mind throughout is the  possibility – 
or inevitability – that, instead of believing that there is one Chinese Taoism 
and one Western Taoism, there are inevitably going be multiple (even myriad) 
 different understandings and interpretations of Taoism in both East and West, 
including many which totally undercut, eradicate or dissolve the supposed 
 border between East and West.
In other words, this is not going to be a discourse about a true Taoism of 
China versus a false Taoism of the West. Readers should be aware that there 
will be intricately sophisticated, nuanced and effectively authentic incarna-
tions of Taoism in the West. Conversely, at the same time, there will be multiple 
modulations of Taoism in China, some of which may well have been invented 
recently, perhaps with motivated ideological ends or agendas.
Taoism’s Travels
It is important to reflect on all of this because it is vital to be vigilant against 
certain types of thinking and the unexamined bias(es) harboured within them. 
To help with this, there are multiple reasons, at the outset, to dispense with the 
idea of ‘authenticity’ (Heath and Potter 2006), as might be implied in an attribu-
tion of highest value to some idea of the ‘original’. If we try to stop fetishizing 
ideas of original and authentic (perhaps because we are aware of the extent to 
which such ideas are themselves so often contemporary inventions), however, 
what might be the alternative?
One option is to replace the overvaluation of ideas of original and most 
authentic with the premise of any supposedly stable and unitary entity actu-
ally being elaborated over time and space in ongoing, open-ended, partial, and 
always in some sense incomplete iterations. Conversely, the search for authen-
ticity implies a journey ‘back to the source’, and such thinking can be mired in 
ideological preconceptions exemplified by the idea of ‘the original and best’ ver-
sus ‘most recent and least authentic/most inferior’. As Rey Chow has shown in 
her analyses of Chinese literary and cultural studies, for instance, the ideologi-
cal and political effects of such styles of thinking can produce highly exclusion-
ary hierarchies in which, for example, former colonies like Hong Kong are not 
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regarded within Chinese studies as being ‘properly Chinese’; hence the litera-
ture and culture produced in such areas are not deemed worthy of study within 
Chinese studies and excluded from the curriculum. The net result is a fetishistic 
fixation on ancient Chinese literature and culture – the older the better.
In this sense, the race to the origin is a race to a kind of mythically- 
manipulated past, and the search for the ‘most authentic’ can become a pro-
ject that hierarchizes, orders and excludes many recent and very real forms of 
practice. Rather than this, cultural studies can be oriented with considerably 
more diverse and dynamic kinds of questions and perspectives. So, when it 
comes to questions about Taoism and culture, for example, one might consider 
beginning from a thoroughgoing questioning of what the ‘it’ is that is being 
referred to whenever we refer to ‘Taoism’. Which Taoism, where and when? 
Does ‘it’ stay the same over time? How? Why? Is it the same when it moves? 
Can such an ‘it’ travel? Can it travel intact? What conditions are required for 
the smooth transition of something like Taoism from one place to another, one 
time to another, one linguistic and cultural context to another, without it falling 
to pieces, breaking up, becoming something else altogether?
As can be seen in the previous paragraph, in challenging simplistic under-
standings, deconstruction has always tended to complicate things – arguably 
deconstruction often tends to overcomplicate matters. In this case, in a reflec-
tion on Taoism’s travels, we might pause to explore whether the movement of 
‘Taoism’ from culture to culture, context to context, is a relatively straightfor-
ward or complex case of cultural movement or cross-cultural communication. 
Any enquiry will be required to address the question of what Taoism ‘is’. Given 
everything said so far, this may well turn out to be tricky, to say the least. None-
theless, as with so many things, it is actually quite easy to come up with a rough 
outline of answer. For instance, as with so many other things, you can start 
simply by carrying out a cursory internet search.
The first result in the list generated by my Google search was the Wikipedia 
entry for Taoism. Admittedly, there are many reasons to doubt the reliability 
of every Wikipedia entry. So, I cross-referenced the Wikipedia entry with the 
second page listed in my search results, which was the BBC pages on Taoism.
(Many may baulk at my admitting something like this. However, part of the 
point of this exploration is to examine the general or popular cultural under-
standings of such a term. To do this requires referring to the main sources of 
information about it. Wikipedia and the BBC can be regarded as mainstream 
sources of information. Hence, there are multiple reasons to start from such 
webpages.)
The first paragraph of the Wikipedia entry on Taoism reads as follows:
Taoism (/'daʊɪzəm/), also known as Daoism, is a religious or philosoph-
ical tradition of  Chinese  origin which emphasizes living in harmony 
with the Tao (道, literally ‘Way’, also romanized as Dao). The Tao  is a 
fundamental idea in most  Chinese philosophical  schools; in Taoism, 
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however, it denotes the principle that is both the source, pattern and 
substance of everything that exists. Taoism differs from Confucianism 
by not emphasizing rigid rituals and social order.  Taoist ethics vary 
depending on the particular school, but in general tend to empha-
size wu wei (effortless action), ‘naturalness’, simplicity, spontaneity, and 
the  Three Treasures:  jing  (sperm/ovary energy, or the essence of the 
physical body), qi (‘matter-energy’ or ‘life force’, including the thoughts 
and emotions), and shén (spirit or generative power).
Specialist or expert academics could perhaps challenge such accessible charac-
terisations. Nonetheless (and as unreliable as Wikipedia may sometimes be), 
this entry squares not only with the BBC pages that I cross-referenced it with 
but also with many other texts that I have read on Taoism before. For instance, 
as with other things that I have read on the subject, the Wikipedia entry con-
curs that: Taoism feeds from and back into lots of different kinds of Chinese 
intellectual and spiritual traditions; that it doesn’t quite fit into Western catego-
ries, yet it is not utterly alien to them; that in Western terms it straddles or flows 
between familiar Western conceptual categories like religion and philosophy; 
that it has specific theories, specific ideas and specific principles, but that there 
are different interpretations, different rituals and different obligations in terms 
of ethics, norms, mores and injunctions, in different approaches to Taoism, 
even within and across China.
If such a definition refers heavily to China, let’s flip perspective now and con-
sider Europe or America. What does Taoism look like here?
If Taoism has a range of different incarnations in China, it seems fair to say 
that in the West it is mostly present only in bits. There is not much explicit or 
highly visible Taoism in the West. Of course, there is some. But, as the BBC 
website notes, the ritualistic and religious dimensions of much Chinese Taoism 
are almost unheard of in the West.
At the same time, a central symbol of Taoism, the yin-yang (or taijitu), is not 
at all uncommon. It is all over the place. Of course, when yin-yangs occur in the 
West, their status is unclear. Yin-yangs most commonly occur in what I will call 
for convenience subcultural contexts, or in the form of tattoos, or on children’s 
stickers, or in posters for taiji lessons at the local community or sports centre. 
Books, pictures and paraphernalia can be found on sale in hippy shops, head 
shops, and alternative lifestyle shops. But Taoism rarely appears in the West as 
part of a fully formed institutional existence.
Words and phrases involving the yin-yang occur frequently in explanations 
of how martial arts like taiji or bagua ‘work’ (sometimes also Japanese arts like 
aikido or even judo), and in relation to the practices of different kinds of qigong. 
But the Taoism of the West seems to manifest principally in or as bits of Taoism.
Indeed, to many, Taoism may still seem exotic or unusual – even though it is 
far from new to the West. There are several centuries long traditions of Western 
intellectual engagements with Chinese and other East Asian philosophies and 
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cosmologies (Said 1978; Clarke 1997; Sedgwick 2003). Many Western philoso-
phers, theologians, theorists and thinkers have had many kinds of interest in 
many of the texts, traditions and practices of Taoism, along with other notable 
East Asian ‘things’, like Zen or Chan and other forms of Buddhism, as well as 
many less well-known shamanic practices, and so on.
The Circulation of Yin-Yangs
Given this, what is the status of Taoism in the West? As mentioned, in some 
ways, Taoism – or at least the trappings of Taoism – or at least bits of it – have 
become familiar in the West. The yin-yang symbol is certainly very well-known, 
even if an understanding of the logic, argument, principles or cosmology it 
implies is often absent. It has mostly found its niche in the West on the bodies 
and clothes and décor of certain ‘types’: Hippies, alternatives, crusties, teens, 
martial artists, New Agers and so on.
Further empirical cultural or sociological analysis of the contexts in which 
the images, trappings, paraphernalia and ideas of Taoism have been grafted into 
the Western world would be rewarding. But my hypothesis is that if we were to 
do a visual cultural analysis and look to see where we could find visual evidence 
of the signs and symbols of Taoism in the West, the study would reveal that the 
signs and signifiers of Taoism are most frequently grafted onto or into contexts 
that present themselves (or are regarded) as alternative, non-mainstream, often 
possibly oppositional or quasi-oppositional, frequently martial artsy, as well as 
New Age and orientalist. In other words: Marginal (Bowman 2017b).
Of course, no visual or material cultural study could tell us everything about 
the status of Taoism in the West. For instance, a study of visual culture would 
remain blind to the reach, scope, and influence of Taoism in books – books of 
Taoism and books about Taoism. Today, a lot of this kind of communication 
and discourse has moved onto blogs, vlogs, and podcasts. And, while there 
might be ways to measure the scale of online discourse about Taoism, it would 
still ultimately be impossible to ascertain the status, reach, influence or place 
of such discourse in any kind of convincing way. Nonetheless, my hypothesis 
about its discursive or cultural status in popular culture is that it emerged and 
exists along with a jumbled and often garbled collection of other often nebu-
lous ideas and associations, many of which are taken also to refer and relate to 
martial arts. What I mean by this might be illustrated by a brief consideration 
of an example: The character of Caine (played by David Carradine), the lead 
protagonist in the early 1970s TV series, Kung Fu (1972-1975).
Although the actor who played him was white, Caine was meant to be from 
China (ethnically half Chinese, to be specific), a martial arts graduate monk of 
the Shaolin Temple and subsequent wanderer in the American ‘Wild West’. It 
is a TV series that maps onto and encapsulates the peak of what is known as 
the ‘kung fu craze’ that swept the US, Europe and much of the rest of the world 
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in the 1970s (Brown 1997; Prashad 2002, 2003; Bowman 2010d, 2013b; Kato 
2012). And I actually think it also illustrates the form of one of the most signifi-
cant recent bursts of Western interest in Eastern philosophy (Bowman 2010d).
For, Caine is not only invincible, he is also stoic, wise, modest, humble, good 
(see also Nitta 2010 as well as Iwamura 2005). He is a mishmash of the Con-
fucian gent, the Taoist sage and – as certain commentators have noted – the 
West Coast/Californian hippy (Preston 2007). In fact, some of the most critical 
commentators have argued that the supposed Eastern wisdom embodied and 
mouthed by Caine has much more to do with Californian ideologies of the 
hippy era than with anything Chinese (Miller 2000).
This raises at least two interesting questions: First, if a major US TV network 
(along with Hollywood film companies) produces shows that champion Taoist 
philosophy, might this suggest that Taoism has (or had, or almost had) a larger, 
less marginal and more mainstream status in the West than we might otherwise 
have thought? But, second, if the brand of Taoism disseminated by this hugely 
popular and enduring TV series seems to hail more from California than a 
mythic Wudang Mountain, does this suggest that Western versions of Taoism 
will always be warped by or transformed into something else? There are other 
questions raised by Kung Fu, of course (Chong 2012; Bowman 2013b, 2015a), 
but these are the two that I would like to look at here.
Eurotaoism
Interestingly, philosophers such as Peter Sloterdijk and Slavoj Žižek have 
proposed that, far from being alternative or obscure, what they call ‘Western 
 Taoism’ and ‘Western Buddhism’ are actually the hegemonic ideology of (or 
at least ideal ideological fit for) postmodern Western liberal consumer society 
(Žižek 2001b). Žižek’s argument is that in situations of deregulated capital in 
a consumerist society the ideological imperative becomes one of not clinging 
and not getting too hung up on things. The first argument here is that things 
like consumerism and feng shui can be brought into alignment quite easily, via 
ideas like de-cluttering, deep-cleaning, updating, going ‘out with the old, in 
with the new’, and refreshing and reinvigorating by buying new stuff.
Indeed, Žižek proposes that a hybrid of ersatz Taoist, Buddhist and yogic 
ideas often blossoms wherever what used to be called yuppie conditions apply. 
For example, he argues that a chaotic life of stock market speculation or finan-
cial trading almost cries out for the calm of feng shui décor, early morning 
yoga, qigong or ‘mindfulness meditation’, as well as things like regular retreats 
(whether ‘glamping’ or in health spas). Most importantly, in such situations, 
Žižek argues, the yoga, taiji, qigong or ‘mindfulness’ practices enable the prac-
titioner to console themselves with the belief that their meditative time is where 
they get in touch with the ‘truth’ of themselves – so that they don’t have to face 
up to the fact that their work life is their ‘real’ life.
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So, for Žižek, Taoism is a kind of ‘spontaneous ideology’ – not imposed from 
above but arising organically in response to the real conditions of economic life. 
By the same token (but on the other hand), the uncertainty, chaos and instabil-
ity generated by deregulated capital is a prime breeding ground for the ethos of 
‘not clinging’, of ‘keeping moving’, ‘not stagnating’, ‘moving on’, ‘going with the 
flow’, and so on. As Žižek puts it, the erosion of traditional rights and erstwhile 
certainties (such as fixed jobs and guaranteed pensions, etc.) is repackaged not 
as loss but as opportunity. A lost job is represented as an opportunity to retrain. 
Having no guarantee of a pension is an opportunity to invest. And so on. Ulti-
mately, Žižek argues (in an almost Taoist move), the very victory of the Western 
economic global system has produced the emergence of what he calls the West’s 
ideological opposite. Sloterdijk calls it ‘Eurotaoism’.
Now, I am not at all sure that ‘Western Buddhism’ or ‘Western Taoism’ could 
be regarded as ‘hegemonic’ in any empirically verifiable sense, but I think the 
argument is interesting. It is possible to see how it might apply, where it might 
apply, and why it might apply. But whether, where, when, and to what extent 
it has been so is another matter altogether. Just because kung fu, yin-yangs, 
taiji, qigong and feng shui have been popular at different times and in different 
places, this does not somehow prove that Taoism or Buddhism are hegemonic 
ideologies.
Of course, establishing the facts of any matter has never stopped Žižek from 
making a sweeping statement or dramatic argument. And then there is the 
question of whether Žižek implies that we are supposed to regard this kind of 
Western Taoism as a good thing or a bad thing. The implication in the Žižekian 
argument is that, as an ideology arising within and because of changes in capi-
talism, this kind of Western Taoism must be a bad thing. But is it?
We could discuss this matter as long as we liked, but it might ultimately have 
the status of the exercises in which Mediaeval Christian theologians would 
reputedly debate how many angels could stand on the end of a pin. So, instead 
of arguing for or against Taoism, let us turn to our second question: The ques-
tion of whether Western Taoism could ever be the same as Eastern Taoism.
A Bit of East is East and West is West
On this matter, answers might be divided into two camps. One camp regards 
the transmission of ideas from East Asian philosophy and thought into the 
West to be entirely possible. The other regards it as impossible. One great exam-
ple of a writer who believed the transmission of ideas from East to West to be 
difficult but possible is Alan Watts. Watts rose to prominence in the decades 
after the Second World War with writings that tried to explain the spirit of Zen, 
Buddhism and Taoism to readers in English. Although not everyone has read 
Watts, one can often find traces of his accounts of East Asian ideas in the words 
of others. For instance, one of my own first encounters with the notion of the 
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Tao came via the writings of Bruce Lee, particularly his posthumous book, The 
Tao of Jeet Kune Do (1975). It was only much later that I read Watts.
As an ethnically Chinese martial artist, Bruce Lee was often called upon, 
when interacting with his Western students and other audiences, to play the 
role of the Taoist or Confucian sage. In fact, playing the wise man was a role 
that he often evidently relished, at least in his daily life (Preston 2007). In terms 
of his professional life, however, he sometimes complained about having been 
ethnically stereotyped and typecast in certain TV and film roles. But in books 
like his Tao of Jeet Kune Do, we find Lee using his most ‘oriental wise man’ tone 
of voice and mode of address. (Ironically, this is so even though what he advo-
cates in that book is actually a totally iconoclastic, non-traditional, deracinated 
and revolutionary approach to martial arts.)
But, given that Lee was ethnically Chinese, and his first language was Can-
tonese, we might assume his Eastern philosophy to be authentic, right? The 
irony here is that recent scholarship and archival work on Lee’s own personal 
library has shown is that he lifted most of his ancient Eastern wisdom straight 
from the pages of writers like Watts, along with other Western interlocutors 
(Bishop 2004). Famously, his favourite expression was the very Buddhist or 
Taoist sounding, ‘Walk on’. But this was a phrase that he picked up from an early 
20th Century English-language book on Buddhism, called Walk On (1947), 
written by the wonderfully named writer Christmas Humphreys (Humphreys 
1947; cf. Bowman 2013b). I mention all of this here to give an indication of the 
complexity of ideas like ‘transmission’, and also, of course, ‘authenticity’. I am 
not saying that Bruce Lee only read Western-authored English-language works 
on Chinese philosophy. But he certainly also did, and these informed his own 
discourse on Chinese philosophy. Whether such texts are right or wrong is a 
complex matter.
There are famous cases of radical misunderstandings of Chinese and Japa-
nese history, society and culture – misunderstandings that have made their way 
into European consciousness as facts and truths. There have been controversies 
around the interpretations present in works such as Eugen Herrigel’s Zen and 
the Art of Archery (1948), for instance, and in the supposedly authoritative and 
certainly enormous body of work on history, culture and civilization in China 
produced by sinologist Joseph Needham (Needham and Wang 1954, 1956, 
1959; Needham, Wang, and Lu 1971; Needham and Tsien, n.d.; Needham and 
Bray 1984; Needham, Harbsmeier, and Robinson 1998; Needham, Robinson, 
and Huang 2004).
Martial arts historian Stanley Henning, for one, points out that at times Need-
ham regards all Chinese martial arts as associated with Taoist health exercises. 
Hence – argues Henning – Needham radically misinterprets the complexity 
of the places of different martial arts in China in different places and different 
times. The effects of this misclassification of all martial arts as essentially being 
Taoist, Henning argues, leads Needham to fundamentally misunderstand some 
key aspects of Chinese culture and society (Henning 1999; Bowman 2015a).
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So, there are risks in the face of interpreting across cultures and across times 
and places. And this leads us to the second camp: The people who do not 
believe that transparent translation across distant cultures is possible.
One interesting representative of this camp would be the infamous Ger-
man philosopher Martin Heidegger (Heidegger 1971). Heidegger was very 
interested in Taoism. Some have even gone so far as to argue that Heidegger’s 
own trailblazing ‘Continental’ proto-deconstructive philosophy was explicitly 
indebted to Taoism and other kinds of East Asian philosophy (May 1996). Hei-
degger even reputedly harboured dreams of producing his own translation of 
the key text of Taoism, the Tao te Ching, or Dao de Jing. (This work is sometimes 
known as the Lao-Tzu, after the name of its attributed author – an author who 
some argue almost certainly did not write it.)
What is perhaps most interesting about Heidegger’s interest in Taoism is that 
he is said to have abandoned his dream of translating the Lao-Tzu/Tao because – 
even though this work is said to be one of the most frequently translated and re-
translated texts in the world – some have even claimed that it is the most trans-
lated text in the world – Heidegger regarded the task of translating it as being 
too difficult. In fact, in the end, despite all of his interests in Taoism and what 
he often referred to as ‘East Asian thought’ (or indeed the ‘East Asian lifeworld’ 
in toto), Heidegger came to regard the East and the West as fundamentally, 
constitutively alien to each other. He came to conclude that, on a fundamental 
and unsurpassable level, ‘East is East and West is West and ne’er the twain shall 
meet’ (Heidegger 1971; Sandford 2003).
A Bit of Difference
Because of this ambivalent relation, what we might see in the case of Heidegger 
is interesting. In fact, what might be learned from Heidegger’s relationship with 
Taoism is quite possibly exemplary of the matrix of possible relationships that 
Westerners have had with Taoism. Not just Taoism, of course. What I’m say-
ing about Taoism could stand for Western engagements with a wide range of 
aspects or essences of Chinese and East Asian thought.
Many have been interested in all of this, and heavily involved in it, precisely 
because it all seems so different. But, if it is all so profoundly different, then 
perhaps (as Heidegger thought) it may be just too different, meaning that West-
erners may never really ‘get it’.
To many of us today, this is a familiar but problematic idea which sometimes 
sounds romantic but which often smells a bit too much of essentialism. Essen-
tialism is one of the dirtiest of dirty academic words, even though essentialism 
in academia is not unusual. It is possible to find it all over the place, whether 
just below the surface or luxuriating in plain sight. There are still, for instance, 
academic studies being published that first propose and then explore the idea 
of the alleged fundamental difference or uniqueness of ‘the Chinese mind’.
Taoism in Bits 101
However, for the rest of us, to propose an essential difference between ethnic-
ities (or ethnonationalities), and to reify or dignify such a proposition through 
any kind of consideration, is deeply problematic. It just smacks too much of 
colonialist (or indeed apartheid) anthropology and psychology, approaches 
that were premised on the belief not only of racial difference but also (‘there-
fore’) of racial hierarchy.
To those of us who work in or around cultural studies – with all of the refined 
(or mandatory) sensitivity to issues of identity that this entails (particularly 
in terms of class, race, gender, and sexuality) – the proposition of an essential 
difference (between East and West, or Europe and China) may appear crass 
to the point of being offensive. It is certainly not an idea we expect to find in 
our academic field. Here, scholars are more interested in cultural ‘crossovers’, 
‘encounters’, ‘communications’ and ‘relations’ than they are in ideas of ‘abso-
lute essences’ and ‘unbridgeable differences’. Just like food, music, fashion, flu 
viruses, factories, or films, Taoism should surely be regarded as able to travel.
Can it travel, though? And, if it does travel, will it stay the same? If not, what 
would any change signify? If Taoism is taken to be a specific example of other-
ness (or at least a bit of a larger field of otherness), then the question is whether 
Westerners can really truly ‘get’ it. Heidegger thought not. He thought it was all 
just too different.
I’m dwelling on this for a moment because it points to a wider problem. To 
paraphrase a question once posed by Stuart Hall, if we are dealing with dif-
ference, if we are interested in difference, in respecting difference, trading in 
difference, and so on, then the question is: What do we think difference ‘is’? 
Does difference refer to something actually different, or are differences merely 
garnish to something essentially similar? Do we think cultural or ethnic others 
are actually significantly different from us, or do we think that we are all actu-
ally the same ‘deep down’? Does difference mean different, or does difference 
mean same? What does difference mean? What does difference do?
Many – including many in cultural studies – solve this by imputing a univer-
sal value to ‘being human’, whilst adding that what produces cultural difference 
is different cultural contexts. But, whether difference is essential or entirely con-
textual, what does it imply for any ‘encounter’, ‘crossover’ and ‘relation’?
Heidegger thought that there were absolute and unbridgeable differences 
between what he called the East Asian lifeworld and the Euro-American one. 
As mentioned, this may sound very bad to our contemporary anti-essentialist 
ears. In this case, it seems all the worse since many people know that Heidegger 
was notoriously a fully paid up member of the Nazi party and that he never 
renounced or even really reflected on this matter publicly after the war.
But, if we bracket off everything we don’t like about Heidegger for the 
moment, it is possible to reformulate his position in apparently much more 
palatable ways. For instance, in cultural theory it is not uncommon to hear the 
idea that all translations from one context to another ought to be regarded as 
mistranslations, or at best partial and biased and incomplete translations; that all 
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crossovers should be regarded as transformations and that all encounters are in 
some sense asymptotic. And so on.
To poststructuralist ears, formulations like this don’t sound at all essential-
ist or fundamentalist. Rather, they sound quite subtle and complex – thor-
oughly deconstructive, even. It is a tenet of deconstruction that all trans-
lation is mistranslation. Similarly, Walter Benjamin argued that the best 
translations are transformations. And the influential psychoanalyst Jacques 
Lacan often seemed to regard all of the main kinds of encounters in life as 
being asymptotic.
Derrida himself was always careful to distance himself from any kind of 
Heideggerian position vis-à-vis difference as absolute or essential. Indeed, for 
Derrida, the obligation of the critical thinker was precisely to avoid collapsing 
difference into opposition. All differences are contextual, contingent effects or 
institutions. There is no opposition between East and West because these terms 
and clusters of concepts, notions and ideas are principally the effects of particu-
lar ways of thinking more than anything else. So, rather than any kind of retreat 
from difference, one can find in the work of this father of poststructuralism a 
principled openness to alterity, difference, encounter and change.
Nonetheless, in one of his earliest and arguably most important works, Of 
Grammatology (Derrida 1976), Derrida effectively inaugurates deconstruction 
by drawing a line. This is a line between the kinds of languages that he will deal 
with and speak about (European languages), on the one hand, and, on the other 
hand, the kinds of language that he will not (surprise, surprise: Chinese). Der-
rida draws this line because, he proposes, the written Chinese language is just 
too different to be dealt with in the same kind of way that he is going to deal 
with European speech and writing.
Much has been written about this undeconstructive inauguration of decon-
struction, in which Derrida smoothly slices out a distinction between Europe 
and China, and in which ‘China’ stands for that which he cannot and will not 
try to think, as the outside of the limits of Europe. I mention it here merely to 
illustrate the ways that even an avowed openness to the ideas of alterity, differ-
ence, encounter, crossover, translation, relation, and so on, can be premised on 
or can flip over into their supposed opposite.
We will soon turn more directly to Taoism. But first I want to emphasise 
that I have started from such philosophers not out of ignorance or contempt 
for other kinds of Western engagements – or non-engagements – with either 
‘Chinese thought’ in general or ‘Taoism’ specifically, but rather, to indicate the 
complexity of the question of a Western interest in Taoism. Put bluntly: If this 
kind of thing messes with the heads of both the daddy and the granddaddy of 
poststructuralism, then what other kinds of mess might we expect?
I’ll mention some of these messes. But before we leave Heidegger I want to note 
the mess as he perceived it. Although he believed in an essential Europe (the pin-
nacle being, of course, German language philosophy), and although be believed 
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in an ‘East Asian lifeworld’ that was essentially inaccessible to Westerners, he also 
believed that Westernisation was ultimately destroying East Asian alterity.
The effect of Western technology – Heidegger singles out the film camera 
– was to draw the world into what he called a Europeanised or Americanised 
‘objectness’. With this, he refers to the growth and spread and effects of Western 
conceptuality, ways of thinking, ways of relating technically to the world, ways 
of capturing and manipulating the world, and so on.
Again, this might sound deeply problematic and Eurocentric. It may roman-
ticise the other, as something essentially vanishing. But this kind of argument 
is not a world away from some of the strongest impulses in postcolonial theory, 
which regard Euro-American cultural and ideological hegemony as being car-
ried not just by gunboats and unequal trade deals but by everything from film 
and media to language itself and even – or especially – the most subtle and sub-
terranean aspects of the spread of an originally European educational structure 
and syllabus. (Along with the obvious examples of the effects of the spread of 
Western medicine and Western science, Dipesh Chakrabarty famously points 
to the matter of the teaching of history. Along with the nation, history is a 
Euro-American concept, Chakrabarty argues. The idea that every nation must 
be a nation with a history ultimately means that Europe is always shown to be 
the origin and the destination. History always becomes the history of Europe. 
Emerging nations follow Europe (Chakrabarty 1992).)
In this kind of perspective, the West arguably always obliterates or trans-
forms that which it encounters. So, in any encounter with Taoism, Taoism is 
obliterated, or transformed, and hence lost. This is because it must be translated 
into an alien conceptual universe.
Thus, in the West, Taoism has been regarded as alternative or even subtly oppo-
sitional to Judeo-Christian and even Islamic traditions, in that it is not a ‘religion 
of the book’. It has been interpreted as a kind of pantheism, or as a kind of stoic 
atheism – a kind of religion without religion. It has been regarded as a kind of 
environmentalism, a kind of green ethos or ideology. It has been regarded as the 
quintessence of ancient Chinese wisdom. It has also been regarded as a kind of 
anti-Confucian and hence anti-establishment Chinese philosophy. It has been 
regarded as involving mystical mumbo-jumbo and bizarre rituals. It has also 
been regarded as an entirely rational and reasonable laissez-faire individualism, 
organised by the idea of following the path of least resistance.
There is a lot more that could be said about all of this. Even these many words 
barely scratch the surface of some of the matters that arise here. But, for now, 
suffice it to say that the idea that we may be barred access to ‘the truth’ or ‘the 
reality’ of something is very familiar in contemporary cultural theory. And, 
most importantly, it is not an idea that is reserved for application to texts and 
phenomena from ‘other cultures’. It is an idea that has been applied to texts 
and phenomena from all cultures, including – especially perhaps – those of 
our own.
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Getting it, a Bit
I tend to accept the idea that there is no simple or unmediated access to the 
supposed truth of a text and that interpretations of texts and phenomena are 
contextual, conditional, changeable, and revisable. But this does not mean that 
anything can just be anything. Interpretations are fought over, fought for, and 
often strongly policed. Just think about the violence that has ensued when dif-
ferent sects have emerged within and around Christianity by interpreting key 
texts, like the Gospels, differently. So, I tend to accept the notion that no one 
has direct or unmediated access to the truth of anything. But the question is 
whether certain Western interpretations of Taoism are obliterations of it, or a 
transformation or warping away from some kind of essence. Is the true essence 
of Taoism simply foreclosed or barred from access by Westerners?
I can accept the idea that I have been raised in a culture in which I have not on 
a daily basis been exposed to Taoist figures, rituals, sensibilities, words, phrases, 
legends, allusions, quotations, architectures, objects, practices and practition-
ers. So, in this sense of context, habitus, texture of life, structure of feeling, his-
tory and cultural literacy, the claim that I’m ‘never going to get it’ is fine.
But what about the supposed messages of Taoism – the lessons to be learned 
of or from Taoism? (In semiotic terms, the signified content or the final signi-
fiers of Taoism.) Can these not be ‘got’?
If the lessons of Taoism are simply or entirely conceptual or communicated in 
language, and if they are only to be accessed via the texts of Taoism, then argu-
ably all of the complications and caveats and problems and aporias of cross-
cultural translation that some call the ‘hermeneutic circle’ will arise here. So, we 
will definitely face some serious obstacles. Cross-cultural translation across vast 
distances of place and time is fraught with hurdles, barriers, mirages, dead ends, 
wrong trees, halls of mirrors and red herrings. This is because we always inter-
pret from where we are and from what we know – which means that a Western 
discourse about Eastern things may always boil down to an internal Western 
monologue about a totally invented non-entity (Said 1978; Sandford 2003).
But the Tao te Ching seems absolutely clear on one or two key points. The first 
is that ‘the Tao that can be spoken is not the Tao’. The second (possibly related 
point) is that spoken or written language is neither the medium of transmission 
nor of knowing either the Tao or Taoism. Perhaps the most famous words in the 
Tao te Ching are ‘he who knows does not speak; he who speaks does not know’.
As Alan Watts himself once noted at the start of one of his early books on the 
subject, many people have taken these words to mean that the effort of com-
munication is pointless, or ultimately doomed to failure. Watts disagreed with 
this interpretation and thought that it was worth the effort to try (Watts 1990).
This is not least because it is possible to talk about something without falling 
into the trap of believing that you are thereby doing it, living it, experiencing it, 
or conjuring it up, in reality. Indeed, perhaps discussing, listening, or even just 
‘thinking about’ may be a precondition of experiencing or doing. Or at least a 
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supplement. It certainly seems that Taoism involves a communicable philoso-
phy or a principled stance in relation to the matter of doing. Western authors 
have tried to express it through all manner of poetic renderings of different 
topics, subjects and themes, from archery to fighting to flower arranging to 
motorcycle maintenance and so on.
My own encounter with a practice that conveyed some kind of understand-
ing (through both doing and feeling) of Taoist principles was taijiquan. My 
own sense over time came to be that the inevitable and necessary lessons to be 
learned in taiji practice – especially via the interactive partner-work of push-
hands practice – offered me a crystal-clear kind of education in Taoism. This is 
not to say that taijiquan offered me everything. It did not make me an expert 
on Taoism. But the interaction of hard and soft, positive and negative, fullness 
and emptiness, the logic of non-clinging, non-ego, non-striving, yielding, and 
the constant apperception of change and transition all led me to think that after 
years of taiji practice I really did ‘get’ the principles of Taoism – at least a bit. At 
least that bit.
But further reflection reminds me that I have also rejected other bits. For 
instance, supplementary parts of the practice of taijiquan involve various stand-
ing, breathing, concentration, relaxation and awareness practices, referred to as 
a number of things, such as qigong, nei-gong, zhang zhuang, and so on. Some 
of these I have always accepted fully – the stretching-and-relaxing breathing 
and postural exercises called ba duan jin [pa tuan chin], for example. I have 
never had any problem with these. Standing post qigong [zhang zhuang] too – I 
am fine with that. But the exercises that allegedly circulate qi internally through 
meridians in the body…I have always found within myself a profound resist-
ance to these. Whenever I do them, I do them somewhat cynically. And, to be 
honest, I have all but abandoned even thinking about doing them. They seem 
to rely on a kind of belief that is just too much like religious faith for my liking.
But, like someone who has renounced their religion, I still often worry and 
wonder: If I have rejected this bit, what does it do to the rest? I know that I 
only dabble in bits of the entire possible taiji world – I do the solo form, part-
ner-work, any kind of sparring, some stretching exercises and some standing 
qigong – but I also know that I have abandoned another huge bit.
So, even within the confines of my own limited experience of one syllabus 
of a more or less Taoist and more or less (once) Chinese practice, I know I 
don’t have it all. And, what is more, I also know that, besides the ‘all’ that I am 
aware I do not know, there is a whole lot more out there – many more ‘alls’ and 
‘everythings’ – much more than I have ever even imagined. I console myself by 
telling myself (sometimes in the manner of an old Chinese sage) that this is true 
of all things. For, could we really ever have it all, or know it all, or get it all? Is 
the ‘all’, the totality, even a real thing? Or is it not, in fact, just an effect, either 
of language or of our experience of a certain state of play? The state of play as 
we perceive it is always determined by the circulation of ideas and practices, 
which themselves derive from different kinds of institutions and investments. 
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Institutions and interpretations are variable and contingent, and they produce 
different effects.
Just as I began with reference to such vague and shifting supposed entities 
as ‘East’ and ‘West’, so we should be aware of what I characterized in Chapter 
Two as the shifting and drifting apparent referents of our focus, their different 
meanings in different times and places, the genetic mutations and quantum 
leaps that occur in ‘cultural translation’ from one time to another, one place to 
another, one language to another, even one utterance or instance to the next, 
and the rather frustrating fact that, despite our eternal desire to see unity and 
simplicity, cultures and practices are always ‘in bits’, always in process, incom-
plete, disputed and contested. As I read it, the one always gives birth to the ten 
thousand things and you can never therefore pin down the one.
So, this means both that no one’s ever going to get it but also that anyone can 
get it – but really only a bit.
The next chapter will consider some of the consequences of this.
CHAPTER 6
Mindfulness and Madness in  
Martial Arts Philosophy
The previous chapters have argued for the inevitability of divergent inter-
pretations both of theory (or ‘philosophy’) and propriety in practice, in and 
around martial arts. This chapter enquires into what some of the consequences 
may be as a result of the inevitability of different interpretations – or selective 
(‘partial’) constructions – of ‘philosophy’ in and around martial arts. In line 
with the  de- and reconstructive argument about interpretations and cultures 
always  emerging out of ‘incomplete’ contingent encounters between chance, 
 contingent or select partial elements, the chapter first seeks to relate the theme 
of ‘Chinese philosophy’ to the Dutch word ‘rust’.
To readers unfamiliar with this Dutch word, such a combination may seem 
odd or eccentric. However, it should be remembered that what may seem 
bizarre in one context may feel natural, obvious, inevitable or even necessary 
in another. In other words, just because the attempt to express ideas of Chinese 
philosophy or Chinese martial arts in terms of a specifically Dutch term may 
seem gratuitous or inexplicable in many contexts, in the Netherlands, such an 
act could be regarded as anything from totally apt to effectively inescapable.
Of course, full disclosure of my reasons for doing this would have to include 
mentioning the fact that I was invited to speak about martial arts and Eastern 
philosophy at a festival of philosophy in Leuven, a festival whose  overarching 
theme was precisely this Dutch word, ‘rust’. Leuven was a city that I had 
long wanted to visit – not least because it is the place in which the wonder-
fully  subversive educator Joseph Jacotot (1770-1840) famously came up with 
his conviction that people can teach what they don’t actually know and that 
learners do not really need teachers (see Rancière 1991). This was helpful for 
me because I am not a philosopher, my knowledge of Eastern philosophy is 
 woefully general, and I don’t speak Dutch. In fact, the first time I heard about 
the Dutch word ‘rust’ was when I was invited to Leuven to speak about it.
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Given my obvious lack of qualifications to speak about any of these things, 
some may regard my acceptance of the invitation to be the height of arrogance. 
However, given my arguments so far throughout this book – combined with 
those of Joseph Jacotot (and latterly his key interlocutor Jacques Rancière) – 
accepting the invitation qua challenge seemed appropriate. For, if Jacotot was 
right to argue that teachers can teach things they don’t actually know, then all 
could be well. By the same token, even if not, according to the rest of that same 
argument, no one really needed me to teach them anything anyway, and they 
would definitely still learn something.
To begin: As already mentioned, one of the first things relevant here that I 
didn’t know in advance was the Dutch word rust. So, I needed to look it up. 
To do so, I duly turned to the OED, which presented me with a phenomenal 
amount of etymological information,1 most of which I could do absolutely 
nothing with. So, next, I just Googled the word, using search terms like ‘Dutch 
word rust’ and ‘meaning of Dutch word rust’. Some cross-referencing across 
 1 Brit. /rʌst/
  U.S. /rəst/
  Forms:
  α. OE–15 rost, OE– rust, ME roste, ME–15 ruste.
  Frequency (in current use):
  Origin: A word inherited from Germanic.
  Etymology: Cognate with West Frisian rust, roast, Middle Dutch roest, rost (Dutch roest), Old 
Saxon rost (Middle Low German rost, rust), Old High German rost (Middle High German rost, 
German Rost), Faroese rustur,  Norwegian rust, Old Swedish rost, rust, ruste, roster (Swedish 
rost ), early modern Danish rost, rust, røst (Danish rust), probably < a suffixed (or  perhaps 
compounded) form of an ablaut variant of the same Indo- European base as red adj. and n. 
(compare rud n.1 probably showing the same ablaut grade), hence with reference originally 
to the red colour of rust. Use in sense A. 6 is also widespread among the other Germanic lan-
guages.
 Different formations also probably ultimately < the same Indo-European base as red adj. 
and n. and also with the meaning ‘rust’ are shown by Old  Icelandic ryð, ryðr, Old High Ger-
man rosomo, and, outside the Germanic languages, by Lithuanian ru¯dys, Old Church Slavonic 
ru˘žda (Old Russian r''ža, rža, Russian rža), classical Latin ro¯bı¯go¯, ru¯bı¯go¯.
 In Old English a strong masculine or neuter a -stem. The Old Saxon and Old High German 
forms (and likewise Middle Dutch rost ) show the expected West Germanic lowering of *u 
> *o in an a -stem formation *rusta-, which is probably also shown by the (rare) early Old 
English form rost. The β. forms suggest the existence of a by-form with a long vowel in Old 
English, although both the date and the mechanism by which such a form arose are unclear. 
The modern form rust with short vowel could then result from this by-form, with shorten-
ing in late Old English before a consonant cluster. However, a form with short u could also 
have existed earlier, since exceptions to the West Germanic lowering of *u > *o before a 
back vowel are not uncommon in Old English. The vowel of Middle Dutch, Dutch roest is not 
satisfactorily explained. (The modern West Frisian form roast shows the expected develop-
ment from West Germanic short *u in this position; the West Frisian form rust probably also 
ultimately reflects a development from *rusta-, rather than from a form with a long vowel.)
 For evidence of currency of forms showing the (diphthongal) reflex of a long vowel in 
English regional (northern) use in the 20th cent. see H. Orton Phonology of a South Durham 
Dialect (1933) §133.
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different sites reassured me that I was finding reliable information, so I felt I 
was learning more and more about the word and its usage and meanings. One 
site told me this:
English words for the Dutch word rust calmness dead ease half time 
hush imperturbability intermission let-up lie-off pause peace placidity 
quiescence quiescency quiet quietness quietude recess reposal repose 
rest silence tranquility tranquillity wait at ease2
Another site concurred with all of this, telling me that ‘rust’ means: ‘Break; 
calm; ease; half‐time; pause; peace; placidity; quiescence; quiescency; quiet; 
quietness; quietude; recumbency; repose; respite; rest; surcease; tranquillity’.3 
And it also told me how to use the word, in the imperative, as a command – 
‘Rust! ’ – which means, ‘Stand at ease!’
At that point, I felt I could rest easy (or rust easy), safe in the knowledge that 
I had just become a bit of an expert on the word, even though I didn’t have a 
teacher and couldn’t otherwise speak Dutch. Even better, I could now see an 
immediate or obvious potential connection between ‘rust’, ‘Eastern philosophy’ 
and martial arts. For, as is commonly believed, there has long been a connection 
made between East Asian martial arts and supposedly Taoist or Zen Buddhist 
ideas of calmness and tranquillity. Of course, much of this connection is based 
on myths (and mainly media myths, at that). Nor does everything covered in 
the meanings of ‘rust’ that could apply to martial arts necessarily have to refer 
to either Taoism, Zen or Buddhism. Anyone who has ever done any wrestling 
or ground-fighting learns quickly not to panic or tense up when rolling around 
on the ground with an opponent who is trying to choke or lock or pin or hold 
or strangle you out. Beginners tense up to high heaven and panic and expend 
enormous amounts of energy. The more advanced you become, the more you 
stay calm, relaxed, tranquil, and the more you can (ultimately) flow.
In such martial arts, the ability to flow is the objective, i.e., not to get knotted 
up wherever the opponent is trying to take control or issue force and instead 
to flow (or crash) around or through a problem and turn the tables. If we are 
face-to-face and you push forward into me and I push forward into you then 
whoever is stronger will prevail. But if you push forward and I flow around that 
then you end up pushing nothing and I should be able to capitalize on that – to 
the extent that I can flow. And the extent to which I can flow is the extent to 
which I am relaxed and calm in a very particular way.
As Bruce Lee famously put it, ‘Be water’, because water can flow and it can 
crash, it can push and it can pull, but you can’t grab it with your fist and if you 
try to punch it you won’t hurt it; it fills any space and passes through any gap, 
 2 http://www.wordhippo.com/what-is/the-meaning-of/dutch-word-rust.html
 3 http://www.majstro.com/Web/Majstro/bdict.php?gebrTaal=eng&bronTaal=dut&doelTaal=
eng&teVertalen=rust
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but try to wrestle it and you end up wrestling nothing. (It’s a wonderful image. 
But I would add that even water can only be like water when it is not too hot 
and not too cold. If it’s too hot, it becomes vapour or steam and loses some-
thing; if it’s too cold, it becomes frozen, tense, rigid and brittle.) Perhaps in all 
martial arts relaxation is the thing. Calmness of mind. Acuity of conscious-
ness. Clarity of intent. Fluidity of body. Each martial art has a different way 
of being relaxed and in flow, a different ideal that practitioners aspire to. The 
boxer, kickboxer, Thai boxer, karateka, escrimador or kung fu hard stylist have 
certain kinds of ways of flowing – combining striking techniques fluidly, rolling 
with the punches, capitalising on the gaps and opportunities provided by the 
other, smashing their way through. The judoka, wrestler and jujitsuka rely on 
the same principle, although it is very differently actualised.
But the premise, aim and ideal is always calm relaxation, if not simply 
tranquillity.
Tranquillity is normally associated with the ‘most internal’ of what they 
(problematically) call the ‘internal’ martial arts. The ultimate example, of 
course, is taijiquan. But many anecdotes from many different martial arts styles 
convey a sense that the highest-level practitioners of almost any martial art can 
convey an air of tranquillity when fighting.
Training Rust
Still, taiji is certainly a notable case insofar as its training is designed to train 
relaxation, calmness and a great deal of what is conveyed by the Dutch word 
rust. Advanced-level taiji practitioners spar like they are strolling, not running, 
charging or dancing. It’s like they are simply carrying out a task that they have 
done countless times and it’s simply second nature. So, watching them deal 
with opponents is like watching someone steering a boat, flying a kite, mow-
ing a lawn, folding laundry, or rolling up a cable; or a fisherman casting and 
 reeling. It’s a very simple, very unglamorous, very relaxed, very natural, yet 
very skilful thing.
I have occasionally had the pleasure of being the one who is folding and 
 felling opponents like a laundry worker folding and flattening out sheets. And 
when you are in that zone, that state of flow, it is very much like that – just 
something that you are doing; pleasurable, but natural – no real effort; no real 
striving, planning, pursuing, just feeling and doing. Of course, I have much 
more often been on the receiving end, against someone who wants to treat me 
like some laundry that needs to be straightened and folded and flattened out. 
A popular martial art saying is ‘you either win or you learn’. And I have done a 
lot of learning.
And not just in taiji. I have been folded and flattened in many different 
 martial arts styles over many years. Occasionally, it has been me doing the 
 folding and flattening, and that is always a very nice treat. But none of the other 
Mindfulness and Madness in Martial Arts Philosophy  111
kinds of sparring that I know involve activities that are as necessarily calm and 
tranquil as taiji. Doubtless, this is connected with the unique and uniquely 
philosophical way that taiji training is approached. In it, all attention is put on 
teaching  relaxation. But this is not quite as simple as it may sound. It is actually 
surprisingly hard to teach relaxation in taiji, and the type of relaxation that is 
the ultimate goal is not simple relaxation. It takes different forms, from mental 
relaxation, to the hyper-awareness of tension and looseness in the body (to ena-
ble higher levels of sensitivity and responsiveness), to the ability to be relaxed 
in otherwise difficult postures or transitions, and through to the cultivation 
of what they call ‘sung jin’, or relaxed force in the application of  techniques. 
There are other dimensions to taiji relaxation or restfulness, too, but the point 
is: Learning it all is no simple matter. It takes a great deal of patience, com-
mitment, and trust – trust in your teacher, trust in the investment of time and 
energy, and trust that it will all pay off or yield dividends.
In many respects, rather than being anything like lying down and  relaxing, 
training for this kind of relaxation is actually analogous to weightlifting, strength 
training, or bodybuilding. In weightlifting for strength or bodybuilding, a key 
principle is ‘progressive resistance’: Over time, you put more and more weight 
on the bar so that the resistance placed on the muscles  progressively increases. 
In response to increasing demands, and in conjunction with adequate rest 
and nutrition, the muscles, tendons and ligaments, etc., respond – by growing 
stronger, often larger, denser, and so on.
Despite appearances, training in and around taiji is similar. However, instead 
of external resistance, there is more a kind of progressive intensification of ‘rust’ – a 
‘progressive res[t]istance’, so to speak. This progressive intensification is  centred 
on awareness of posture and breath. More refined awareness of posture goes 
hand in hand with more intensified relaxation. More refined and intensified 
awareness and control of breath leads to all sorts of unexpected health and skill 
consequences. On this level, I would recommend it to anyone. Taiji and qigong 
can become quite a remarkable combination for producing a sense of healthi-
ness. But the idea that taiji and qigong are ‘simply’ all about rest or relaxation 
is misleading. As with any martial art, taiji requires really devoted and focused 
training. You have to learn how to be relaxed. You have to work hard to take 
control of your mind and relax it. This is not simple. It is not simple or easy 
to make yourself train every day when a lot of that training involves standing 
stock still for half an hour or more in a relatively awkward position, focusing 
on your breathing and posture and sensations – especially when you have jobs 
to do, the clock is ticking, there is work to do, and so many other demands. You 
have to believe in it and trust in it.
So, when it comes to the relaxation required in successfully mastering taiji, 
or maybe any physically and mentally demanding skill-set, to speak of ‘rest’ 
is kind of correct, yet also not quite right. I guess calmness would be the best 
term to apply across the board. When you’re not in some sense calm, you’re 
probably not going to be functioning at your best. This is so even though some 
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approaches to combat training insist on forcing practitioners into extremes of 
adrenaline, fear, and beyond sustainable states of exhaustion. But, again, the 
reason for this is to get used to it so as to learn how to manage panic and terror 
and exhaustion – in short, once again, so that you become, in a very particular 
way, calm, even when operating at high levels of stress.
Zen Again
Of course, as mentioned earlier, many East Asian martial arts are associated 
with lofty philosophical and cultural ideas and ideals, such as those associated 
with Zen Buddhism or Taoism. However, I always hesitate before accepting 
associations like these. This is for two reasons. The first is because such associa-
tions tend to come from dubious media myths and often have little historical 
basis. The second is because there is rarely to never any observable Zen (Chan) 
or Taoist dimension to them – at least no more than there is in anything else.
Despite this caveat, I still also think that it is easy (and justifiable) to see 
how and why something like taiji could be regarded as Taoist. Even though it 
is possible to refute most fantasy histories of taiji, it is undoubtedly the case 
that everything in its logic of training and application can be (and normally is) 
expressed in terms of yin and yang plus a range of other terms deriving from 
Taoist cosmology and principles. However, other than for internal  Chinese 
martial arts like taiji – possibly also aikido – I really don’t know how far it is 
possible to claim that other martial arts are ‘philosophical’ in the same way.
This is so even though the most popular story of the origins of ‘all’ kung fu 
states that kung fu originated as a consequence of Zen Buddhist training in 
the Shaolin Temple in China. Of course, this is a myth – indeed, perhaps it is 
an almost perfect myth. It has a grain of truth: Self-defence was required at 
the Temple, as it was everywhere, and over time the temple gained a fearsome 
reputation. But, as an origin myth, it is easy to refute. However, even though the 
myth is easy to debunk, it keeps coming back. Like a phoenix, or a Terminator, 
the myth of Shaolin Temple Zen training as the origin of kung fu keeps coming 
back, no matter how well you think you have killed it. This is why people seem 
compelled to associate East Asian martial arts with pacifism in general and 
Buddhism in particular. But my claim here is that all of this is just a ‘bolt-on’ to 
bolster the myth.
The reason I want to make such a claim here is to suggest that mythic 
 narratives and claims about moral or ethical codes are not what we should be 
looking at or thinking about when we enquire about the ‘philosophy’ of this or 
that martial art. All ethics or moralities or mores are optional extras. Rather 
than looking for philosophy in the ‘blah blah blah’ that so often surrounds 
martial arts, what I want to suggest is that the philosophy of a martial art is 
embodied, in particular ways. All martial arts and approaches to fighting are 
the manifestation of a kind of theory, or philosophy, or ideology, or fantasy. 
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The moves, the training, the sparring, they all imply either a conscious or an 
unconscious ‘ theory’ or ‘philosophy’ of all sorts of things: What violence is, 
what combat is, what works best, how bodies work and interact, what teaching 
and learning should be like, what society is like, what the place of the individual 
is within society, and so on. All martial arts, from the most supposedly ancient 
to the most avowedly modern, are based on tacit, implicit or explicit premises, 
hypotheses, arguments, theories, fantasies or philosophies about the world, 
society, and our place and responsibilities within it.4
Philosophize-a-babble
As mentioned in an earlier chapter, a friend of mine once told me that her kung 
fu instructor would often sit them all down and give them lectures about the 
philosophy of their kung fu style. Do such lectures make that kung fu style itself 
philosophical? I would suggest not.
We could sit down and philosophize anything – everything – that we do. But 
in what way does that mean that it ‘is’ philosophical? As I have said, I think 
that taiji ‘is philosophical’ because it actualizes Taoist principles. It is a physical 
expression of them (among other things). In a similar way, I think that many 
other martial arts are based on implicit or explicit theories about the particular 
kind of toughness and calmness that need to be cultivated.
Consider this. In karate they ‘kiai’. Taiji has no ‘kiai’. This could be said to 
be an embodied dimension of the ‘philosophy’ underpinning each practice. In 
some martial arts training, what is valued and what is trained is speed, or flow, 
or power, or sensitivity, or athleticism, and so on. I’ve never made a noise in taiji 
– apart from maybe a yelp of pain here or there. But almost every punch I have 
ever thrown at a pad in escrima training has been accompanied by some kind of 
guttural shout or grunt or hiss – expressing and intensifying the intent to smash 
the target as hard as possible. So, there’s something there – whether you call it 
a philosophy or a theory or psychological attitude to be trained and developed.
There are also principles that could (some would argue should) be trained 
across all martial arts, which could be called philosophical. One is ‘go weak 
for technique’, as in: When you are training, always train as if you are weaker 
than your opponent. That way, you have to develop superior technique. For, if 
it’s just strength against strength, then the stronger will always win. Maybe this 
kind of attitude could be called almost Taoist. Or maybe it could just be called 
 4 Is it philosophical to say that a person has the right to defend themselves? You may say yes or 
no or maybe. You may even begin to wonder what it is that makes something a philosophical 
question at all. And that’s all good. Jacques Derrida regularly suggested that the question of 
what is and what is not a philosophical question is actually a question that is always at the 
heart of philosophy. So Derrida saw everything as philosophical. (And, of course, we may add, 
therefore nothing is uniquely or specifically or only philosophical.)
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universal. Or maybe Taoist principles are universal. Certainly, taiji advocates 
such an approach to the most refined degree.
Yet, I still see no necessary Zen Buddhism in kung fu or karate or judo or 
jujitsu. And I actually cannot comprehend why something like taekwondo 
ever even makes any reference to the yin-yang symbol. For, even though many 
 martial arts make connections to the yin-yang, I firmly believe that this is 
 principally because the yin-yang is a cool-looking symbol. It often has next 
to no functional connection with what they do. In other words, I am suggest-
ing that the connections that are often assumed to exist between supposedly 
‘Eastern’ martial arts and so-called ‘Eastern philosophy’ are both not essential 
and often garbled and convoluted. In fact, I will go further and state that these 
connections often owe more to mass media myths and fantasies than anything 
specific to the practices themselves.
But does that mean that I am saying that there are some ‘truly’ philosophical 
arts like taiji, which are therefore ‘good’ (because they are philosophical in my 
apparently preferred sense), while there are other, maybe modern, corporate 
and profit-focused arts, like MMA or taekwondo, which are somehow therefore 
‘bad’ (because they are not philosophical in my apparently preferred sense)? 
I’m going to say ‘No’. I’m not saying that – for lots of reasons. More reasons 
than there is time or space even to gesture to here and now. Everything can be 
philosophized. Everything we do is the manifestation of some kind of implicit 
or explicit theory or outlook or philosophy. But, even if something is strongly 
connected with a philosophy that you or I may personally prefer, this does not 
necessarily make such practices ‘good’. Calmness does not mean good. Nor 
does calmness mean moral, safe, sane or superior.
Madfulness Meditation
Consider this. What is it that makes so many people think that things like yoga, 
taiji and qigong are somehow simply or necessarily good? I would  propose that 
one of the main things that leads to this conclusion relates to the many  regular 
associations made between these kinds of practices and the idea of ‘good 
health’: Mental health, mind-body awareness, mindfulness, work/life balance, 
and so on.
Now, as I’ve already confessed, as a practitioner of taiji and qigong, on some 
level I really do believe in the ‘positive mental health’ narrative that surrounds 
internal martial arts and yoga. But, as a practitioner of other martial arts, and 
also as someone who sometimes has a philosophical bent, and certainly as 
someone who watches YouTube and so on, I also wonder whether sometimes 
such positive mental health and supposed awareness come at a cost of positive 
self-delusion and a particular lack of awareness.
For instance, many (perhaps most) taiji practitioners believe in magic. Some 
martial artists believe you can hit someone without actually making physical 
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contact with them, like some kind of Jedi Knight. The magic conduit for this 
and many other things is called chi (qi) – which is an eminently magic proposi-
tion. Nonetheless, many people believe in qi. But for what reasons, on what evi-
dence, and to what ends? Much of this may be harmless. But, at the same time, 
videos abound on YouTube of hapless qi and ki masters who have done things 
like challenge MMA and other full contact martial artists to fights only to be 
battered black and blue by them. There are also embarrassing videos aplenty in 
which poor deluded students bounce and leap about in response to their mas-
ter’s touch, or gesture. Similarly, many people spend long hours and days and 
weeks and months and years and decades engaged in practices ranging from 
qigong to push-hands to point sparring and so on believing that they are pre-
paring themselves for the reality of combat. In short, there are many kinds of 
martial arts self-delusion, all of which I’m sure are also accompanied by many 
kinds of awareness and insight.
In the wider cultural ideological realm, what are we really to make of employ-
ers offering their overworked and stressed out employees free taiji or mind-
fulness meditation classes? Do firms lay on such services out of the goodness 
of their hearts? Or might there be other agendas? We might ask the same of 
the state promotion of martial arts in schools across Asia. Is this motivated 
by philosophical ideals any loftier than nationalism? And how many financial 
traders, speculators, yuppies and bankers have believed that they are most in 
touch with their own fundamental truth and reality when they are engaged in 
their early morning yoga or meditation, and not when they are speculating 
on futures? Perhaps at the most extreme end of things: How many sociopaths 
or psychopaths or misanthropes have either prepared for or dealt with their 
atrocious acts by meditating? (Anders Behring Breivik prepared himself for 
what has been called one of the most devastating acts of mass murder by an 
individual in history on July 22, 2011, by undertaking a long period of training 
in what he called ‘Bushido meditation’. I will return to this in the next section.) 
Or, at another extreme: Consider the fact that many martial artists of the late 
19th Century anti-foreigner Boxer Uprising in China believed that their ‘iron 
shirt’ kung fu training would make them impervious to bullets. In many differ-
ent kinds of cases, what seems to sustain and nourish people in many martial 
arts activities are fantasies about tapping into or communing or connecting 
with something. Very often, this involves fantasies about an ancient mystical 
truth. The fantasy is a fantasy of something that may well never have existed. Qi 
and chakras and meridians may well be tenets of faith, and the internal martial 
arts training which focuses on moving qi through meridians may well be an 
exemplary exercise in supreme self-delusion.
Or it may not. Maybe you can never know something unless you try it. Or, 
maybe more than ‘trying’, maybe you can never truly know something unless 
you’ve mastered it. But maybe trying to master something like this will be the 
very thing that pulls you into a world of self-delusion. Maybe this is particularly 
so because to try to master anything like this will always require having some 
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kind of faith and some kind of belief. You cannot maintain qigong meditation 
or taiji slowness training without some element of belief, some element of faith, 
some element of trust in something – whether that be a teacher, or a promise of 
health or invincibility or longevity.
Philosophers from Kierkegaard to Derrida have reflected on the decision – 
the decision to do something, to try something, to make a certain move, to 
reach a certain conclusion – and they have called it ‘a moment of madness’, a 
leap of faith, a step into the unknown, the abyss, the void. Take the blue pill or 
take the red pill; have faith in an idea or an argument or theory or a philosophy. 
Persuade yourself to stand in static meditation every day for half an hour or 
more. Practice forms over and over again for the rest of your life. Maybe this is 
the path. Or maybe you’re swimming on dry land, believing it will help you to 
swim up a strong river; or maybe you’re just playing air guitar, believing that 
you are turning yourself into the new Jimmy Hendrix.
What is sensible and what is not? Listening to someone or walking away? 
What if they claim to have all the answers, to be the experts, to know the truth? 
We know we should eye such people with suspicion. But what if someone told 
you at the outset that they were going to hold forth on something they might 
actually know nothing about – like how a word from a language they can’t 
speak relates to a world of philosophy they only know in the most woefully 
general of ways? What would you do in that situation? What did you do in that 
situation? Did you trust? Or did you rust?
Philosology and Psychosophy
Clearly, ‘philosophy’ and ‘psychology’ can shade into each other, and  different 
interpretations of philosophy, or different philosophies, can have  psychological 
impacts. In martial arts, as well as there being different philosophies, there 
are differing underlying psychological theories or beliefs that inform or even 
underpin different disciplines (Bowman 2014b). Different styles, systems, 
regions and periods often manifest different discourses, theories or ideologies 
of what we might call martial arts psychology. All of this might be referred 
to as the martial artist’s outlook, mindset, psyche, or subjective stance or 
 attitude. Such outlooks or attitudes might be linked to the ethos of the training 
 environment (García and Spencer 2014).
Of course, sometimes – as in many discourses around boxing or MMA – 
the dominant idea has often been that ‘being a fighter’ is something innate – 
 something you are ‘born with’ (Spencer 2011; see also Wacquant 2004). This 
seems to be a very common claim among competitive fighters and those 
involved in some way with what we might call street fighting (i.e., people with 
some kind of connection to non-rule-bound fighting and violence, such as 
bouncers, for example). But my sense is that, in most martial arts, being – or, 
more precisely, becoming – a fighter is conceived of in terms of some kind of 
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notion of ‘fighting spirit’, and that such a ‘spirit’ is something that is cultivated, 
through what Foucault would term ‘the means of correct training’ (Foucault 
1978). My sense is also that different martial arts – or even the ‘same’ martial 
art at different times – seek to cultivate very different ‘kinds’ of martial arts 
subjects.
In my own life, I have experienced very different kinds of training ethos. 
Some seemed saturated with a vague sense of the inherent value of ‘ toughening 
up’ (Downey 2007; Green 2011; Spencer 2011). Others focused more on  having 
fun, competition and competitive play. Still others put the importance of a 
 certain psychological attitude front and centre – whether that be  cultivating 
dispassionate calm responsive sensitivity (as in taijiquan, particularly in 
 push-hands training), developing an explicit ‘predator awareness’ self-defence 
mindset, or an insistence on a kind of all-out aggression, such as that which 
is termed ‘forward thinking’ in escrima concepts (Bowman 2014b, 2015a; see 
also Miller 2008, 2015). Some were informed by mysticism, others by hierarchy, 
authority and deference, and still others by camaraderie and a sense of being 
involved in a shared research project. Informed by this diversity of experience, 
as well as other forms of research, I have argued before that martial arts can 
very often be regarded as intimately imbricated within different kinds of ideol-
ogy. However, what I am proposing here is something slightly different. Unlike 
virtually all other studies in this realm, I am at this point less focused on the 
matter of the ideologies that ‘go into’ the discourse of a martial art and more 
interested in the question of the types of subjects that ‘come out’, that are pro-
duced in and by martial arts training: The type of subjective attitude, mindset, 
sense of identity and orientation towards the world.
Obviously, this is a two-way street – or even an incredibly complex junction. 
But an article by Oleg Benesch highlights what I am interested in here, in very 
stark terms. Benesch begins ‘Reconsidering Zen, Samurai and the Martial Arts’ 
(Benesch 2016) with a consideration of the case of Anders Behring Breivik, 
who, ‘on July 22, 2011 … committed one of the most devastating acts of mass 
murder by an individual in history’. Benesch writes:
Over the course of one day, he killed 77 people in and around Oslo, 
Norway, through a combination of a car bomb and shootings. The latter 
took place on the island of Utøya, where 69 people died, most of them 
teenagers attending an event sponsored by the Workers’ Youth League. 
During his subsequent trial, Breivik remained outwardly unemotional 
as he clearly recounted the events of the day, including the dozens of 
methodical execution-style shootings on the island. His calmness both 
on the day of the murders and during the trial, shocked many  observers. 
It was also an important factor in an attempt to declare Breivik insane, 
a move that he successfully resisted. Breivik himself addressed this 
 subject at some length, crediting his supposed ability to suppress 
 anxiety and the fear of death through concentrated practice of what he 
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called ‘ bushido meditation’. He claimed to have begun this practice in 
2006 to ‘de-emotionalize’ himself in preparation for a suicide attack. 
 According to Breivik, his meditation was based on a combination of 
‘Christian prayer’ and the ‘bushido warrior codex’. Bushido, or ‘the way 
of the warrior’, is often portrayed as an ancient moral code followed by 
the Japanese samurai, although the historical evidence shows that it is 
largely a twentieth-century construct. (Benesch 2016, 1)
Benesch’s own interests in this matter relate to addressing the matter of many 
misunderstandings of the history of notions like ‘samurai spirit’ and the 
 supposed connection of this spirit with Zen. As the above passage suggests, he 
is animated by the fact that what is ‘largely a twentieth-century construct’ has 
functioned ideologically. Benesch’s project, here and elsewhere, is to set out 
the ways that such factually incorrect discourses have emerged and to clarify 
the ways that they have functioned ideologically. However, as noted, my own 
interests at this point are chiefly related to what we might call the various types 
of psychology or pseudo-psychologies of violence and training for combat that 
are attendant to different kinds of martial arts pedagogy and philosophy.
Benesch’s article is extremely helpful for me here because it sets out clearly the 
relations between a number of elements that I contend it is important to realise 
are interconnected. Specifically, this is the connection between a  training ethos 
and its theory of psychology – or, indeed, its theory of the subject – and the 
extent to which neither of these are ‘innate’ or ‘necessary’, but, on the contrary, 
entirely ‘cultural’. This is not ‘cultural’ in the sense that we often too easily use 
the term – as when we say ‘Eastern’ or ‘Western’, or ‘American’ or ‘European’, 
and so on. Rather, this is cultural in the sense of engendered, cultivated, fos-
tered, stimulated, managed, produced, even policed, through techniques of 
 discipline, and always informed by ideology.5
Indeed, the implications of Benesch’s opening reflection on the case of 
 Breivik’s ‘psychology’ go further than many studies of the relations between 
ideology and psychology otherwise tend to go. For instance, in a very rich and 
suggestive passage, Benesch notes:
The extent to which the methodical nature of Breivik’s terror attack could 
be ascribed to his meditation techniques, ‘bushido’ or otherwise, has 
been called into question by those who see it as another  manifestation 
of serious mental disturbance. On the other hand, Breivik’s statements 
regarding ‘bushido meditation’ have parallels with the ‘Warrior Mind 
 5 In a study of language, argumentation, the establishment of truth and ideology, Jean Fran-
çois Lyotard once argued that ‘to link is necessary, but how to link is contingent’ (Lyotard 
1988). My contention here is that both training methods and ideological outlooks are con-
tingent, as is the manner of their linkage. The different forms that the various connections, 
combinations and relations take will always produce very different things.
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Training’ program implemented by the US military during the Iraq 
War. This program claims to have its roots in ‘the ancient samurai code 
of self-discipline’, and is described as a meditation method for dealing 
with a host of mental issues related to combat. Both Anders Breivik 
and  Warrior Mind Training reflect a persistent popular perception of 
the samurai as fighting machines who were able to suppress any fear 
of death through the practice of meditation techniques based in Zen 
Buddhism. Zen has also been linked with the Special Attack Forces (or 
‘Kamikaze’) of the Second World War, who supposedly used meditation 
methods ascribed to Zen to prepare for their suicide missions. (1)
Here, not only does Benesch reinforce my contentions about the ‘cultural’ 
dimensions of all of this, he actually raises the stakes of my own argument by 
introducing the question not just of mindset but also of sanity and insanity.
Hopefully, none of us are anything like Breivik. But Breivik claims to have 
believed himself to have trained for his acts of unimaginably callous mass mur-
der by following a self-styled but not entirely alien or unusual type of ‘martial 
art’ psychological training. Which raises the question: Are such martial arts 
ideologies themselves to be regarded as sane or insane?
Such a question, posed outside of any context or any specific case study, will 
hardly permit a univocal response. Such a question is based on an unaccepta-
ble generalisation at both ends. It is, to borrow a phrase from Freud, an equa-
tion between two unknowns. What is a martial arts ideology? What is sanity? 
Clearly, there is a lot more work to be done here before we can even formulate 
our question adequately. Nonetheless, I am reminded of the time a few years 
ago when a student of mine walked out of a film screening. The film I was 
showing was Ghost Dog: The Way of the Samurai (1999), in which the epony-
mous Ghost Dog (Forest Whitaker) is a late 20th Century black urban character 
who so identifies with the samurai ideology advocated in the putative samurai 
manual, Hagakure, that he has crafted himself as the ‘retainer’ of an old mafia 
gangster who once saved his life. Ghost Dog lives alone, trains martial arts, and 
undertakes assassinations whenever his ‘master’ requires.
The film has always raised interesting questions for me about identity 
 construction, cross-cultural interests and historical communication (Bowman 
2008). But when I asked the student why she walked out of the screening she 
replied: Because Ghost Dog was insane. Until then, I had not actually stepped 
outside of the fictional world of the film to ask myself the question of Ghost 
Dog’s sanity. The film presents him as an assassin with a fixation on samurai 
ideology. What does that make him? Eccentric? Mad?
Ghost Dog spends a great deal of time involved in solitary martial arts train-
ing, and he regularly reads the Hagakure as if to ‘de-emotionalize’ himself vis-
à-vis ‘death’ (the Hagakure regularly reiterates the necessity of ‘meditating on 
inevitable death’). Ghost Dog believes himself to be the ‘retainer’ of a mafia 
boss. So, to this extent, he could easily be labelled insane. Similarly, another 
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contemporaneous film, which is more explicitly about insanity, resonates with 
cognate ideas. In a memorable scene in Fight Club (1999), Brad Pitt’s Tyler Dur-
den holds down the hand of Edward Norton’s ‘Narrator’ – aka ‘Jack’ – on a table 
and gives him a serious chemical burn. All the while, Tyler holds forth on the 
subject of experiencing the sensation in the moment and giving up on the idea 
of escaping from the pain, either in the form of physically running away and 
trying to soothe the pain or in the form of retreating to ‘your cave’, or – as they 
used to say – ‘using mind over matter’ to escape from the pain of the situation 
by visualising something else, some other situation, elsewhere.
The dialogue in the scene runs as follows:
Tyler: Can I see your hand please?
[Narrator gives him his hand. Tyler grabs it, licks his lips and kisses the back 
of Narrator’s hand]
Narrator: What is this?
[Tyler looks at him, sprinkles lye on Narrator’s hand and says]
Tyler: This is a chemical burn.
[Narrator screams in pain, staring at his hand as it begins to burn, reeling 
while Tyler grasps it tightly.]
Tyler: It will hurt more than you have ever been burned and you will have 
a scar.
Narrator: What are you doing?! [Screams]
Narrator Voice Over: Guided meditation worked for cancer; it could work 
for this.
[Narrator closes his eyes. Cut to the scene of a green forest in his mind. Cut 
back to Tyler.]
Tyler: Stay with the pain. Don’t shut this out.
Narrator: No, no, no! God! [Screaming, moving violently, trying to escape 
Tyler’s grasp]
Tyler: Look at your hand! The first soap was made from the ashes of heroes, 
like the first monkey shot into space. Without pain, without  sacrifice, we 
would have nothing.
[Narrator closes his eyes again, trying to shut the pain out, trying to be calm]
Narrator Voice Over: I tried not to think of the words ‘searing’ or ‘flesh’.
Tyler: Stop it! This is your pain. This is your burning hand. It’s right here.
Narrator: I’m going to my cave, I’m going to my cave, I’m going to find my 
power animal. [Sobbing]
Tyler: No! Don’t deal with it the way those dead people do. Come on!
Narrator: I get the point, okay? Please!
Tyler: No, what you’re feeling is premature enlightenment.
[Narrator closes his eyes. Cut to his mind’s eye in his cave. Cut back to Tyler. 
Tyler slaps Narrator across his face]
Tyler: This is the greatest moment of your life, man, and you’re off  somewhere 
missing it.
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Narrator: I am not!
Tyler: [Narrator sobs and protests in pain but Tyler cuts him off] Shut up. Our 
fathers were our models for God. If our fathers bailed, what does that 
tell you about God?
Narrator: [Grunts, eyes closed, still fighting the pain] No, no, I don’t…
[Tyler slaps narrator across his face again. Narrator, still reeling, moves his 
hand attempting to reach for the sink, for water. Tyler holds fast.]
Tyler: Listen to me. […] You can run water over your hand to make it worse, 
or, look at me. [Their eyes meet] Or you can use vinegar to  neutralize 
the burn.
Narrator: Please let me have it!! Please!! [Sobbing]
Tyler: First, you have to give up. First, you have to know – not ‘fear’ – know 
that someday you’re gonna die.
Narrator: You don’t know how this feels!! [Narrator stares daggers at Tyler. 
Tyler stares back and defiantly holds up his right hand to reveal a massive 
scar on the back of it.]
Tyler: It’s only after we’ve lost everything that we’re free to do anything. 
Narrator: Okay. 
[As his flesh continues to melt, fizzle, smoke, and burn, Tyler slowly lets go 
of Narrator’s hand as he appears to calm down and accept the situation. 
Narrator stares intently at his hand, holding it out in front of himself on 
his own – Feeling it, not trying to run from it or trying to minimize the 
pain somehow. Tyler then reaches for a bottle of vinegar and dumps it on 
Narrator’s outreached hand. Narrator, with tremendous relief, clutches his 
hand to his chest and drops to the ground. Tyler looks down at him.]
Tyler: Congratulations: You’re one step closer to hitting bottom.
This moment of madness, in a film that is arguably about madness in  multiple 
ways and on multiple levels, makes an unusual reference to mindfulness. 
This takes the specific form of the potential connections between this act, its 
 rationale, and the kind of Zen-Samurai-madness-martial mindset that Benesch 
focuses on.
Quite unlike the therapy culture that Jack has become immersed in at the 
start of the film, in which people are regularly enjoined to visit their ‘caves’, 
find their ‘power animal’, let their feelings out, and so on, Tyler insists on the 
 necessity of facing up to, looking directly at, and surrendering to the intensity 
of the physical experience. Tyler will not allow Jack to run away from or try to 
change the situation. He demands that Jack ‘give up’ and stop trying to escape. 
He asks him to accept the inevitability of death, and he adds, at the end, that ‘it’s 
only after we’ve lost everything that we’re free to do anything’.
Immediately after this scene, we see Jack in his office being confronted by 
his boss, who brandishes an incriminating copy of the rules of Fight Club 
retrieved from a photocopier. In response to the rhetorical question of what 
Jack thinks his boss should do when presented with a situation like this, Jack 
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suggests that his boss should be very, very afraid, as the kind of person who 
writes  material like that is highly likely to be the kind of person who might just 
snap and stalk through the office building with an assault rifle, wreaking havoc 
and  committing mass murder.
Is it significant that these two 1999 films seem to connect explicitly with what 
Benesch (following the US military) calls the ‘warrior mind’ with a kind of 
Zen-informed martial training (the ‘meditation on inevitable death’ that Ghost 
Dog reads from the Hagakure)? Certainly, these two filmic texts can be read 
side by side in terms of Benesch’s connection of the chilling approach of Breivik 
to very real mass murder and my former student’s damning statement that she 
could not sit through Ghost Dog because the main character was ‘insane’. From 
this position, there is much that could be thought and said about Fight Club. 
 Certainly, Jack is technically insane. The film makes clear that he is  hallucinating 
the very existence of Tyler Durden and quite probably the existence of Helena 
Bonham Carter’s Marla too. Maybe he’s hallucinating all of it. But I also find the 
film to be potentially connected with debates in and around martial arts studies 
and social psychology in numerous ways.
I have written about much of this before. I have written about the ways that 
the spectre of Bruce Lee informs the imaginary ultimate male, Tyler Durden 
(Bowman 2010d). I have reflected on the relations between Fight Club and what 
I called the ‘fight-club-ization’ that took place in and around martial arts after 
the televisual explosion of the UFC and the emergence of MMA in its wake 
(Bowman 2013b). And so on. But here, thanks to Benesch’s provocative work 
on the supposed connections between the ‘warrior mind’ and something akin 
to ‘Zen’ bushido training, I want to reflect on the treatment within Fight Club of 
what we might call its ‘moment of mindfulness’.
(Some readers may notice in the phrase ‘the moment of mindfulness’ an 
 allusion to Kierkegaard’s famous line about how ‘the decision is a moment of 
madness’. This is fortuitous, or maybe just fertile. Derrida certainly picked up 
this idea and ran with it into some of his most stimulating and – I think – 
important work [Derrida 1996, 2001].)
It seems important to note that Fight Club makes a clear distinction between 
what Tyler subjects Jack to and what Jack has hitherto experienced in his  earlier 
addiction to therapy culture. At the start of the film, Jack is suffering from 
insomnia. He has pleaded with medical practitioners for medication but to no 
avail. When drugs are not forthcoming, he takes the advice of one doctor and 
goes to see ‘what real pain is’: He attends a testicular cancer support group. 
Being forced to ‘let it all out’ in the group, Jack gets cajoled into a situation 
where sobbing is mandatory, and he finds, after the emotional expenditures in 
the group, that he is able to sleep at night. Nonetheless, his interest in support 
groups becomes an obsession and he becomes addicted to therapy culture.
The appearance of ‘another faker’ named Marla impedes his ability to get 
satisfaction from his groups, and it is only after Tyler Durden appears and 
drags him away from all mainstream forms of modern social life and culture, 
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 especially the creature comforts afforded by consumerism, that Jack moves 
from therapy culture and towards fighting as therapy.
I have written about ‘fighting as therapy’ elsewhere (Bowman 2017b), so I will 
try not to repeat any of that here. What I am interested in at this point is less the 
fighting in Fight Club and more the moment of mindfulness, where Tyler makes 
Jack focus on the pain of a chemical burn, give in to it, give up the possibility of 
avoiding or escaping it, and ultimately accept the inevitability of death.
In response to the pain and his inability to escape Tyler’s grip, we see Jack 
trying not to think of the words ‘searing’ and ‘flesh’ – the searing of his flesh 
being that from which he is trying to escape via entrance into his ‘cave’. 
The cave is a place he has learned to go to during therapy sessions. Tyler 
shouts him back into the present, however. Then an image of beautiful trees 
in a forest flash up, but Tyler keeps shouting at Jack and drawing him back 
into the  present moment. The images of/from ‘his cave’ and the very  easily 
 recognisable – indeed clichéd – image of ‘a peaceful place’ (dappled light 
through trees) – disappear when Tyler shouts at him.
So, in this film, too, at this moment, the ‘warrior mind’ emerges through 
‘reflection on inevitable death’, ‘meditating on inevitable death’ and living one’s 
life ‘as dead’, as if already dead.
It is very shortly after this that the first recruit to Tyler’s paramilitary cult 
turns up and stands on the doorstep of Tyler and Jack’s house, waiting for 
 permission to enter and to begin ‘training’. The visual representation here is 
modern and military. But those immersed in the mythology of Eastern martial 
arts will recognise the scenario as the first test of potential students seeking 
to be taught by a given master.6 Shortly after this scene, of course, we see the 
 production of a small militia and the initiation of ‘Project Mayhem’.
What is going on in all of this? The film certainly involves both meta and 
micro critiques of many things: Consumerism, therapy culture, the supposed 
 vacuity of much work and daily life, the men’s movement, and, most  prominently, 
 masculinity. But what are we to make of the implicit connection between the film’s 
championing of living in the moment, feeling it, accepting it, not  retreating from 
pain, and so on, and several species of insanity? Is this all ‘just in the film’, or might 
there indeed be challenging lines of enquiry between mindfulness and madness?
There are many questions that could be asked in light of all of this. Here, I will 
concern myself with only one: The (ostensibly ‘secondary’) question of what is 
‘just in a film’ and what exists or circulates ‘really’ or ‘in the real world’. This is a 
complex question, one which relates to what we might call the  relations between 
filmic representations or constructions of martial arts and wider  cultural ideas 
about them. This is also the focus of the next chapter.
 6 To American viewers, there is also a strong reference to the behaviour of ‘frat boy pledges’. 
Thanks to Kyle Barrowman for pointing this out to a very British viewer.

CHAPTER 7
Fighting Talk – Martial Arts Discourse in 
Mainstream Films
Introduction
This chapter examines conversations, dialogues and statements about martial 
arts in films that can by no stretch of the imagination be regarded as martial 
arts films. It does this in order to glean insights into the status of martial arts in 
mainstream popular culture. As such, although it is a study that reads and takes 
evidence from films, its concerns are not those of the discipline of film studies. 
Rather, it is interested in the ways that martial arts are understood, positioned, 
and given value within the wider flows, circuits, networks or discourses of cul-
ture. As well as offering a discrete analysis of martial arts discourse as registered 
in film dialogue, this chapter also serves as a recapitulation and reiteration of 
the overarching poststructuralist or deconstructive theoretical framework that 
has organised this book.
The premise here is that mainstream, non-specialist films in which dialogue 
about martial arts occurs can be regarded as texts that relate to, arise from, 
register, and feed back into wider understandings of and opinions about mar-
tial arts. This is especially the case for films set in the contemporary world and 
which implicitly make some kind of claim to having some kind of relationship 
with realism (even if they are comedies).
Of course, there is no simple mapping of or direct relation between repre-
sentation and reality here. A statement or conversation offered in a fiction film 
does not simply reflect or recount opinions circulating in face-to-face or online 
conversations among real people in the ‘real world’. However, in all commu-
nicative processes, sense can only be made of utterances that employ shared 
ideas, familiar conventions, and so on, even if a new utterance (e.g., a conversa-
tion in a film) brings in unique, new or surprising elements, formulations, or 
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combinations of elements. So, the premise of this study is not that film dialogue 
simply maps, reflects or expresses established cultural values in straightforward 
ways; rather, the premise is that film dialogue registers, reworks, reiterates and 
replays familiar cultural values in complex and creative ways – but ways that 
always seek to ‘make sense’ by relating to, playing around with and reworking 
established ideas and values.
It is in this way that this study seeks to explore and cast light on the ‘discur-
sive status’ of martial arts in Anglophone popular culture. Given the necessarily 
interdisciplinary approach and orientation of this work, something should be 
said first about the notion of discourse and the theory of discourse as it func-
tions in this work, before turning our attention to the discussion of martial arts 
in non-martial arts film.
Popular Cultural Discourse
Michel Foucault argued that the ‘regularity in dispersion’ of certain types of 
statement about an object, phenomenon or practice have a structuring effect on 
what that object, phenomenon or practice is deemed to be. They influence how 
it is understood, thought about, related to and treated in cultural, political and 
institutional discourses (Foucault 1972; Deleuze 2006; Widder 2008). Multiple 
schools of thought have developed in the wake of this, including several spe-
cies of discourse theory (Akerstrøm Andersen 2003). A key premise of most 
of these is that the connotations, meanings and values permeating and con-
gregating around (perhaps) anything are determined at least in part by wider 
representational tendencies (Barthes 1972; Stuart Hall and et al 1997; Laclau 
2000; Bowman 2007). There are disagreements about the details, but all schools 
of discourse analysis concur that key instances, contexts, styles and genres of 
representation at least ‘influence’ (and sometimes actually ‘produce’) the way 
things are thought about, imagined, and related to – and even what they are 
deemed to ‘be’ (Derrida 1982; Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Said 2000).
Regardless of whether or not one or another theory of discourse adequately 
captures how human societies ‘really work’, it is certainly the case that between 
the 1970s and 1990s the concept or metaphor of discourse (along with such 
related concepts as ‘representation’ and ‘textuality’) entirely reorientated the 
paradigms and approaches of numerous academic fields, and even helped to 
generate new ones (Hall 1992; Mowitt 2003; Bowman 2015a). Indeed, in this 
sense, the notion of discourse itself generated considerable discourse. In Fou-
cault’s own terms, the notion of discourse arguably became what he would have 
termed a ‘founder of discursivity’ in its own right (Foucault 1991). It is some-
thing that generated new thoughts, new words and new practices.
Although developed conceptually in the 1970s and 1980s, it is still not 
uncommon for academic subjects of all kinds to conceptualise the world as 
discourses made up of texts. Texts are the constructs that come out of and feed 
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back into discourses. The ‘textual paradigm’ and/or the ‘discourse approach’ 
can be regarded as organising and structuring the focus and language of a great 
deal of academic work in the arts, humanities and social sciences (Mowitt 1992; 
Bowman 2007).
This present study is to be situated within this tradition, although it proceeds 
in full awareness of the complexity, uncertainty and problems associated with 
both textual and discourse approaches (Hall 1992; Mowitt 1992; Bowman 2007, 
2008). Some of these problems include disagreement among scholars about 
where and how discourses are to be pinpointed or demarcated; whether they 
exist principally at the level of representation (Said 1995; Young 2001) or at 
the level of institutional policies, laws and legislations (Foucault 1977; Young 
2001); whether they principally relate to the realm of public media (Fairclough 
1995) or every micro and macro level of modern human life (Arditi and Valen-
tine 1999); in which direction ‘causality’ runs in discourses – that is, whether 
representations are the causes of things (from attitudes and beliefs to policies) 
or whether other things (from attitudes and beliefs to policies) are the causes 
of representations (Krug 2001; Judkins 2014b; Barrowman 2015b); and so on. 
There is a great deal of what arch-theorist of textuality Jacques Derrida would 
call ‘undecidability’ in these waters (Derrida 1981). But what all scholars of dis-
course studies can be said to agree upon is the tenet of the significant cultural, 
political, and even ontological power of representations.
Following the broadly political orientations of many of the founding theo-
rists of discourse studies, the dominant tendency within all schools of discourse 
analysis has been to maintain an explicitly political focus. Hence discourse 
analyses tend either to choose explicitly political topics (for example, the media 
coverage of elections) and to subject them to further political interrogation, or 
they take ‘cultural’ topics (like the practices and identities of everyday life) and 
unearth the political dimensions of these topics (Laclau 1994; Torfing 1998). In 
this sense, discourse studies tend to produce insights into the ‘political’ bias or 
orientation of whatever is examined.
Yet, despite the inescapably ‘politicizing’ effect that the notion of discourse 
produces in its focus on the contingency, variability and hence changeability of 
the human world, there is no necessary reason why discourse studies and dis-
course analysis should have an explicitly, directly or literally political starting 
point or end point. Indeed, precisely because the notion of discourse already 
presumes the immanently political character of (potentially) everything (Arditi 
and Valentine 1999; Marchart 2007), employing it to reveal ever more political 
aspects to ever more areas of life is perhaps not the most interesting or challeng-
ing thing to do when employing it at this time. Perhaps scholars no longer need 
to belabour the inevitable conclusions about the political dimensions of things. 
This is a conclusion that discourse analysis can easily reach (Hall 2002). For, 
given that discourse theories tend to posit that ‘everything’ in human social and 
cultural life is contingent and hence political, maybe to search for the political 
dimension and reach a political conclusion over and over again is predictable. 
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But what else is to be done with a paradigm organised by the syllogism that 
everything is contingent, that contingency involves variation and change, and 
therefore everything is political?1 Is the political focus unavoidable?
The obligation for academic work to discover and rediscover the politi-
cal dimensions of the world is heavy. Robert J.C. Young once argued that the 
imperative to focus on ‘the political’ has been the dominant ‘architectonic’ 
organising knowledge production in the arts, humanities and social sciences 
over at least the last half century (Young 1992). Similarly, Gary Hall notes that 
even though cultural studies has often claimed to be open to the study of any 
and all aspects of culture it has overwhelmingly tended to choose worthy politi-
cal objects and refract everything through a ‘politicizing’ lens (Hall 2002). Rey 
Chow, too, notes that even the apparently non-political and firmly aesthetic/
cultural field of film studies became settled, stabilized, regularized and more 
firmly established when its dominant questions, concerns and themes became 
those of identity (and) politics (Chow 2007).
My current concern proceeds with all of this as its backdrop, but it also fights 
against aspects of it. The aim is not to paint martial arts as a continuation of 
politics by other means.2 Nor is it to look into specific, specialist, niche or actual 
martial arts contexts, fields or ‘subcultures’. Indeed, it is resolutely not look-
ing ‘into’ anything specifically martial arts ‘proper’ at all. This work does not 
look at what martial artists say, think or feel about themselves, in their own 
specialist contexts, such as blogs, vlogs, magazines, books, and so on. Rather, it 
is interested in establishing what non-martial artists feel, think and say about 
martial arts and about martial artists. The aim is to establish the range of ideas 
and values that circulate about martial arts, about martial arts practitioners, 
and about martial arts fans. The wider research project has so far taken in the 
realms of comedy, popular culture and journalism research (Bowman 2017a, 
2017b). Here, my attention is on the discursive status of martial arts in film. 
Specifically, the focus is on films that could in no way be construed as martial 
arts films. My question is whether there are any patterns, repetitions, reitera-
tions, or any ‘regularity in dispersion’ of discursive statements about martial 
arts outside of proper martial arts contexts.
 1 Moreover, as Freud most famously argued, there is a pleasure in repeating. In different ways 
and in different contexts, repetition produces stability, intelligibility, familiarity, and gives 
orientation. So, posing the same kinds of questions and rediscovering the same kinds of 
answers makes sense (in more than one way). Yet, must discourse analysis always and only 
rediscover the political, wherever it looks?
 2 Many excellent studies have already carried out important work that has shown this, across 
a range of different historical and cultural contexts. I will not give a list of citations pointing 
to any of these works at this point, because I do not want to give the impression that such 
works only do this one thing. On the contrary, all good works of cultural studies (and martial 
arts studies) do much more than ‘merely’ this one thing. My point is simply that ‘perceiving 
the political’ continues to function as a reliable way to confer validity and legitimacy upon 
an academic orientation.
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Methodological Matrix
The importance of film to martial arts culture (and also to the status of  martial 
arts within popular culture) cannot be overstated (Bowman 2017b). Filmic rep-
resentations of martial arts have long been a key force in stimulating interest 
and participation in martial arts (Bowman 2010d, 2013b). Moreover, stylised 
martial artsy fights appear regularly in all kinds of films today. In other words, 
films certainly do not need to be ‘martial arts films’ to have martial arts within 
them. Indeed, the frequency of their appearance suggests that martial arts 
remain as popular and ‘bankable’ as they have been since the global ‘kung fu 
craze’ of the 1970s (Brown 1997). In Foucauldian terms, this proliferation and 
frequency of their reiteration in a range of different kinds of texts and  different 
discursive contexts could constitute a ‘regularity in dispersion’. Certainly, 
 martial arts are a very familiar part of all kinds of films. This is so much so that 
they might be regarded as a standard feature of popular culture, a standard part 
of widespread ‘normal’ cultural literacy. People might be expected to ‘know 
about’ martial arts – albeit only at the level of recognition or acknowledgement 
if not ‘knowledge’ – in the same way that one might reasonably expect people 
to ‘know about’ ballet, say, or farming, witchcraft or drug dealing, for example. 
‘People’ may never have experienced these things directly, but they more or less 
‘know’ what they are. When this does not come from first-hand experience, it 
often comes from media representations.
Obviously, comparatively few people could be expected to be able to 
 distinguish kung fu from karate or karate from taekwondo. Fewer still could 
be expected even to have heard of krav maga or escrima. But the majority of 
 people could be expected to recognise ‘martial arts’ when they see them. If not 
un equivocally ‘popular’, then, martial arts are certainly part of ‘the  popular’ 
(Hall 1994) – stitched into the current ‘popular cultural formation’ ( Morris 
2004; Morris, Li, and Chan 2005). So, the question is: Outside of martial 
arts films and films that can be said to be steeped in martial arts practitioner 
 discourses, how are martial arts thought about and talked about?
Blurred Lines
In posing this question, the problem of how to demarcate and separate an 
inside from an outside immediately arises. There is a great deal of grey area 
around the category ‘martial arts film’. It is unclear whether there is even a 
fixed or  demarcated genre of martial arts film in the West. Certainly, many 
action films feature martial arts choreography. But, in trying to separate  martial 
arts films from non-martial arts film, it may not prove possible to establish 
a  stable boundary between, say, martial arts film, action film, action comedy, 
horror, and others. It is equally difficult to clinch the case of whether a film is 
 mainstream, niche, cult, or some other designation.
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So, in attempting to establish anything about what we might conceptualise as 
the ‘wider’, ‘mainstream’, or ‘popular’ discursive status of martial arts in ‘wider’ 
(non-specialist) circuits of culture, we are facing a number of problems. All of 
these devolve on the problem of where or how to draw the line between spe-
cialist and non-specialist, martial arts and non-martial arts, mainstream and 
subcultural, and so on.
Rather than attempting to resolve such categorical and taxonomical conun-
dra here, another option was chosen. This involved the decision to impose a 
radically simplifying and drastically clarifying border, one that may initially 
seem eccentric but that offered the benefits of being clear, stable, meaningful, 
and not easily problematized, jeopardised, made unclear, or deconstructed. 
This was the decision to focus on dialogue about martial arts in unequivocally 
non-martial arts films.
In applying such a principled limitation of focus, the first thing discovered was 
that, other than in martial arts and action films, martial arts are rarely  discussed. 
They are often shown. There are often moves, gestures, visual  allusions, and 
 visual references. But conversations about martial arts are few and far between. 
Furthermore, in order to find such elements to analyse, there are no methodo-
logical shortcuts: One simply needs to know a lot about lots of films. There are 
no databases to dig into and no search terms that an internet search engine can 
return results for. Google doesn’t understand what is being asked when search 
terms are phrases like ‘dialogue about martial arts in non-martial arts films’. 
Even Americanising it by changing the word ‘films’ to ‘movies’ doesn’t help. It 
was not possible to construct a search question with any mention of martial arts 
films in it that led anywhere other than to pages about martial arts films.
Having no database and unable to establish ‘intelligible’ search terms, the only 
recourse was to rely on memory and knowledge of as wide a range of films as 
possible. This returned a very limited number of results. So, the question was 
posed online, in several Facebook groups. Reasoning that people with an  interest 
in martial arts would be most likely to remember references to martial arts in 
films, I focused my attention on the Martial Arts Studies Facebook Group, which 
had almost 1,000 members at the time (in early May 2017).
Interestingly (and perhaps significantly), it turned out that it is not just 
 inhuman search engines that do not understand questions about ‘dialogue 
about martial arts in films that are not martial arts films’. It was evident that the 
overwhelming majority of people asked could not quite get their heads around 
the question either. In fact, from among dozens of respondents, only one or two 
people actually understood the question. Most knowledgeable among them was 
film scholar Kyle Barrowman, who came up with a number of valuable sugges-
tions, some of which I will discuss below.
However, the majority of people who understood the question suggested 
action films. Most people suggested The Matrix (1999). Unfortunately, it was 
clear that I had to exclude The Matrix because, even though many people 
don’t seem to think of it as a martial arts film, it was choreographed by famous 
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martial arts choreographer Yuen Woo Ping, it is choc-full of stylistically precise 
martial arts choreography, and (as I had discovered during my ill-fated internet 
searches) it regularly features in top tens of ‘must see’ martial arts films. The fact 
that people don’t seem to recognise when a Hollywood action film becomes 
a martial arts film (or vice versa) perhaps says more about the porousness of 
these two supposed genre categories and the essential lack of a fixed and stable 
Hollywood martial arts film genre than anything else. So, The Matrix fell within 
this study’s ‘exclusion zone’. But some limit cases do deserve some attention and 
warrant some quick preliminary consideration.
Liminal Cases
In terms of Hollywood action films that feature martial arts, it seems significant 
to note that relatively few of them actually discuss martial arts. In mainstream 
US action films, martial arts are shown, not discussed. Very few action films 
with martial arts choreography in them even mention martial arts at all in the 
dialogue. To illustrate this, and the porousness of the borders between ‘martial 
arts film’ and ‘action film’ in the US context, let us briefly consider some well-
known examples, even though they are technically outside the parameters of 
this study.
One notable case is the amnesiac Jason Bourne (The Bourne Identity [2002], 
The Bourne Supremacy [2004], The Bourne Ultimatum [2007], Jason Bourne 
[2016]) who wonders aloud in The Bourne Identity why it is that he knows so 
much about combat, strategy, situational awareness, and survival despite not 
remembering who he is. However, other than one brief moment of musing, 
there is no specific dialogue about his ample fighting abilities.3 Elsewhere, long 
before the Bourne films, in Conan the Barbarian (1982) the titular  warrior 
played by Arnold Schwarzenegger was sent to study with ‘Eastern’ sword 
 masters, but it was only the extra-diegetic voiceover that told us this. There 
was some talk in Batman Begins (2005), reminiscent of Highlander (1986), of 
 training and deception, but very little. And, it deserves to be noted, the ‘action’ 
film, Batman Begins, is structured by a martial arts (and) oedipal narrative of a 
once adopted and subsequently renegade (or ‘ronin’) ninja.
Similarly, the sci-fi fantasy Star Wars films have many of the hallmarks of 
Chinese martial arts wuxia pian, or swordplay drama (Feichtinger 2014). Some 
might call this cultural appropriation, or expropriation. From such a perspec-
tive, The Matrix can either be regarded as a trailblazing Western ‘heir’ to the 
Hong Kong style of ‘wire-fu’ fight choreography that prepared Western audi-
ences for the aesthetics of the subsequently successful Crouching Tiger, Hidden 
Dragon and subsequent transnational wuxia pian ‘wire-fu’ films, or it can be 
 3 In terms of Jason Bourne’s fighting style, The Bourne Identity specifically showcases Filipino 
martial arts (Bowman 2013b).
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regarded as a film that is guilty of the ‘cultural appropriation’ or ‘expropriation’ 
of Hong Kong traditions (Hunt 2003; Tierney 2006; Park 2010; Barrowman 
2015b).
This list could continue. But already two points can be made. First, that the 
lines between ‘action film’ and ‘martial arts film’ in the Hollywood context are 
extremely blurred. And second, that within all such films actual dialogue about 
martial arts is rare, fleeting and scanty. In The Matrix, Neo (Keanu Reeves) 
wakes up from his software installation and breathlessly announces, ‘I know 
kung fu!’ Yet other than a few remarks about fighting skill and strategy, this is 
close to the pinnacle of martial arts dialogue in the film. And the response from 
Morpheus (Laurence Fishburne) is not, ‘Please tell me all about it’, but rather, 
‘Show me’.
Another significant limit case is the classic 1987 cop actioner Lethal Weapon. 
Early in the film, veteran cop Roger Murtaugh (Danny Glover) tries to engage 
his undesirable new partner Martin Riggs (Mel Gibson) in conversation,  saying, 
in reference to his Los Angeles Police Department personnel file, ‘[the] file also 
said you’re heavy into martial arts, taiji and all that killer stuff. I suppose we 
have to register you as a lethal weapon’.4
Of course, Lethal Weapon definitely has at least one foot too far into our 
exclusion zone to be classed as a ‘non-martial arts film’. But the way it positions 
taiji as ‘killer stuff ’ is interesting. This is because, as I have discussed at length 
elsewhere, taiji is also a kind of ‘limit case’ martial art. By dint of its complex 
history, by far the majority of taiji practitioners have little inkling of its combat 
applications and even less ability to apply them in either free or rule bound 
sparring or combat (Wile 1996; Frank 2006; Bowman 2015a, 2016, 2017b). 
Overwhelmingly, taiji is predominantly associated in popular consciousness 
with calm, soft, flowing, meditative solo sequences. But Lethal Weapon presents 
taiji as the very thing that makes its eponymous ‘weapon’ lethal.
Libidinal Cases
Another slightly less limit case film treats taiji very differently. The 1985 
‘ coming of age’ teen wrestling film Vision Quest (also known as Crazy for You) 
positions taiji as precisely an esoteric, meditative, restful, relaxing endeavour. 
But in Vision Quest this more typical ‘feminized’ depiction of taiji comes with a 
twist. In the scene in which taiji appears, Louden Swaine (Matthew Modine) is 
delivering room service to a travelling salesman, called Kevin (R.H. Thomas). 
 4 These lines of dialogue are technically unforgettable, in that it is from them that the film 
itself, all of its sequels, and the recent TV serials get their name. Thanks to Kyle Barrowman 
for pointing this out to me.
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The salesman is practicing taiji in the hotel room when Louden arrives, and the 
two engage in conversation about it:5
Louden: What is that stuff?
Kevin: Taiji. National form of exercise in China. [Signing the room  service 
receipt] I’ll, uh, put your tip on this, ok?
Louden: Can you get a workout that way?
Kevin: 800 million Chinese can’t be wrong. It’s mainly a matter of  getting 
the mind into the muscles. I use it a lot when I’m on the road. It helps 
me sleep like a baby.
Louden: Really? I’m on like a 600-calorie-a-day diet and working out like a 
madman. I’m so wired when I hit the rack, I can’t sleep at all. I lie there 
for about, I don’t know, six hours thinking about my life and stuff before 
I finally drop off.
Kevin: My name is Kevin.
Louden: Louden. Louden Swain.
Kevin: [Louden turns to leave] Let me show you how it’s done, Louden. 
[Louden turns back] It’ll help you sleep.
Louden: All right.
Kevin: Why don’t you stand there. Face this way. Just sort of catch me out of 
the corner of your eyes. [Louden stands next to Kevin] Ok, now breathe 
in. Raise the arms. Keep the movements slow, fluid. Breathe out. Shift 
your weight to the left. Step onto the right. Sort of stack your hands 
like that over the knee. Now step back to the left. [Kevin moves over by 
Louden to help him with his form] Move your arms. Step back to the left. 
Stack your arms the other way. Step out.
  [Kevin’s hands, which were initially guiding Louden’s arms, move lower on 
his body. Then his right hand slides up Louden’s right leg, at which point 
Louden flinches and moves away]
Louden [Flustered]: I think I got it now. I’ll try it on my own when I get a 
chance.
Kevin: Do you want to come up later when you’re off-duty?
Louden: No. [Louden picks up the bill off of the dresser and backs away 
towards the door] I don’t think so, I got to get home. I’m in  training.
Kevin: Training, huh? What sport?
Louden: Wrestling.
Kevin:  Wrestling? You know, I sell sporting goods for a living. As a  matter of 
fact, I carry a good line of wrestling shoes.
Louden: [Leaving hurriedly] Just leave the tray by the door when you’re 
 finished.
 5 The scene from which the following dialogue has been transcribed can be viewed in full here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5f_MzPVuBq0
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There is much that is interesting about both the dialogue and the action in this 
scene. But one thing that leaps out is the association of taiji practice with homosex-
uality, especially because here it functions as a pretext for and gateway to attempted 
seduction. This could be because of a perceived narrative need to set up a clear 
counterpoint or foil for what the film wishes to construct as the more masculine 
activity of wrestling. In other words, the lead character’s adverse reaction to homo-
sexual advances can be taken as a device to clarify his heterosexuality – as if to 
reassure viewers, once more, that despite his engagement in wrestling he is not 
homosexual. The perceived necessity of such a scene could relate to a common 
representational problem with wrestling: As many commentators have noted in 
different contexts, the appearance of wrestling and grappling can often come to 
seem a little too similar to the appearance of amorous lovemaking for (heter-
onormative or homophobic) comfort (Downey 2014; Bowman 2017b).
So, the semiotic function is that an already ‘feminine’ (because ‘gentle’ and 
‘Eastern’ [Said 1978]) taiji becomes a device of homosexual seduction that 
Louden must reject. This further clarifies the heterosexuality both of himself 
and of wrestling. Yet, his final reaction after running away from the hotel room 
is odd. After racing along the corridor and pressing the button for the eleva-
tor, Louden throws himself down to the floor and executes a number of rapid 
push-ups. The peculiarity of this ostensibly comic act seems to undermine the 
attempt to safely exclude him from the realm of homoerotic investment. His 
panicked push-ups have an air of desperation about them – as if he has to do 
something – anything – to channel his intense feelings (whatever they might be) 
into a kind of sublimated and socially acceptable form.6
This sexual dimension takes us smoothly into another interestingly odd and 
uncomfortable scene. This is a scene in Stanley Kubrick’s adaptation of Lolita 
(1962), in which Clare Quilty (Peter Sellers) discusses judo with a hotel man-
ager, called Mr. Swine:7
Quilty: Mr. Swine, do you mind if I ask you a sort of personal question?
Swine: Sure, go ahead.
Quilty: What is a guy like you doing in a job like this?
Swine: What do you mean?
Quilty: Well, you just don’t seem to be the type.
Swine: [Laughs] Well, as a matter of fact, I was an actor.
Quilty: I knew it, I knew it. [He turns to his female companion] Didn’t I say 
to you? [He turns back to Mr. Swine] When I first saw you, there was 
something about you, a sort of aura that all actors and actresses have.
 6 The counter to this interpretation, however, is to recall that Louden is presently ‘working out 
like a madman’, in order to cut weight; so he would have been acting like this while waiting 
for the elevator no matter what had just happened. Thanks again to Kyle Barrowman here.
 7 The scene from which the following dialogue has been transcribed can be viewed in full here: 
https://youtu.be/SX6vrnz5tJY.
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Swine: Well, since you’re a playwright, uh, maybe you could use me some-
time, hmm?
Quilty: Yeah, maybe I could – use you – sometime. [He laughs to himself but 
then gathers himself] Mr. Swine, what does an actor-manager do with his 
spare time in a small town like this?
Swine: Well, I don’t have much spare time, but...I swim, play tennis, lift 
weights. Gets rid of the excess energy. [He looks at Quilty’s female 
companion and then back at Quilty] What do you do with your excess 
energy?
Quilty: [He looks up at his female companion] Well, we do a lot of things with 
my excess energy. [He looks back at Mr. Swine] I’ll tell you one of the 
things we do a lot of, that’s judo. Did you ever hear about that?
Swine: [Chuckles with a sort of surprise] Judo? Yes, I’ve heard about it. You 
do judo with the lady?
Quilty: Yeah, she’s a yellow belt, I’m a green belt; that’s the way nature made 
it. What happens is she throws me all over the place.
Swine: She throws you all over the place?
Quilty: Yes. What she does, she gets me in a sort of thing called a 
 sweeping-ankle throw. She sweeps my ankles away from under me and 
I go down with one hell of a bang.
Swine: Doesn’t it hurt?
Quilty: Well, I sort of lay there in pain but I love it. I really love it. I lay hov-
ering between consciousness and unconsciousness. It’s really the great-
est. [They both chuckle]
In this scene, we encounter martial arts combat training depicted as both 
 heterosexual and yet somewhat creepy and uncanny – somewhere between vio-
lence and sexuality, somewhere most likely connected with sadomasochism. 
The perversion hinted at here derives from the impropriety, uncanniness, or 
‘un-homeliness’8 of transgressing so many cultural lines and norms at once: The 
publicly-policed borderlines between pleasure and pain, sexuality and violence, 
exercise, competition, health, sadism and masochism – and, moreover, talking 
about it in this ‘double entendre’ manner with a complete stranger, of the same 
sex, quite flirtatiously, while ‘the lady’ is actually present.
As mentioned, wrestling, grappling and ground-fighting already  struggle 
semiotically because they transgress so many visual and spatial norms that police 
male to male proximity and interactions (Downey 2014; Bowman 2017b).9 The 
‘double entendre’ insistence of this uncanny proximity to heterosexual sex, but 
 8 In the original German, Freud’s term ‘uncanny’ is ‘unheimlich’, which can also be translated 
as ‘unhomely’. 
 9 The situation is not helped by the fact that the most popular form of ground-fighting in the 
world today is known as Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu, a name that is reduced to the acronym ‘BJJ’. All of 
this seems to render it as apparently ‘crying out’ to become the butt of sexual innuendo and 
homophobic and misogynistic sleights, affronts and verbal attacks.
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here with a male ‘witness’ (voyeur) present, amplifies and twists (or queers) it 
further.
As such, our first two legitimate examples of dialogue about martial arts in 
non-martial arts films have sexualised it, specifically via discussions of  dealing 
with ‘excess energy’. The travelling taiji practitioner in Vision Quest is gay (and 
predatory). The two men discussing judo training with a woman in Lolita 
seem to revel in the perverse hetero, bi and homosexual innuendos involved 
in  talking about it.
As a side-note (with reference to films that fall within the exclusion zone), 
we can note that it has so far only been in the action films mentioned that 
martial arts are presented as non-sexually exciting and conventionally cool. In 
Lethal Weapon, Riggs is the crazy, suicidal, ‘lethal weapon’ martial artist cop 
and former soldier. In The Matrix, Neo gasps with excitement about suddenly 
knowing kung fu. The crew of The Nebuchadnezzar who watch Neo fight with 
Morpheus show us how to react properly – with amazement and excitement 
and delight at the combatants’ skills. So, the spectrum of value emerging here 
runs from sexual perversion to heteronormative hypermasculinity. Some films 
try to police the border between these realms. Others regularly traverse it.
From Kinky to Kingly to General
Consider Charlie Rogers (Elvis Presley) in Roustabout (1964). Charlie is about 
start his motorcycle to leave when a group of ‘tough guy’ college kids accost 
him, their aim being to ‘get him’:10
Student #1: Is that your ’cycle? [Pronounced ‘sickle’]
Charlie: You ought to stop reading those hot rod magazines, buddy. ’Cycle 
is out. It’s either bike or motorcycle.
Student #2: ‘Made in Japan’, huh?
Charlie: That’s right. Made in Japan.
Student #2: What’s the matter? Aren’t American ’cycles good enough for 
you?
Charlie: You don’t dig world trade, college boy, after all the economics they 
tried to shove into you?
Student #3: Get off, buddy.
Charlie: [Charlie gets off and readies himself for the inevitable attack. Stu-
dents #1 and #3 try to assault him, but he fights them off with deft karate 
blocks and strikes. He then turns his attention to Student #2, the only one 
still standing] Come on! Come on!
 10 The scene from which the following dialogue has been transcribed can be viewed in full here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8K98R2VWHCM
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Student #2: [He begins to back away with his hands up waving Charlie off] 
No, no! That’s karate!
Charlie: That goes with the ’cycle.
Here a young, modern, rebellious, non-traditional, forward-looking Elvis 
 Presley puts paid to the old-thinking ‘college boys’ by using an unexpected and 
culturally new style of fighting from Japan called karate. After two attackers 
have been floored, the third aggressor hesitates. Charlie eggs him on, encourag-
ing him to ‘come on’, but he says, ‘No, no! That’s karate!’ Here, martial arts skill 
is unexpected, superlative, foreign, exotic, educated, novel, problem solving – 
to be feared and avoided. Basically, it is masculinising.
It is precisely this hope, fantasy or promise – as depicted in this scene in 
Roustabout – of attaining a kind of ‘phallic agency’ by way of achieving rela-
tive invincibility that has attracted many to martial arts practice. The desire is 
the desire for potency, agency, confidence, competence, plenitude, and so on. 
Traditionally, this has been called masculine, of course. However, eventually, 
the girls have been allowed to arrive. After two Street Fighter films with Sonny 
Chiba (The Street Fighter [1974] and Return of the Street Fighter [1974]), Sister 
Street Fighter (1974) finally arrived. After three Karate Kid films (The Karate 
Kid [1984], The Karate Kid Part II [1986], The Karate Kid Part III [1989]), The 
Next Karate Kid (1994) was a girl. And so on. Unfortunately, this is not the 
place to engage with gender issues adequately.11 The point is that the skill of 
Elvis in Roustabout exemplifies precisely the kind of hopes that many people 
have about martial arts.
This is certainly what drives the 32-year-old layabout Kip (Aaron Ruell) to 
want to check out the local martial arts club that he has seen advertised on TV 
in Napoleon Dynamite (2004).12 However, in the scene in Napoleon Dynamite 
in which Napoleon (Jon Heder) and his brother Kip go to the ‘Rex Kwon Do’ 
martial arts club in town, we see martial arts and martial artists treated not as 
calm, cool, collected and hypermasculine, nor as sexually predatory or kinky, 
but rather, as bundles of neuroses.
The voice of the sensei, Rex (Diedrich Bader), is gravelly in the extreme. He 
shouts like a drill sergeant. He is arrogant, self-aggrandising and abusive to his 
potential students. And his martial arts demonstration contains a large num-
ber of clichés and classic one-liners. (I am not sure if it was this scene that 
led people to refer to ‘naff ’ martial arts demonstrations as ‘grab my arm dem-
onstrations’. But, certainly, if you were to say to a martial artist that a certain 
 11 Moreover, while this was the Hollywood cinema ‘gender chronology’, in Hong Kong cinema, 
it was reversed, with the girls – specifically, the girl, Chang Pei-pei, from King Hu’s Come Drink 
with Me (1966) and Chang Cheh’s Golden Swallow (1968) – arriving first and then the guys – 
specifically, Chang Cheh’s guys, like Jimmy Wang Yu and David Chiang, before, ultimately, of 
course, the arrival of the guy, Bruce Lee – taking over later. Thanks to Kyle Barrowman for 
making this point.
 12 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hzh9koy7b1E
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demonstration was a ‘grab my arm demonstration’, they would most likely 
understand what you mean. It evokes a kind of old-fashioned, discredited kind 
of  demonstration, involving unrealistic scenarios and ineffective techniques. 
Unfortunately, such demonstrations still abound. They are still being given, 
to this day, and are posted in all seriousness online.) Indeed, the martial arts 
teacher, Rex, is a composite character, made up of stereotypes and clichés that 
abound in the world.
Rex declares that to be a martial artist you must ‘discipline your self-image’. 
Rex himself wears stars and stripes pantaloons. This means that, contrary to 
the orientalist imagery and self-orientalising predilections of many Western 
martial artists, Rex has disciplined his image in a ‘non-traditional’ but cultur-
ally significant way. The gravelly voice and drill sergeant shout are of course 
comedic affectations within the film, but they also importantly smack of the 
military. This is significant because the history of the development of ‘Asian’ 
martial arts in the US is a narrative in which the US military features very 
prominently (Krug 2001). In this context, the stars and stripes clown trousers 
that Rex is so proud to be wearing reinforce the militaristic/patriotic dimen-
sion while adding to it an even more widely ridiculed image: That of the body-
builder. (There was a long-running fashion for bodybuilders in the 1980s and 
1990s to wear incredibly baggy elasticated pantaloons, not too dissimilar to 
those made famous by MC Hammer in the 1990 music video for his hit song 
‘U Can’t Touch This’.)
In these ways, Rex is a composite of images of American drill sergeants, 
1980s Bon Jovi-inspired rock fans, and vain tough guys, all coming together 
in the character of a gaudy insecure jingoistic redneck thug. Rex is a comedy 
caricature that nonetheless points to all the features that went into the making 
of one enduring image of the martial artist in the US.
However, Rex is not the only one to talk about martial arts in Napoleon 
 Dynamite. Nor is his way of talking about them the only way. Rex and his 
 hilarious martial art of Rex Kwon Do could easily draw all of our attention, 
but in actual fact the entirety of Napoleon Dynamite can be read as a film that 
is deeply and thoroughly infused with an awareness of the status of ideas of 
martial arts in American teen culture. At the start of the film, Napoleon tries 
to impress the new kid, Pedro (Efren Ramirez), by telling him that there are 
a lot of gangs in the school and that some of them tried hard to recruit him 
– because he has ‘pretty decent bo-staff skills’. Later on, Napoleon asks Deb 
(Tina Majorino) to collect some items of hers that he has been looking after, 
because, he claims, he can no longer fit his ‘num-chucks’ [sic] in his school 
locker.
Indeed, as we learn from his regular mentions of them, the 16-year-old 
 Napoleon is quite heavily fixated on the Asian martial arts weapons the ‘bo-
staff ’ and ‘num-chucks’ (nunchaku). His elder brother, Kip, however, is more 
taken by the call of the cage: He tells Napoleon early on that he is in training to 
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become a cage fighter, and it is he to asks Napoleon to pull him on his roller-
skates to Rex’s ‘Rex Kwon Do’ club in town.
Both of these fantasy fixations start to wane as the characters become involved 
in real relationships with girls. Kip stops discussing cage fighting when he 
hooks up with his new girlfriend LaFawnduh (Shondrella Avery) and switches 
instead to focusing on cultivating a ‘black’ ghetto sartorial style.  Napoleon 
stops  fretting about bo-staffs and num-chucks when he discovers dancing and 
 especially as his relationship with Deb grows.
In other words, martial arts in Napoleon Dynamite are fantasy resolutions 
to problems. Napoleon tries to impress Pedro and Deb by claiming bo-staff 
and nunchaku skills. But, later on, he laments his lack of them. In a memo-
rable scene, Napoleon sets out his answer to the question of what girls want: 
They want ‘skills’. And he feels he doesn’t have any. Pedro asks what he means 
by skills, and Napoleon answers: ‘Nunchuck skills…bowhunting skills…com-
puter hacking skills…Girls only want  boyfriends who have great skills!’ Kip 
has also given his answer to the same question, having announced early on in 
the film: ‘Napoleon, don’t be jealous ’cause I’ve been chatting online with babes 
all day. Besides, we both know that I’m training to become a cage fighter’. And, 
of course, Rex famously challenges everyone with the belligerent rhetorical 
 question, ‘You think anybody thinks I’m a failure because I go home to Starla 
at night?’ (Starla being an extremely masculine-looking bodybuilder played by 
real-life women’s bodybuilding champion Carmen Brady).
Martial arts in Napoleon Dynamite are refracted through extant cultural 
imagery derived from film and TV: Napoleon is interested in the ‘classic’  martial 
arts filmic idea of being skilled with Japanese weapons (the bo, the nunchaku); 
Kip is taken by the ‘modern’ Western idea of cage fighting; and Rex seems to 
be saturated in imagery derived from the incorporation of Asian martial arts in 
US military training.
The vocal style of Rex is not a world away from that of Gunnery Sergeant Emil 
Foley (Louis Gossett Jr.) in An Officer and a Gentleman (1982), who trains 
the officer cadets in hand to hand combat. Similar, too, is Sensei John Kreese 
(Martin Kove) in The Karate Kid, whose dojo is run like a Marine Corps basic 
 training camp and is adorned with images of Sensei Kreese himself when he 
was actively serving as a Marine.
The Karate Kid is obviously a martial arts film, so we will have to pass over it 
here. However, An Officer and a Gentleman is not. Nor is it an action film. But 
martial arts do feature within it, and there is dialogue about them within the 
film. Therefore, we can give it some attention.
Early on in An Officer and a Gentleman, Zack Mayo (Richard Gere) des-
patches a belligerent aggressor in a scenario not dissimilar to the one Elvis’ 
Charlie found himself in in Roustabout, although without the cocky sass. To 
the contrary, Gere’s Zack has repeatedly told the aggressor ‘I do not want to 
fight you’, and afterwards, despite his friends’ joy, amazement and delight in his 
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victory (‘Did you see that guy’s face!?’) and sympathy (‘He gave you no choice’), 
Zack is angry at himself: ‘There is always a choice!’13
This idea of the trained fighter who wishes to avoid fighting emphasizes, in 
this case, his ‘gentlemanliness’. We could trace this particular construction of 
gentlemanliness genealogically back to the ‘gentlemanly art’ of Bartitsu and the 
jujitsu craze of Victorian Britain, as exemplified by Sherlock Holmes. It can also 
be traced back to various ideologies of pacifism that are often imputed (often 
apocryphally) to ‘oriental’ martial arts – such as Buddhist and Taoist pacifism 
or classic Confucian gentlemanly ideals.
Sherlock Holmes turned out to have ‘some knowledge … of baritsu, or the 
Japanese system of wrestling’. What Conan Doyle rendered as ‘baritsu’ was 
actually called ‘Bartitsu’. It initially appears as a retroactive ‘deus ex machina’ 
in The Return of Sherlock Holmes 1. The Adventure of the Empty House (1903): 
Holmes explains upon his return that he used martial arts to save himself dur-
ing his fight with Moriarty on the Reichenbach Falls (Godfrey 2010). Recent 
film adaptations have made much of Holmes’ martial arts skills, most recently 
in the form of the rather messy gentlemanly thug Holmes as played by Robert 
Downey Jr.
With many gentlemen fighters, what led to the development of their skill was 
an earlier brutalisation. In An Officer and a Gentleman, a flashback shows us 
that the childhood incarnation of Gere’s Zack was beaten up by a gang of local 
kickboxing kids in a crowded Asian city back street. Hence, we learn his need to 
develop his own kickboxing skills. They derive from what Sylvia Chong would 
discuss in terms of ‘the oriental obscene’ infusing and in part constituting the 
Western gentlemanly identity (Chong 2012).
Full Metal Jacket (1987) gives us a different creation scenario. Two Marines 
relaxing in town, photographing a prostitute who is trying to solicit them, 
have their camera snatched by a Vietnamese thief, who, in a parting display of 
adrenaline fuelled anger and triumph, turns and performs kicks, finger jabs and 
strikes in their direction before escaping on a motorbike. One Marine turns to 
the other and says, ‘Wow, did you see the moves on that guy?’14
It is easy to see why the West fell in love with Eastern martial arts: The ‘moves’ 
can be spectacular. However, it is not compulsory to fall in love with or in thrall 
to them – nor with the ‘moves’ of the other guy. For instance, when the Houston 
team are preparing for a daunting match in Tokyo against a Japanese team in 
Rollerball (1975), the management brings in someone to explain that the Japa-
nese players will be using martial arts techniques from karate and (somewhat 
surprisingly, the Korean art of) hapkido. The reason for the lesson is because 
‘forewarned is forearmed’. But the team is cynical. Why should they care about 
Japanese martial arts when they all already know the ‘good ol’ Houston fist in 
 13 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5er6ufig0uo
 14 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hch3HL8gPTk
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the face technique’?15 Indeed, in Rollerball, the martial moves of the other are 
rejected, in favour of sticking with the simplicity and homeliness of the pugilis-
tic approach that they already practice.
Fighting Talk
Perhaps the rejection of the oriental other that we see in Rollerball is something 
of an exception. Certainly, in many other films, the oriental otherness of mar-
tial arts is fetishized, idealised, and desired. Indeed, even when they haven’t 
actually trained in it at all, some people realise that simply talking about martial 
arts and claiming to ‘know’ them can constitute a viable form of self-defence. 
Eddie Murphy’s Billy Ray Valentine exemplifies this in Trading Places (1983), in 
a comic scene in a prison cell.16
In this scene, Billy claims to have fought dozens of police officers who 
attempted to arrest him the night before. When questioned about why he 
appeared to be crying when brought into the cell, he claims the police had 
used tear gas (a substance normally reserved for riot situations) to subdue 
him. Throughout this scene, what Murphy’s character invests in are the ways 
in which martial arts both look cool and might make you seem scary and off-
putting to any potential aggressor. The verbal claims to be able to ‘do’ martial 
arts might both carry some cultural capital and therefore act as a deterrent.
We see the other side of this logic in an early scene in The Wanderers (1979). 
Again, it is a new kid’s first day at school (Perry, played by Tony Gianos). Joey 
(John Friedrich) is introducing the new ‘kid’ (his new found 19-year-old 
friend-cum-protector) to the gang culture of his school and neighbourhood. 
Walking along packed school corridors, Joey points to different groups and 
reels off their names and ethnic characteristics. Irish gangs, black gangs, Italian 
gangs, etc. Then Joey points out The Wongs. Excitedly, Joey describes them like 
this: ‘27 guys all with the last name Wong, all black belts in jujitsu who could 
kill you with one judo chop!’17
I have known this film and this line for most of my life. For many years, I 
thought little of it, other than what it is on one literal level designed to make 
the impressionable viewer think: The Wongs are a cool-looking and formida-
bly tough gang of Asian martial artists. Of course, because of scenes like this, 
which treat ethnic difference less than ‘politically correctly’, The Wanderers is 
now held up in various online charts and YouTube analyses as an example of 
‘Hollywood racism’. And, of course, Joey is ethnically profiling the gangs. But 
the gangs are ethnically organised. Indeed, within this framework the Wongs 
are fulfilling their ethnic stereotype destiny – by being Asians who are martial 
 15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WUSCpZMbPnQ
 16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4WMErc1n6Ks
 17 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GzPeYdeG2co
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artists. It needs to be noted that racial tension is part of the dramatic tension, 
story arc and symbolic order of this film. So, denouncing the film’s supposed 
‘racism’ is less interesting than thinking about the matter of Joey’s palpable 
excitement at the idea of them all being ‘black belts’ who ‘could kill you’ with 
one technique.
It was only when racking my brains for filmic examples for this study that 
I realised that I would be able to make a pedantic aficionado point about the 
differences between jujitsu and judo, and hence say something about Joey’s 
ignorance. And it was only then that I thought, hang on: Wong? Jujitsu? Judo? 
The name Wong is Chinese, not Japanese. Jujitsu and judo are Japanese. What 
is going on here? I confess, to try to learn more, I had to turn to the visuals, 
not the dialogue, to try to clarify the ethnic situation here – in particular, by 
turning to the final fight of the film – the huge gang fight on the football field. 
And, to my eyes, it looks like the Wongs are practicing a Chinese martial art, 
rather than anything Japanese (although I cannot be sure). Of course, now I 
could be accused of ethnic stereotyping. But I think it is more interesting to 
think about the ways in which the film – in the form of Joey – cares not a jot 
about the actual specificities of whether the Wongs and their martial arts are 
Chinese or Japanese. Indeed, even if the disjunction between the family name 
and the ethnic attributions are a knowing joke on the part of the filmmakers, 
the only thing that the film cares about is the fact that true martial arts skill in 
a teen-world context makes the martial artists seem fearsome and cool to their 
non-martial artist peers.
But the martial arts experts who are held in awe are othered. They are pre-
sented as readymade and complete. We may ask about the aspirant martial 
artist, the subject who desires to become an expert. Films often seem to face 
a problem when it comes to the matter of a character aspiring to become fear-
some and cool themselves, via self-cultivation and training. In fact, it seems 
that, unless this occurs within a martial arts film and is depicted via large doses 
of training montages, the desire to become a martial artist seems always on 
the verge of becoming ridiculous. One can ‘be’ an adept fighter. One can ‘be’ a 
martial artist. But if there is desire and training and aspiring, it seems that this 
is most easily depicted as comic, eccentric, perverse, and weird.
Of course, some non-martial arts films do occasionally associate martial arts 
training with higher cultural values. At the end of Once Were Warriors (1994), 
for instance, the central characters – a mother and two brothers (Beth [Rena 
Owen], Nig [Julian Arahanga], and Boogie [Taungaroa Emile]) – come together 
as a family. The film is set in a poverty ravaged Maori community, and all kinds 
of violence have been horrifically and relentlessly present throughout. The older 
brother, Nig, has embraced a close-knit gang community and is  covered in 
Maori tattoos. By contrast, by the end of the film, the younger brother, Boogie, 
has found a kind of salvation in traditional Maori martial arts training. In an 
affectionate scene, the older of the brothers asks the younger whether he’d like 
some similar tattoos. ‘No thanks’, says the boy, ‘my tattoos are on the inside’.
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However, even ‘higher’ cultural values can easily be mocked – especially if 
there is any kind of ethnic, racial or cultural cross-dressing involved ( Bowman 
2010b). If the last vestiges of all-but-lost Maori arts are presented as a symbol of 
a tiny glimmer of hope for the ravaged community in Once Were  Warriors, any 
kind of cross-ethnic cultural performance of another culture’s art is always going 
to raise eyebrows and questions. Hence, Gaylord Focker’s (Ben Stiller) father, 
Bernie, played by Dustin Hoffman, in Meet the Fockers (2004),  practices capoeira. 
Capoeira is an afro-Brazilian martial art that has a great deal of  cultural and 
political significance as a postcolonial practice, and its  practitioners and the 
academics who study it invest heavily in its cultural significance (Griffith 2016). 
But, in Meet the Fockers, capoeira is reduced to the term ‘dance fighting’.18 It is 
not ‘proper fighting’, it is ‘dance fighting’. The white man who invests in it is 
obviously a certain ‘type’. What kind of type? As I have argued about this before, 
in the words of the 1998 Offspring song ‘Pretty Fly For a White Guy’, the white 
cultural cross-dresser or cross-performer is always going to be regarded as a 
‘wannabe’ (Bowman 2010b).
The ‘wannabe’ is neither one thing nor another, neither this nor that, neither 
here nor there. The wannabe wants (to be) something they are not. Sometimes, 
the desired thing itself is impossible (invincibility, for example). Other times, 
the wannabe cannot be, attain or obtain what they desire because doing so is 
impossible (changing ethnicities, for example). Such a person is going to find 
themselves scorned, spurned, ridiculed, reviled, or at best pitied.
Conclusion
This work has set (and transgressed) some artificial/schematic parameters in 
order to focus on the margins of martial arts discourse and to see what might be 
gleaned about the discursive status of martial arts. Drawing the line in such an 
unusual place required us to give some attention to an area of martial arts margi-
nalia that might otherwise remain ignored, with all of the attention of martial arts 
studies (or cultural studies of martial arts) going to ‘proper’ contexts of martial 
arts, such as the visual realm of fight choreography or the discursive construction 
of martial arts in ‘proper’ martial arts films. Obviously, these are important areas 
of enquiry. But this chapter imposed a principled exclusion of all things ‘proper’ 
and ‘obvious’ (and inevitably failed to maintain the border: In setting it, we trans-
gressed it, and in setting out what we would not talk about we regularly had to 
engage with what we said we weren’t going to). In doing so, the films we were able 
to examine suggested that outside of martial arts discourse proper, martial arts 
have multiple potential significations, and diverse potential values.
Because of the attempt to exclude visual representation and prioritise verbal 
representation, not many films could be found that fitted the bill comfortably. 
 18 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=srV41k0NWgo
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There seem to be very few non-action films that discuss martial arts. This is so 
even though visual representations of martial arts abound. Nonetheless, what 
this unconventional foray into the margins of martial arts discourse in film sug-
gests is that discussions of martial arts in non-martial art films tend to relate to 
fantasies and desires in relation to identities that originate or proliferate in the 
face of feelings of insecurity, at transitional times, and in transitional contexts. 
In Lacanian terms, they emerge and circulate as (if) answering a lack or a need.
This explains why those who are believed to ‘have it’ or ‘be it’ can be revered 
as ‘real men’. Conversely, those who are seen to be striving or fantasising about 
becoming ‘it’ or getting ‘it’ can so easily be regarded as lacking, as wanting, as 
losers. As Kaja Silverman argued of the Lacanian understanding of subjectivity: 
Identity, fantasy and desire are so complexly intertwined and imbricated that, 
in Lacanian terms, one cannot really discuss one of these dimensions without 
discussing the others (Silverman 1983, 6). The fact that non-psychoanalytic 
discourses do discuss identity without discussing fantasy and desire helps to 
put things like martial arts practice in such an odd position. Taiji and judo are 
both ‘not meant’ to be sexual, and yet can so easily be depicted as uncannily, 
almost, or also so. This internet meme from many years ago encapsulates if not 
the full constellation of possibilities then at least some key parallax views:
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There are more potential reasons why, discursively or culturally, martial 
arts inevitably lie between a rock and a hard place – neither this nor that, 
both this and that. For instance, they are peculiar structured responses that 
seek to ‘manage’ the problem of physical violence in its own terms. However, 
physical interpersonal violence is itself of a peculiar status: Physical violent 
responses to the threat or reality of physical violence are rarely regarded as 
the best or most intelligent possible responses. They are most easily regarded 
as aberrant responses to aberrant situations. After all, fighting is what chil-
dren do, what parents enjoin them to grow out of. Attacking others in day to 
day life is rarely regarded as a mature or balanced thing, even if others attack 
or threaten to attack you. In (most) ‘civilised societies’, the state has accrued 
(almost) all of the rights to the legitimate dispensation and management of 
violence. Adults should not ‘normally’ settle differences with a fist fight. To 
some, such actions signal being ‘more’ than an average person; to others, it 
signals being ‘less’, or abnormal.
Martial arts thrive in liminal spaces, spaces of becoming: Becoming adult, 
becoming competent, capable, ‘strong’, and so on. Perhaps ‘most properly’, 
martial arts are ‘transitional objects’ in the psychoanalytic sense, or ‘vanishing 
mediators’ in Fredric Jameson’s sense of something that enables a new situation 
to emerge (whether that be adulthood or heteronormative partnering), that 
must recede and be forgotten once the new condition has been reached. As 
both one of Wittgenstein’s and one of Buddhism’s aphorisms puts it in different 
ways: Once you’ve used the tool to do the job, you don’t lug it along with you; 
you just put it down and move on.
But martial artists don’t move on. To this extent, they fail to become 
‘ normal’, or at least defer it. Unless they turn into Rex, this could become 
socially  acceptable. However, unless martial arts training happens in child-
hood, at the start of the process, the aspirant, desiring martial artist can appear 
ridiculous – whether ‘funny peculiar’ or ‘funny ha-ha’. This is because martial 
arts involve effort, process and ‘becoming’: They have a kind of originary lack 
inscribed in their heart. The very desire to do martial arts, and practicing 
martial arts with the aim of becoming different, more, better, other, etc., sig-
nals the presence and workings of lack, desire, insecurity, and incompletion. 
Children can play at martial arts and become more competent. Adults are 
meant to be complete. The adult who desires martial arts mastery too late in 
life diverges from the norm.
Martial arts signal liminality, they involve crossing multiple borders at once, 
the desire to become unproblematically powerful (Elvis’ Charlie) or to have 
hidden depths and untold skills (Richard Gere’s Zack), but the entire dis-
course is haunted by the risk of remaining in the realms of murky conscious 
or unconscious desires and unclear investments, like those of the predatory 
Kevin, the insecure Rex, Napoleon and Kip, or the uncannily creepy Quilty. 
One suspects that such eccentric and idiosyncratic – tragicomic, laughable, 
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weird – characters offer us more insight into what it is to try to become or be 
something than do the alpha males on screen who perform the supposed ideal 
and construct the supposed norm. But maybe, ‘really’, people are ‘really’ a lot 
less like Elvis’ Charlie or Richard Gere’s Zack Mayo, and considerably more like 
Napoleon Dynamite or Eddie Murphy’s Billy Ray Valentine: All talk.
Conclusion: Drawing the Line
This work began by posing the question of what the essence of martial arts 
might be. It has deconstructed this question and this matter in a variety of 
ways in a journey around some of the regions associated with martial arts. 
This has neither been a journey to the heart of the matter (as ‘heart’ in this 
sense would be a synonym of centre or essence) nor a cartographic journey 
around a  circumference (as this would involve the circumnavigation of a stable 
 territory). If such a journey were possible, then the essence of martial arts could 
be defined.
Approaching martial arts as a complex, contingent and variable range 
of discursive constructs in this way can suggest one of at least two possible 
 relationships to the question of ‘definition’ with which we began, and which 
has returned in various ways throughout this book. One relation involves 
 accepting the variability of the construct and defining the object, phenomenon 
or field of practice anyway. Another relation involves accepting the  variability 
of the  construct and declining, on that basis, to offer any firm definition, while 
nonetheless tacitly accepting that martial arts exist, at least as ideas and notions 
within various discursive and cultural contexts. Both relations have their 
 benefits and drawbacks, as we have seen.
I have argued for the latter. One symptom of this choice may be said to have 
taken the form of my repeated assertion that martial arts studies researchers 
ought to move on from the question of defining martial arts in one breath before 
I have myself returned again and again to the topic in the next. However, my 
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fixation on encouraging researchers and writers to get ‘past’ a certain  fixation 
on defining exists because I believe there are more negative consequences to 
the fixation on definition than there are positives. Consequently, once more, it 
seems important to reiterate here the argument about why it is that the question 
of ‘how to define martial arts’ is not only a pseudo-problem but also regressive 
and even potentially damaging for martial arts studies.
Consider it this way. The question of definition (in martial arts studies and 
elsewhere) involves asking and exploring the question of where to draw the line. 
When we ask ‘What is or are martial arts?’, we are asking a specifically focused 
version of ‘Where do we draw the line?’ Once asked, the question ‘What is or 
are martial arts?’ will become a matter that discussion and debate will become 
stuck on, or stuck in. This is because there is no universally  clinching and 
uncontestably definitive answer.
While there may be no obviously negative intellectual or even ethical or 
 political consequences associated with arguing about definitions, there are 
some less obvious ones. As such, in order to avoid this quicksand, in what 
 follows, I want to walk around the trap, reflecting less on ‘Where do we draw 
the line?’ and more on ‘Why draw the line?’ and, indeed, ‘How – or in what 
ways – should anyone draw the line?’
To do this requires reflection on what the act of defining or drawing a line 
in the first place is or does. Posed directly: What is the line, anyway? What 
is a definition? What is the need that is being engaged? While there is a very 
large amount that could be said in response to such questions, in relation to the 
 definition of martial arts, the line that people believe needs to be drawn is a line 
between ‘martial arts’ (on one side – the inside) and ‘not martial arts’ (on the 
other side – outside). The line, the definition, is the border between an inside 
and an outside. On one side of the line (on the inside), there will be martial arts 
(proper). On the other side of the line is the outside, which is everything else, 
and which is not proper to martial arts. This is one way to depict the ideal, tidy, 
well-defined situation: On one side of the line, the inside, the proper object of 
martial arts studies; on the other side of the line, the outside, all the stuff that is 
not the object of martial arts studies.
This may seem simple. But it is not. As this book has sought to illustrate in 
various ways, it does not take too much time to realise that ‘martial arts’ cannot 
actually be disentangled, disambiguated or extricated from many of the things 
that any definition will try to say is not proper to them. Any such definition will 
not merely be an abstraction, it will also be a reduction and indeed therefore 
a fiction. It will share many of the features of a representation of something 
that does not actually exist anywhere. Rather than this, in the cultural world of 
 martial arts practice and discourse, there are always supplements, images, ideas, 
practices, products, fantasies, realia, phantasmagoria, simulacra,  prosthesis, 
grafts, add-ons, extras, and ‘related’, that cannot and will not be removed.
A dawning realisation of this ineradicable proliferation and constitutive 
 multiplicity accounts for why people often attempt to escape from the trap by 
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moving from the singular to the plural. People can often realise that there is no 
simple unity, but they nonetheless still want to erect a definition. Because of 
this, realising that the category ‘martial arts’ is constitutively imprecise,  scholars 
try to return us to precision by adding categories. Accordingly, we get more 
 categories, we get refinements and differentiations: Martial arts and/or com-
bat sports, self-defence, military combat training, combatives, weapons-based 
combat systems, religious practices, cultural traditions, calisthenics taught in 
schools, traditional, non-traditional, deracinated, de- and re-territorialized 
practices, and so on and so forth. This produces ideas of entities that are called 
hybrids, and so on. However, each addition, seeking to introduce a level of 
clarity and precision, nonetheless inexorably introduces even more grey area, 
imprecision and further grounds for disagreement.
This occurs because the perceived need to introduce more and more terms 
and concepts in order to try to clarify things is a paradoxical drive that comes 
in response to a fundamental lack of precision and clarity. This can never 
fully be eradicated by trying to mop it up by throwing more categories at it. 
The  addition of ever more categories, gradations and combinations does not 
 actually produce clarity or reduce unclarity. Rather, it principally produces 
metalanguages and ever more intricate language games.
Metalanguages and language games are not somehow simply or necessarily 
universally true. They are themselves locally-produced cauldrons of termino-
logical soup. When they sound scientific, they may be impressive. But they are, 
at root, just variable attempts to solve the problem of how to conceptualise and 
communicate with clarity and precision. But because there is no necessary rela-
tion between a field and its demarcation, a practice and its  conceptualisation, 
nor indeed between one discourse and another, ‘clarity and precision’ only 
exist within a community of language game players. Stated differently, how 
those steeped in anthropological approaches may have long been inclined to 
 conceptualise and demarcate ‘martial arts’ may differ hugely from how those 
working in sociology, cultural studies, philosophy, religious studies, dance or 
theatre studies may each have done so. Each approach involves a language 
game, the production of a metalanguage, and each of these is almost certainly 
going to differ from others.
This is a situation of proliferation, despite all attempts to pin down and wrap 
up. Producing proliferation, producing more, is what academic (and other) 
 discourses do. They do not simply strip away and reveal bare or naked essentials. 
They construct and fabricate lenses through which to see differently. They 
produce alternatives. They challenge each other. They generate more.
In the field of martial arts studies, discussions often circulate around  different 
conceptualisations of the object ‘martial arts’. It is clear that different  people 
draw the line around their conceptualisation of their object of attention 
 differently. It is my hope that over time it should become more and more clear 
that the definitional act of drawing a line is inherently problematic. Which is 
not to say that it is not going to be done. Everyone needs to find ways to be able 
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to refer, or to say ‘I am talking about this, and not that’. Every academic study 
needs to draw the line between the inside (what it is about) and the outside 
(what it is not, cannot or will not be about or even look at). As I regularly say to 
my PhD students, there are two questions that every examiner will ask you in 
one way or another. First, why did you draw the line here and not there? And 
second, why did you approach it in this way and not another?
Both of these questions must be answered. You need to know that you could 
have drawn your line elsewhere and differently, and that this would inevitably 
have changed things. You also need to know that you could have approached it 
differently, and that this would have produced very different kinds of insight, 
perspective, result, outcome or conclusion. In other words, what academic 
works need more than some inevitably failed definition is a critical reflection 
on the necessary act of drawing a line – any and every ‘I am talking about this 
(and not that) in this way (and not another way)’. Indeed, doing so enables us 
to see that there are more important matters than where to draw the line. These 
involve thinking about how and why a line has been drawn.
In conversation with a colleague who works in performance studies, for 
instance, my colleague voiced reluctance to work under the heading of ‘ martial 
arts studies’ at all. This is because the act of drawing a line around such 
 practices seemed not only somewhat arbitrary, stifling and artificial, in terms 
of his own interests, but also ethically problematic. As someone interested in 
performance, he asked why he would separate martial arts from other kinds 
of physical  practice. And anyway, how and why could or would anyone really 
draw  convincing lines between martial arts practices and dance or theatre or 
ritual or religion, or indeed athletics, somatics, or therapeutics, and so on?
On thinking about this, I became inclined to expand the problem further and 
wider. Maybe my colleague is actually still too limited – too steeped in  thinking 
about embodied practices. For, what about media and technology? Can we 
separate martial arts, or the study thereof, from practices and studies of film, 
drama, gaming, literature, or heritage? What about philosophy?
Nonetheless, the ethical dimension of my colleague’s reluctance seemed 
 particularly thought-provoking. What does it mean to cast a net that only looks 
for and at martial, combative, fighting, defensive or offensive practices? What 
does it mean to insist on identifying all of the practices out there that seem 
to fit the bill in terms of their ‘martial’ dimensions? Is this not in and of itself 
a violent contortion, and a bending of the world to the will or the mind’s eye 
of the observer? Maybe my escrima practice seems fairly obviously martially 
orientated. But what about my taiji practice? Just because I search in my taiji 
practice for combative dimensions and applications, must I insist on reducing 
taiji to this dimension for everyone, and enshrining it in academic discourse in 
this particular contingent and motivated way?
Inventing and chopping up the conceptual spectrum in such a way as to  enable 
the claim that ‘martial arts’ is an obvious and necessary field, fit for an academic 
discipline to congregate around it, may actually seem like a fairly  contorted and 
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contorting act, when viewed from a broader perspective.  Privileging ‘martial’ 
over ‘art’ may also amount to doing a kind of violence to the very objects that 
fall within its purview.
How can any such tendentious act be justified? Should perhaps martial 
arts studies really always be understood as a subset of other fields, such as 
 performance studies, for instance? The answer could be yes. As long as it can 
also be agreed that it should also be a subset of religious studies, and a subset 
of film studies, as well as a subset of subcultural studies, ethnic studies, area 
studies, sports studies, history, and so on. The point is that none of these  subsets 
exist on a fixed or immutable map. There is no Venn diagram or flow chart 
that could adequately depict some real or permanent relation of inclusivity or 
exclusivity. There is no essential or necessary ‘proper place’ for this or any other 
field. Its ‘proper place’ is always a consequence not of fit but of performative 
elaboration. This is because ‘martial arts’, like anything else (‘literature’, ‘religion’, 
‘science’) is a contingent discursive establishment (a construct) rather than an 
essential referential category (a datum).
To evoke a Kantian distinction, ‘martial arts’ is synthetic rather than  analytic. 
It is not an object proper to scientific study, and nor does it need to be. The study 
of something like this is not really scientific because – to borrow an insight that 
D.N. Rodowick once made about ‘film studies’ – it is something we simply know 
about, that we experience in different ways at different times and in different 
places, something that changes, that changes us, that we can change, and so 
on (Rodowick 2007; see also Rodowick 2014). We can’t really ‘do’  martial arts 
 studies exhaustively or thoroughly, as if it were some kind of science. It doesn’t 
lend itself to that kind of treatment at all. Rather, it presents itself as a range 
of phenomena for reflection, philosophy, theory, rumination. Martial arts, 
however conceived or however instantiated, seem or seems to beg questions – 
questions about ‘what it is’ and about ‘other things’: Life, value, health, gender, 
nation, strength, honour, fun, commerce, ethnicity, culture, identity, and more.
To choose martial arts studies as a category – to attempt to institute it as a 
field – is to accept or at least trade in an inheritance. We have the term ‘martial 
arts’. It is a discursive category, even if it is not properly referential, indeed even 
if it is barely able to evoke its own content. Nonetheless, history has given it 
to us. People are likely to ‘kind of just know’ what you mean when you say it, 
even if their understandings are hugely different, even utterly  incompatible, 
and even though any attempt to specify the content of the field cannot but pro-
duce contradictory objects and practices. This is the most ‘obvious’  reason I 
avoided the so-called problem of definition for so long: Because one ‘ obviously’ 
need not define because ‘obviously’, ‘in the real world’, definition is a pseudo- 
problem – the effect of a certain orientation in the face of what it means to 
study or do academic work.
Of course, one always has to negotiate competing injunctions. Definitions 
and categories do emerge. But they often fall down when pressed or pushed. 
Such definitions need to be pressed or pushed and pulled, because they can 
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come to seem stifling. And they can come to be stifling – because of the effects 
that they can have on our orientations.
This is why I argue that, in martial arts studies as elsewhere, the  question 
should not simply be ‘Where do you draw the line?’ Rather, the equally – 
 perhaps more – important questions that we should engage with are ‘Why 
draw a line?’ and indeed ‘How can we let ourselves try to draw a line?’ If one 
feels compelled to draw a line around a field or object, and to map it out in a 
 certain way, this is a compulsion one might expect to be matched with an equal 
 compulsion when it comes to policing the territory that has been marked out. 
In other words, those scholars who seem merely to be exercising an honest and 
innocent drive to speak clearly and precisely and to define coherently may yet 
turn out to be the most diligent border guards, hostile to any non-legitimate 
travellers.
The postcolonial critic Gayatri Spivak once argued that making any distinc-
tion, making any discrimination, specifying, erecting or using any conceptual 
categories, is irreducibly and inescapably political in some sense. This is because 
producing differentials erects binaries, and binaries are inevitably hierarchical. 
The inside is the proper, the outside is the improper, the other. The question 
thus becomes: How hospitable are we to be to difference that presents itself as 
impropriety, as alterity? How is difference to be treated? This is both the ethico-
political and conceptual-orientation problem of all disciplinary discourse. For 
martial arts studies, it suggests that what needs to be asked is: How do we define 
the hospitality of martial arts studies to that which requests admittance but 
seems improper? How do we invent both martial arts and martial arts studies 
in our discourse? Engaging such important questions relies on deconstruction – 
the deconstruction both of martial arts and of martial arts studies.
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What is the essence of martial arts? What 
is their place in or relationship with 
culture and society? 
Deconstructing Martial Arts analyses 
familiar issues and debates that arise 
in scholarly, practitioner and popular 
cultural discussions and treatments of 
martial arts and argues that martial arts 
are dynamic and variable constructs 
whose meanings and values regularly 
shift, mutate and transform, depending 
on the context. 
It argues that deconstructing martial 
arts is an invaluable approach to both 
the scholarly study of martial arts in 
culture and society and also to wider 
understandings of what and why martial 
arts are. Placing martial arts in relation to 
core questions and concerns of media and 
cultural studies around identity, value, 
orientalism, and embodiment, 
Deconstructing Martial Arts introduces 
and elaborates deconstruction as a 
rewarding method of cultural studies.
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